1 PROTECTION VISAS

THE STATUTORY CONTEXT

The Australian Constitution gives the Commonwealth Parliament power to make laws with respect to ‘naturalisation and aliens’. Pursuant to this power, the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act), together with the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations), regulates the entry into, and presence in, Australia of aliens, or non-citizens.

1 The Constitution, s.51(xix). Section 51 of the Constitution enumerates the matters with respect to which the Commonwealth Parliament may make laws ‘for the peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth’. The long title of the Act describes it as ‘an Act relating to the entry into, and presence in, Australia of aliens, and the departure or deportation from Australia of aliens and certain other persons’. Its object, as set out in s.4(1), is ‘to regulate, in the national interest, the coming into, and presence in, Australia of non-citizens’. A majority of the High Court has held that ‘non-citizens’ are ‘aliens’ for the purposes of s.51(xix) of the Constitution: Shaw v MIMA (2003) 218 CLR 28.
Under s.29 of the Act, the Minister may grant a non-citizen permission, known as a visa, to either travel to and enter Australia or remain in Australia. Section 30 of the Act provides that visas to remain in Australia may be permanent or temporary. A permanent visa allows the recipient to remain in Australia indefinitely. A temporary visa allows the recipient to remain in Australia for a specified period, until a specified event occurs, or while the holder has a specified status.

Section 31(1) of the Act provides that there are to be prescribed classes of visas. These are set out in Schedule 1 to the Regulations. In addition, there are visa classes provided for in the Act, including protection visas.

Section 31(3) of the Act provides that the Regulations may prescribe criteria for the grant of the various classes of visa. These criteria are set out in Schedule 2 to the Regulations, and are additional to those provided for in the Act (including relevantly, s.36). Some criteria are common to a range of visa classes, for instance criteria relating to health, public interest and national interest. Other criteria are specific to particular visa classes.

Section 45 of the Act provides that subject to the Act and Regulations, a non-citizen who wants a visa must apply for a visa of a particular class. The requirements for a valid visa application are provided for in s.46 of the Act and r.2.07 of the Regulations, and set out in Schedule 1 to the Regulations. The Minister, and the Tribunal on review, can only consider a valid visa application.

If, after considering a valid visa application, the Minister is satisfied that the criteria for the visa and certain other matters are satisfied, the Minister is required to grant the visa; if not, the visa must be refused. There are also provisions in the Act concerning the number of visas of specified classes that may be granted in each financial year.

**THE PROTECTION VISA SCHEME**

Section 35A of the Act establishes the classes of visas known as protection visas, which include permanent protection visas, temporary protection visas and safe haven enterprise...
visas. Part 4 of Schedule 1 to the Regulations - ‘Protection, Refugee and Humanitarian visas’ - prescribes three classes of protection visa – Protection Class XA, Temporary Protection Class XD and Safe Haven Enterprise Class XE. Each of these visas currently contain one subclass each: 866 (Protection), 785 (Temporary Protection) and 790 (Safe Haven Enterprise) respectively.

The temporary protection regime prevents certain people from being eligible to apply for, or being granted, a permanent protection visa, including those who are ‘unauthorised maritime arrivals’, or otherwise arrive in Australia without a visa, or are not immigration cleared on their last arrival in Australia, or already hold a temporary protection visa. Such persons may, however, apply for a safe haven enterprise visa. While also a temporary visa, the safe haven enterprise visa provides a ‘pathway’ to obtaining eventual permanent residency.

The protection visa is, in part, a mechanism by which Australia provides protection from situations which engage its non-refoulement obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (‘Refugees Convention’) and 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (‘Protocol’) as well as under other international treaties, namely, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’), the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty (‘Second Optional Protocol’), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (‘CROC’) and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (‘CAT’).

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11 Section 31 of the Act provides that there are to be prescribed classes of visas, as well as the classes provided for in sections of the Act, including s.35A(2), (3) and (3A). The definition of protection visa in s.5(1) provides that ‘protection visa’ has the meaning given in s.35A. Before this time, protection visas were established in s.36(1) and by operation of s.35A(5), such classes continue to be a class of protection visas.

12 Schedule 1, Part 4, Items 1401, 1403 and 1404. The Refugee and Humanitarian Class XA visa in Item 1402 is not a ‘protection visa’ as defined. The Class XA Subclass 866 visa is a permanent visa which permits the holder to remain in Australia indefinitely and to travel to and enter Australia for a period of 5 years from the date of grant: cl.866.511. The Class XD Subclass 785 visa is a temporary visa, permitting the holder to remain in Australia for a period of 3 years (or longer pending the determination of a subsequent visa application): cl.785.511. The Class XE Subclass 790 visa is a temporary visa, permitting the holder to remain in Australia for a period of 5 years (or longer pending the determination of a subsequent visa application): cl.790.511. The purpose of the Subclass 790 visa is to provide protection and to encourage enterprise through earning and learning while strengthening regional Australia: s.35(3B).

13 Schedule 1, Part 4, item 1401(3)(d). A child born in Australia, to a parent who did not hold a visa but held one upon their last entry to Australia, is not prevented from applying for a Protection (Class XA) visa: Schedule 1, Part 4, item 1401(3A) as inserted by the Migration Legislation Amendment (2017 Measures No.1) Regulations 2017 (F2017L00437). See s.46A(1A) and r.2.06AAB which provide circumstances in which a holder or former holder of a safe haven enterprise visa may validly make an application for certain prescribed visas.


16 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) (‘ICCPR’).


19 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85 (entered into force 26 June 1987) (‘CAT’).

20 Explanatory Memorandum, Migration Amendment (Complementary Protection) Bill 2011 at 1.
Australia acceded to the Refugees Convention in 1954 and the Protocol in 1973, thereby undertaking to apply their substantive provisions. However, those provisions do not form part of Australian law unless and to the extent that they have been validly incorporated into municipal law by statute.\(^2\) For protection visa applications made prior to 16 December 2014, s.36(2)(a) of the Act effectively draws into municipal law the Convention definition of ‘refugee’ contained in Article 1. However, for applications made on or after that date, the Act does not refer to the Convention, but instead defines ‘refugee’ for the purpose of s.36(2)(a), drawing on concepts from the Convention definition.\(^3\) Despite this ‘de-linking’ of protection visas from the Convention, the protection visa remains the principal mechanism by which Australia offers protection to persons who are ‘refugees’.\(^4\)

Similarly, Australia ratified the ICCPR in 1980,\(^5\) the Second Optional Protocol in 1990,\(^6\) the CAT in 1989\(^7\) and the CROC in 1990.\(^8\) Like the Refugees Convention, these instruments have not been formally incorporated into Australia’s migration legislation. The ICCPR is referenced in the Migration Act in relation to ‘significant harm’ for the purposes of the complementary protection criterion, but generally speaking, its provisions have not been drawn into the Act. Section 36(2)(aa) is designed to establish ‘complementary’ grounds for protection for persons who are not ‘refugees’ under the Refugees Convention and Protocol but nevertheless are at risk of the most serious forms of human rights abuses.\(^9\) Whilst it may assist Australia in discharging its non-refoulement obligations under the ICCPR and the other instruments listed above, it does not serve to directly import those obligations into the Migration Act. The focus therefore is on the requirements of the migration legislation.

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\(^5\) MEIA v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273 per Mason CJ and Deane J at 286-7, Gaudron J at 304 agreeing, Toohey J at 298, 301. See also NAGV and NAGW of 2002 v MIMIA (2005) 222 CLR 161 at [34]-[35].

\(^6\) The Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Caseload Legacy) Act 2014 (No. 135 of 2014) amended s.36(2)(a) of the Act to remove reference to the Refugees Convention and instead refer to Australia having protection obligations in respect of a person because they are a ‘refugee’. ‘Refugee’ is defined in ss.5H, with related definitions and qualifications in ss.5(1) and 5J-5LA. These amendments commenced on 18 April 2015 and apply to protection visa applications made on or after 16 December 2014; table items 14 and 22 of s.2 and item 28 of Schedule 5 to the Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Commencement Proclamation dated 16 April 2015 (FRLI F2015L00543).

\(^7\) See Explanatory Memorandum, Migration Reform Bill 1992 at [26] and also SAAP v MIMIA (2005) 228 CLR 294 per Kirby J at [143].


\(^9\) 2 October 1990.


\(^12\) Explanatory Memorandum, Migration Amendment (Complementary Protection) Bill 2011 at 1.
Requirements for a valid protection visa application

There are a number of statutory ‘bars’ that prevent a person from making a valid protection visa application, including those in s.46A (unauthorised maritime arrival) and s.46B (transitory person), s.48A (non-citizen has been refused a protection visa while in the migration zone), s.91E (Comprehensive Plan of Action and safe third countries), s.91K (temporary safe haven visa), and s.91P (non-citizens with access to protection from third countries). Non-citizens to whom those provisions apply are unable to apply for a protection visa.

For persons who can make a valid protection visa application, there are additional requirements for a valid application set out in Schedule 1 to the Regulations, including requirements concerning the form in which the visa application must be made. The statutory bars and these additional requirements are discussed below.

Unauthorised maritime arrivals and transitory persons

With limited exceptions, ss.46A and 46B prevent persons who are ‘unauthorised maritime arrivals’ and ‘transitory persons’ respectively from making a valid application for a visa, including a protection visa. This bar applies to such persons who are in Australia who are either an unlawful non-citizen or hold a bridging visa, temporary protection visa or other prescribed temporary visa.

A person is an ‘unauthorised maritime arrival’ if the person ‘entered Australia by sea’ (i.e. not on an aircraft) at an ‘excised offshore place’ such as Christmas Island, at any time after the excision time for that place, or at any other place at any time on or after 1 June 2013; and became an unlawful non-citizen because of that entry; and is not an ‘excluded maritime arrival’. A child born to an ‘unauthorised maritime arrival’ in the migration zone or

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31 See section 46(1)(d) and 46(1)(e), as amended and inserted by the Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (No.135 of 2014).
32 Each of these bars can be lifted by the exercise of a personal, non-compellable ministerial discretion: ss.46A, 46B, 48B, 91F, 91L, and 91Q, respectively. The statutory bars which prevent a valid protection visa application need to be distinguished from other statutory exclusions, which prevent a non-citizen who has made a valid visa application from being able to satisfy the criteria for the visa. Those exclusions are discussed later in this Chapter and also in Chapters 7 and 9 of this Guide.
33 Sections 46A(1) and 46B(1).
34 Sections 46A(1)(b) and 46B(1)(b). The prescribed temporary visas are Temporary Safe Haven (Class UJ), Temporary (Humanitarian Concern) (Class UO), Subclass 785 visas granted before 2 December 2013 and Safe Haven Enterprise visas: r.2.11A and 2.11B.
35 Section 5AA(1).
36 Section 5AA(2) provides that a person ‘entered Australia by sea’ if the person entered the migration zone except on an aircraft that landed in the migration zone; or entered the migration zone as a result of being found on a ship detained under s.245F and being dealt with under s.245F(9); or entered the migration zone as a result of exercise of certain powers under the Maritime Powers Act 2013; or entered the migration zone after being rescued at sea.
37 ‘Excised offshore place’ is defined in s.5(1) to mean Christmas Island, Ashmore and Cartier Islands, Cocos (Keeling) Islands, any prescribed external Territories or islands, and Australian sea or resource installations. The Coral Sea Islands Territory and all Queensland islands that are north of latitude 21°, all Western Australian islands north of latitude 23°, and all Northern Territory islands north of latitude 16° are prescribed in r.5.15C of the Regulations.
38 The excision time for an excised offshore place is defined in s.5(1) of the Act.
39 Section 5AA(3) defines a person who is an ‘excluded maritime arrival’ as a person who is a New Zealand citizen who holds and provides a New Zealand passport that is in force; or is a non-citizen who holds and produces a passport that is in force and is endorsed with an authority to reside indefinitely on Norfolk Island; or is included in a prescribed class of persons.
a regional processing country, and who is not an Australian citizen at birth, is also an ‘unauthorised maritime arrival’.  

If a person arrived in Australia by sea at the Territory of Ashmore and Cartier Islands, they will not be an unauthorised maritime arrival due to this arrival method. However, it appears that if such a person then entered Australia by sea (i.e. entered the migration zone not on an aircraft) by being taken to an ‘excised offshore place’ (such as Christmas Island) at any time after the excision time for that place, or any other place at any time on or after 1 June 2013, they will be an unauthorised maritime arrival due to that method of entry. Conversely, it appears that if a person who arrived at the Ashmore and Cartier Islands then entered Australia by sea by being taken to an ‘excised offshore place’ prior to the excision time for that place or by being taken to any other place prior to 1 June 2013, or were taken by aircraft to another place at any time, they will not be an unauthorised maritime arrival.

A ‘transitory person’ is: a person taken to a place outside Australia under the repealed s.198A; a person who was taken to a regional processing country under s.198AD; a person taken to a place outside Australia under s.245F(9)(b) of the Act or under certain provisions of the Maritime Powers Act 2013; or a person who, while a non-citizen and during a particular period was transferred from the MV Tampa or MV Aceng to the MV Manoora and taken to another country, and disembarked in that other country. A child born to a ‘transitory person’ in the migration zone or a regional processing country, and who is not an Australian citizen at birth, is also a ‘transitory person’.

Although there is a general prohibition on persons who are unauthorised maritime arrivals and transitory persons making a valid visa application, the Minister retains a non-compellable discretion to determine that these restrictions do not apply to a person of either

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40 Subsections 5AA(1A) and 5AA(1AA).
41 DBB16 v MIBP [2018] FCAFC 178 (Perram, Wigney and Lee JJ, 6 August 2018, reasons published on 19 October 2018) at [37]. The Court declared that the Minister had no power to appoint the Western Lagoon of Ashmore Island to be a port, as it is not a port as the term is used in s.5(5) of the Act. Section 5AA provides that a person becomes an ‘unauthorised maritime arrival’ if they entered Australia by sea, and to have entered Australia by sea requires a person to enter the migration zone which is defined in s.5(1) to include a ‘port’ but does not include sea within the limits of a State or Territory but not in a port. ‘Port’ is defined in s.5(1) to mean a ‘proclaimed port’ or ‘proclaimed airport’. As the area described was not a ‘port’ within the meaning of the Act, the instrument made under s.5(5) declaring it as a ‘proclaimed port’ was not valid. This means that as DBB16 had not ‘entered Australia by sea’ as defined, he was not an unauthorised maritime arrival on the basis of entering Australia via the excised offshore place of Ashmore and Cartier Islands.
42 Section 5AA(1), as inserted by the Migration Amendment (Unauthorised Maritime Arrivals and Other Measures) Act 2013 (No.35 of 2013), which commenced on 1 June 2013.
43 This is because a person who arrives at the Ashmore and Cartier Islands has not ‘entered Australia by sea’ and has not entered the migration zone, but a subsequent entrance by sea at a place which satisfies s.5AA(1)(a) would render a person an unauthorised maritime arrival. Note that DBB16 v MIBP [2018] FCAFC 178 (Perram, Wigney and Lee JJ, 6 August 2018, reasons published on 19 October 2018) dealt with an applicant who arrived at the Western Lagoon within the Ashmore Reef on 7 November 2012 and was then taken to Darwin. Section 5AA(1)(a)(ii), which provides that a person is a unauthorised maritime arrival if they enter Australia at any other place (such as Darwin) at any time on or after the commencement of this section, was not applicable as this section commenced on 1 June 2013.
44 This is because these methods of entry do not fall within s.5AA(1)(a).
45 Section 5(1).
46 Section 5(1) definition paragraphs (d) and (e).
class, if he or she considers it is in the public interest.\textsuperscript{47} This power may only be exercised by the Minister personally.\textsuperscript{48} In addition, s.46A will not prevent an unauthorised maritime arrival from applying for a prescribed class of visa if that person holds or has held a Class XE safe haven enterprise visa and satisfies prescribed employment, educational or social security requirements.\textsuperscript{49}

**Previous refusal of protection visa**

Section 48A of the Act applies to a non-citizen who has made a valid application for a protection visa, where the grant of the visa has been refused.\textsuperscript{50} It prevents the non-citizen from making a further application for a protection visa while in the migration zone; although this bar generally does not apply to a non-citizen who has been refused a protection visa, has departed Australia and then returned to the migration zone.\textsuperscript{51}

A person in the migration zone whose protection visa has been cancelled is also not permitted to make a further application for a protection visa while in the migration zone.\textsuperscript{52}

If the Minister thinks it is in the public interest to do so, he or she may determine that the restriction on applying for a visa in s.48A does not apply to a person.\textsuperscript{53}

In addition to operating differently for applications made on behalf of another person at different points in time, s.48A also applies differently depending on when the further application for a protection visa was made.\textsuperscript{54}

**Further application made on or after 28 May 2014**

For further protection visa applications made on or after 28 May 2014, s.48A(2) defines an ‘application for a protection visa’ to include any application for a visa of the class known as protection visas, under the Act or Regulations in force at any time.\textsuperscript{55}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{47} Sections 46A(2)-(7) and 46B(2)-(7).
  \item \textsuperscript{48} Sections 46A(3) and 46B(3).
  \item \textsuperscript{49} Sections 46A(1A). The visas for which such a person may apply and the relevant requirements are specified in r.2.06AAB and related legislative instruments (currently IMMI 15/070, 15/071, 15/072 and 18/081). The relevant requirements must be satisfied for a period of 42 months (whether or not continuous) while the applicant holds the visa: r.2.06AAB(2).
  \item \textsuperscript{50} SZGME v MIAC (2008) 168 FCR 487, per Black CJ and Allsop J at [4], [7]-[14], Moore J dissenting.
  \item \textsuperscript{51} The bar will continue to apply in circumstances where removal of a person from the migration zone under s.198 has occurred, or has been attempted but not completed, and the person has returned under the circumstances specified in s.42(2A)(d), (da) or (e); ss.48A(1AB) and (1A), as amended by the Home Affairs Legislation Amendment (Miscellaneous Measures) Act 2019 (No.3 of 2019). In such circumstances that person is taken to have been continuously in the migration zone. For example, see SZVEB v MIBP [2016] FCCA 1300 (Judge Smith, 3 May 2016) at [14], where the Court held the applicant was taken to have been continuously in the migration zone despite removal under s.198 as he was refused entry by the other country and as a consequence travelled back to Australia.
  \item \textsuperscript{52} Section 48A(1B).
  \item \textsuperscript{53} The relevant provisions of the Migration Amendment Act 2014 (No.30 of 2014) were designed to overcome the effect of the judgment in SZGIZ v MIAC (2013) 212 FCR 235, referred to below: Explanatory Memorandum, Migration Amendment Bill 2013. Section 48A, as amended by that Act, applies to prevent applicants from making a further protection visa application on or after 28 May 2014 (item 4 of Schedule 2 retains the effect of the amendment in item 3 of Schedule 2 in the event of the Migration Amendment (Regaining Control Over Australia’s Protection Obligations) Act 2013 coming into effect at a later time). The amendments are prospective in the sense that they prevent further applications made after commencement of the relevant provisions: item 5 of Schedule 2.
  \item \textsuperscript{54} Section 48A(2)(aa) as amended by the Migration Amendment Act 2014 (No.30 of 2014).
clarifies that the bar to making a further application applies regardless of the grounds or criteria for applying (or for the visa grant, in the case of a cancelled visa), or whether the grounds or criteria existed earlier.\(^{56}\)

**Further application made before 28 May 2014**

Where a further application for a protection visa was made before 28 May 2014, s.48A applies as it was before amendment by the *Migration Amendment Act 2014*. Before this amendment, s.48A(2) provided that an ‘application for a protection visa’ included ‘an application for a visa, a criterion of which is mentioned in ss.36(2)(a), (aa), (b) or (c)’, which respectively relate to being either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention, a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘complementary protection’ criterion, or a member of the same family unit of either such person.

In *SZGIZ v MIAC*, the Full Federal Court held that the operation of the statutory bar in s.48A was confined to a further application which duplicated the same essential criterion for the grant of the visa as in the earlier unsuccessful application.\(^{57}\) That is, it did not prevent a non-citizen who had made a valid application on the basis of the refugee criterion in s.36(2)(a) from making a further application on the basis of the complementary protection criterion in s.36(2)(aa) or the family membership criterion in ss.36(2)(b) or (c) while he or she remained in the migration zone.\(^{58}\) Similarly, it appears that a person who made an application only on the family membership criteria in s.36(2)(b) or (c) could make a further application with claims against the refugee or complementary protection criteria in their own right before 28 May 2014.\(^{59}\) Where an applicant has already been assessed against the refugee criterion, neither

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\(^{56}\) In *MIBP v CTW17* [2019] FCAFC 156 (Robertson, Farrell and Wigney JJ, 5 September 2019), the Full Federal Court confirmed that the 28 May 2014 amendment to s.48A(2)(aa) had the effect that the statutory bar in s.48A applies to prevent all further onshore protection visa applications made on or after 28 May 2014 by a non-citizen who had previously been refused a protection visa while in the migration zone, regardless of whether the further application is based on a different criterion to the previous unsuccessful application, or a criterion or grounds that did not exist earlier: at [32], [37]-[39]. In *AZABF v MIBP* (2015) 235 FCR 150, the Court confirmed the efficacy of the 28 May 2014 amendments to s.48A: per North ACJ, Collier and Flick JJ at [26]. In *SZVKH v MIBP* (2016) FCCA 1032 (Judge Manousaridis, 6 May 2016) the applicant argued that the original application was invalid because of the introduction of the criterion in s.36(2)(aa) prior to that application being determined (see [3]). The Court followed *SZUZM v MIBP* [2015] FCCA 1202 (Judge Smith, 14 May 2015), on the effect of the amending provisions that introduced the CP criterion, holding the original application retained its character as a valid application and s.48A(1) prevented the further application (at [20]-[21]).

\(^{57}\) *SZGIZ v MIAC* (2013) 212 FCR 235 at [38].

\(^{58}\) *SZGIZ v MIAC* (2013) 212 FCR 235 at [43]-[47]. In *SZRSN v MIBP* [2014] FCA 527 (Rares J, 5 May 2014), the Federal Court appeared to accept that a further protection visa application was barred because it was not ‘materially different’ from the earlier application made on the same criteria. To the extent that this might suggest that a further application made in respect of the same criterion as an earlier application could be valid where there is a material difference in the claims, it is difficult to reconcile with the reasoning in *SZGIZ*.

\(^{59}\) In *EEJ16 v MIBP* [2019] FCCA 3359 (Judge Blake, 21 November 2019) a husband applicant first applied for protection on the basis that he met the refugee criterion (s.36(2)(a)) and his wife on the basis that she was a member of her husband’s family unit (s.36(2)(b)). Following *SZGIZ*, the applicants applied again for protection visas on the basis that the husband satisfied the complementary protection criterion (s.36(2)(aa)) and the wife being a member of his family unit (s.36(2)(c)). As part of this application a claim was advanced by the husband that his wife would suffer discrimination as a Tamil woman in Malaysia. This claim was considered by the Tribunal under s.36(2)(aa) but not under s.36(2)(a). The Federal Circuit Court held that the Tribunal would have erred by failing to address the wife’s discrimination claim under s.36(2)(a) if she had advanced the claim as an individual applicant under that criterion. However, as the husband had advanced the discrimination claim, it could only be assessed by the Tribunal under s.36(2)(aa) and therefore the Tribunal did not err (see [34]-[38]). This judgment should be treated with caution as the Court’s reasoning as to why the discrimination claim could only be considered under s.36(2)(aa) but not s.36(2)(a) is unclear, and it appears contrary to established authority that any claims unarticulated by an applicant but which arise tolerably clearly from the material needs to be considered: see *NAVK v...*
the delegate nor the Tribunal has any jurisdiction to consider a further application made on the basis of the complementary protection criterion against the refugee criterion.\footnote{MIMA}[2004] FCA 1695 (Allsop J, 22 December 2004) at [15].

Where an application made on the basis of the refugee criterion was refused by the Department without considering complementary protection, the applicant could still apply again on the basis of the complementary protection criterion, even if the Tribunal considered the complementary protection criteria in affirming the refusal.\footnote{SZRNJ v MIAC}[2014] FCCA 782 (Judge Cameron, 17 April 2014), the Federal Circuit Court held that a further protection visa application based on complementary protection was valid, notwithstanding that the Tribunal had addressed complementary protection in its review of the earlier decision. The Court drew a distinction between the delegate’s decision and the Tribunal’s decision for the purposes of s.48A, finding that the Tribunal’s decision was irrelevant to the question of when an application has been ‘refused’: at [22]-[23].

\footnote{SZTTI v MIBP}[2015] FCCA 236 (Judge Nicholls, 6 February 2015). Consistent with the reasoning in SZRNJ, the Court considered the earlier protection visa application needed to be understood, as at the date of the introduction of the complementary protection criterion, as including an application for the protection visa based on that criterion; the delegate was obliged to consider the earlier application under both criteria in s.36(2): at [42].

\footnote{AMA15 v MIBP}[2015] 244 FCR 131 at [48].

Previous application made on a person’s behalf

Section 48A does not bar any ‘further’ protection visa application made prior to 25 September 2014 by a person who, as a question of fact, lacked capacity (e.g. because they were a child or had a mental impairment) to make an earlier purported application.\footnote{SZVBN v MIBP}[2017] 254 FCR 393 per Robertson, Griffiths and Wigney JJ (Mortimer and Siopis JJ dissenting).

For minors and those with a mental impairment who have had a previous protection visa application made on their behalf, if a ‘further’ application is made on or after 25 September 2014, s.48A(1AA) extends the operation of the s.48A bar to the making of further onshore protection visa applications for minors and those with a mental impairment.\footnote{Section 48A was amended to apply to applications on behalf of another person by the Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No.1) 2014 (No. 106 of 2014) with effect from 25 September 2014. In MIBP v CTW17}[2019] FCAFC 156 (Robertson, Farrell and Wigney JJ, 5 September 2019), the Full Federal Court held that the definition of ‘application for a protection visa’ in s.48A(2)(aa) and s.48(1C) were directed to clarifying and reinforcing the operation of s.48A as a bar on making subsequent protection visa applications irrespective of whether the subsequent application was based on a different criterion to that which formed the basis for the previous application, or a criterion or ground that did not exist earlier: at [32].

\footnote{See generally Part 2 Division 3 Subdivision AI of the Act and r.2.12A of the Regulations and Schedules 11 and 12 to the

\textbf{Comprehensive Plan of Action and safe third countries}

Subdivision AI of Part 2 Division 3 of the Act applies to non-citizens who are covered by either the Comprehensive Plan of Action approved by the International Conference on Indo-Chinese Refugees, held at Geneva in 1989 (CPA) or an agreement between Australia and a country that is, at the relevant time, a safe third country in relation to the non-citizen seeking asylum, and prevents such non-citizens from making a valid protection visa application.\footnote{The Subdivision was enacted because the Parliament considered that ‘certain non-citizens

\footnote{MIBP v SZVCH}[2016] 244 FCR 366 per Kenny, Siopis and Besanko JJ at [44] and per Mortimer J at [97] (Dowsett J agreeing); application for special leave to appeal dismissed: SZVCH v MIBP [2017] HCASL 78 (Bell and Gageler JJ, 5 April 2017). See also AMA15 v MIBP [2015] 244 FCR 131 at [48].

\footnote{In SZRNJ v MIAC}[2014] FCCA 782 (Judge Cameron, 17 April 2014), the Federal Circuit Court held that a further protection visa application based on complementary protection was valid, notwithstanding that the Tribunal had addressed complementary protection in its review of the earlier decision. The Court drew a distinction between the delegate’s decision and the Tribunal’s decision for the purposes of s.48A, finding that the Tribunal’s decision was irrelevant to the question of when an application has been ‘refused’: at [22]-[23].

\footnote{SZTTI v MIBP}[2015] FCCA 236 (Judge Nicholls, 6 February 2015). Consistent with the reasoning in SZRNJ, the Court considered the earlier protection visa application needed to be understood, as at the date of the introduction of the complementary protection criterion, as including an application for the protection visa based on that criterion; the delegate was obliged to consider the earlier application under both criteria in s.36(2): at [42].

\footnote{SZVBN v MIBP}[2017] 254 FCR 393 per Robertson, Griffiths and Wigney JJ (Mortimer and Siopis JJ dissenting).}
who are covered by the CPA or in relation to whom there is a safe third country, should not be allowed to apply for a protection visa or, in some cases, any other visa.\textsuperscript{66}

A 'safe third country' in this context means, in relation to a person, a country prescribed by the Regulations as a safe third country in relation to the person or a class of persons of which the person is a member, and he/she has a prescribed connection with that country.\textsuperscript{67}

For these purposes, only one country has been prescribed as a ‘safe third country’ in relation to a specific class of persons, namely, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in relation to certain Vietnamese refugees or their families covered by an agreement between Australia and the PRC.\textsuperscript{68}

These restrictions on making a valid protection visa application may be waived by the Minister personally. The Minister, if he or she considers it is in the public interest to do so, may give written notice to the person that the provisions preventing the making of an application do not apply.\textsuperscript{69}

**Temporary safe haven visa**

Subdivision AJ of Part 2 Division 3 of the Act prevents certain non-citizens who were granted temporary safe haven visas from making a valid application for any other type of visa whilst in Australia.\textsuperscript{70} The Minister may, however, give written notice to a person that such prohibition does not apply, if he or she thinks it is in the public interest to do so.\textsuperscript{71}

\textsuperscript{66} Section 91A.

\textsuperscript{67} Section 91D. The Regulations may provide that a person has a prescribed connection with a country if the person is/was present in the country at a particular time or period; or the person has a right to enter and reside in the country: s.91D(2).

\textsuperscript{68} Regulation 2.12A, as substituted by Migration Amendment Regulations 2011 (No. 5) (SLI 2011, No. 147), which commenced on 15 August 2011 and ceased to be in force after 14 August 2013: s.91D(4).

\textsuperscript{69} Section 91F. The waiver is for a limited specified period starting when the notice is given. The power can only be exercised by the Minister personally, and there is no duty to consider exercising the power, even if specifically requested to do so: ss.91F(2) and (6).

\textsuperscript{70} The Temporary Safe Haven (Class UJ) visa is provided for by r.2.07AC of the Regulations, and item 1223B of Schedule 1 and Part 449 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations. Class UJ previously also included Subclass 448 but this was repealed by the Migration Amendment (Redundant and Other Provisions) Regulation 2014 (SLI 2014, No.30) from 22 March 2014. With effect from 18 April 2015, s.91J(2) provides that Subdivision AJ does not apply to an unauthorised maritime arrival or a transitory person. Such persons are instead covered by ss.46A and 46B. Subsection 91J(2) was inserted by item 13 of Schedule 3 to the Migration Amendment (Protection and Other Measures) Act 2015 (No.35 of 2015). In addition, certain persons who have been offered, but not granted, a temporary stay in Australia for the purpose of an application for a Temporary Safe Haven (Class UJ) visa cannot be granted a protection visa: cl 866.227. In Plaintiff M79/2012 v MIAC (2013) 252 CLR 336 the High Court confirmed that a person who has been validly granted a temporary safe haven visa is barred by s.91K from making an application for a protection visa (French CJ, Brennan, and Bell JJ at [42], Gageler J at [107]). The Court was considering the validity of the exercise of the Minister’s discretionary power in s.195A(2) of the Act (to grant certain detainees a visa of a particular class if he or she thinks it is in the public interest to do so) to grant the plaintiff a temporary safe haven visa for 7 days and a bridging visa for 6 months. This had the effect of engaging the bar in s.91K to prevent the plaintiff from applying for a protection visa, which the grant of the bridging visa would otherwise have enabled him to do..

\textsuperscript{71} Section 91L. The power can only be exercised by the Minister personally, and there is no duty to consider exercising the power, even if specifically requested to do so: ss.91L(2) and (6).
Protection of third countries

Subdivision AK of Part 2 Division 3 of the Act prevents non-citizens to whom it applies from making a valid application for a protection visa. Section 91M of the Act states that the Subdivision was enacted because the Parliament considered that 'a non-citizen who can avail himself or herself of protection from a third country, because of nationality or some other right to re-enter and reside in the third country, should seek protection from the third country instead of applying in Australia for a protection visa'.

Subdivision AK of the Act applies to two broad categories of persons, namely:

- a non-citizen who is a national of two or more countries, and
- a non-citizen who has a right to re-enter and reside in any country apart from Australia or a country of which the person is a national, or former habitual resident.

In the first category, the Federal Court has held that the word 'national' in s.91N(1) is not to be construed as involving more than the fact of nationality and therefore no additional inquiry into a non-citizen's ability to avail himself or herself of protection is to be made, beyond this fact.

In the second category, the non-citizen must also have resided in the available country for at least seven continuous days. The Minister must also have made a declaration that the available country provides asylum seekers with access to effective assessment procedures, that it provides protection to persons to whom it has protection obligations and that it meets relevant human rights standards for such persons. This restriction on dual nationals and certain persons who have third country protection can be waived by the Minister. If the

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72 These provisions were introduced by the Border Protection Legislation Amendment Act 1999 (No. 160 of 1999). The same Act also introduced ss.36(3)-(5), which exclude certain persons from Australia’s protection obligations if they have protection in another country. Section 36(3)-(5) are discussed later in this Chapter, and in Chapters 7 and 9 of this Guide.
73 Section 91N(1), to be read with s.91N(6).
74 Section 91N(2), to be read with s.91N(3)-(5).
75 SZOAU v MIAC (2012) 199 FCR 448 per Robertson J at [22], [61] and [71] (Buchanan and Barker JJJ agreeing). A person is a ‘national’ of a country according to that country’s laws of nationality, and regardless of what other rights may attach and how that nationality may be recognised as a practical matter or whether it is ‘effective’: SZOUY v MIAC [2011] FMCA 347 (Smith FM, 3 June 2011), at [46]. See also SZOYP v MIAC [2012] FMCA 403 (Cameron FM, 16 May 2012) and SZOXM v MIAC[2011] FMCA 564 (Cameron FM, 22 July 2011). SZOAU was applied in CZBJ v MIAC [2013] FCCA 23 (Judge Driver, 2 May 2013) in relation to a child who had dual nationality because of her parents’ nationalities. The judgment confirmed that s.91M did not import into Subdivision AK of Division 3 of Part 2 of the Act any requirement for the applicant to be able to access effective protection in the third country of which the applicant was a national (at [27]), despite the potential consequence of a child being required to live separately from her parents and the forced separation of her parents (at [30]). The judgment in SZQYM v MIAC (2014) 220 FCR 505 considered the operation of s.91N in the context of citizens of North Korea who were found to have been dual citizens of South Korea according to South Korean nationality law. The Federal Court held that the appellants’ claim to be North Korean citizens was not enough to engage s.91N; it was necessary to establish the question of nationality as a jurisdictional fact (on the balance of probabilities, considering the operation of South Korean nationality law in the particular circumstances on the available evidence) as a precondition to the operation of the statutory bar in s.91P.
76 Or, if the regulations prescribe a longer continuous period, for at least that period or longer; s.91N(2)(b). At the time of writing, no longer period had been prescribed.
77 Section 91N(2)(c). Subsections 91N(3) and (4) relate to the making and revocation of declarations in relation to countries for the purpose of Subdivision AK. Any such declaration, or any revocation of a declaration, must be in writing and tabled before each house of Parliament. At the time of writing, no declaration had been made.
Minister considers it in the public interest to do so, he or she may give written notice that provisions imposing the restriction do not apply for a seven day period.\textsuperscript{78}

**Application form and other Schedule 1 requirements**

A visa application must be in the approved form, which must be completed in accordance with any directions on it.\textsuperscript{79} Completion of an application in the approved form is an essential precondition to the exercise of the power to consider, and to grant or refuse, a visa.\textsuperscript{80}

The current approved forms for permanent protection visas, temporary protection visas and safe haven enterprise visas are specified in a legislative instrument. For the latter two visas, the applicable forms vary depending on whether the applicant holds or previously held a temporary protection or safe haven enterprise visa. Instructions in the forms vary for applicants making their own claims for protection and those who are simply claiming to be members of the same family unit as those who do.\textsuperscript{81} Substantial compliance with the form will suffice.\textsuperscript{82} However, an application that does not answer the critical questions as to why the applicant claims protection does not substantially comply with the requirements and therefore is not a valid application and cannot be considered.\textsuperscript{83}

In addition to the use of the correct form, Schedule 1 to the Regulations prescribes other matters for a valid protection visa application. These have been amended over time for the different classes and subclasses of protection visa, and relate to matters such as the applicable visa application charge, the location of the applicant and the location for making the visa application.

**Limitations on who may make a valid application for the visa**

Although in certain cases the same application form can be used to apply for either a permanent protection visa, a temporary protection visa or a safe haven enterprise visa, an application can only be valid as one of the three classes of visa.

**Protection (Class XA)**

A valid application for a Protection (Class XA) visa can only be made by a person who: held a visa and was immigration cleared on their last entry into Australia; is not an unauthorised

\textsuperscript{78} Section 91Q(1). The Minister may consider information that raises the possibility that the person might not obtain protection in the third country: s.91Q(2). The power can only be exercised by the Minister personally, and there is no duty to consider exercising the power, even if specifically requested to do so: ss.91Q(3) and (7).

\textsuperscript{79} Section 46(1)(b), and rr.2.07(1)(a) and (3) of the Regulations.

\textsuperscript{80} See MIMA v Li; MIMA v Kundu (2000) 103 FCR 486 at [59].

\textsuperscript{81} Items 1401(1), 1403(1) and 1404(1) of Schedule 1 to the Regulations and Migration (LIN 18/029: Arrangements for Protection, Refugee and Humanitarian Visas) Instrument 2018 (FRLI F2019C00149, compilation date 13 February 2019).

\textsuperscript{82} Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s.25C. For discussion of s.25C in the context of Form 866 see SZGME v MIAC (2008) 168 FCR 487 per Black CJ and Allsop J at [75]:[94].

\textsuperscript{83} See e.g. MIMA v Li; MIMA v Kundu (2000) 103 FCR 486; Yilmaz v MIMA (2000) 100 FCR 495. An invalid, or ‘inchoate’ application may be cured, or completed, by providing the relevant information to the Department: see Li and Kundu; and Yilmaz. Furthermore, the information might be supplied to the Tribunal and the Department after the delegate’s decision is made and during the review process: SZGME v MIAC (2008) 168 FCR 487, per Black CJ and Allsop J at [32], referring to Yilmaz; compare Li and Kundu at [82].
maritime arrival; and does not and has never held certain kinds of visas (Temporary Protection, Safe Haven Enterprise, Temporary Safe Haven, Temporary (Humanitarian Concern)). While a person who does not meet one of those requirements cannot validly apply for a permanent protection visa, they may make a valid application for a temporary protection or safe haven enterprise visa.

**Temporary Protection (Class XD)**

An application for a Temporary Protection (Class XD) visa can only be made by a person who: is unable to make a valid application for a Protection (Class XA) visa, holds or has held certain kinds of visas (Temporary Protection, Safe Haven Enterprise, Temporary Safe Haven, Temporary (Humanitarian Concern)), did not hold a visa on their last entry into Australia, is an unauthorised maritime arrival, or was not immigration cleared on last entry into Australia.85

A further requirement for making a visa application is that the applicant does not have an application for a safe haven enterprise visa pending before the Department at the time of making the temporary protection visa application (although the applicant may have been refused or granted such a visa, or withdrawn an application).86 In addition, the application cannot be validly made at the same time as an application for a safe haven enterprise visa.87 If an applicant purports to apply for both visas at the same time, the application for the temporary protection visa will be deemed invalid, whereas the application for the safe haven enterprise visa will remain on foot.88

**Safe Haven Enterprise (Class XE)**

An application for a safe haven enterprise visa may only be made by the same category of persons who may apply for a temporary protection visa. That is, a person who: is unable to make a valid application for a Protection (Class XA) visa, holds or has held certain kinds of visas (Temporary Protection, Safe Haven Enterprise, Temporary Safe Haven, Temporary (Humanitarian Concern)), did not hold a visa on their last entry into Australia, is an unauthorised maritime arrival, or was not immigration cleared on last entry into Australia.89

Further, an applicant who has an application for a temporary protection visa pending before the Department cannot validly apply for a safe haven enterprise visa. The applicant may, however, apply for a safe haven enterprise visa at the same time as making an application for a temporary protection visa, although in such a case the application for the temporary

84 Item 1401(3)(d) of Schedule 1 to the Regulations.
85 Item 1403(3)(d) of Schedule 1 to the Regulations, as amended by Migration Legislation Amendment (2017 Measures No.1) Regulations 2017 (F2017L00437).
86 Item 1403(3)(e) of Schedule 1 to the Regulations. Note that any further visa application remains subject to the s.48A bar on making a further application for a protection visa.
87 Item 1403(3)(f) of Schedule 1 to the Regulations.
88 Items 1403(3)(f) and 1404(4)(f) of Schedule 1 to the Regulations.
89 Item 1404(3)(d) of Schedule 1 to the Regulations, as amended by Migration Legislation Amendment (2017 Measures No.1) Regulations 2017 (F2017L00437).
A protection visa will be invalid. A further distinguishing requirement for the safe haven enterprise visa is that the applicant must include in the application an indication in writing that they, or a member of the same family unit as the applicant who is also an applicant for a safe haven enterprise visa, intends to work or study while accessing minimum social security benefits in a specified regional area.

Conversion of permanent to temporary protection visa applications

Regulation 2.08F of the Regulations operates to convert undetermined Class XA permanent protection visa applications made before 16 December 2014 (pre-conversion applications) by prescribed applicants into applications for Class XD temporary protection visas. The prescribed applicants are those who hold or have ever held certain kinds of visas (Temporary Protection, Temporary Safe Haven, Temporary (Humanitarian Concern)), did not hold a visa on last entry into Australia, are unauthorised maritime arrivals, or were not immigration cleared on last entry into Australia.

Pre-conversion applications were converted on 16 December 2014 if the Minister had not made a decision on the application under s.65 of the Act before that day. Where a decision was made before that date, the occurrence of any of the following events on or after 16 December 2014 will trigger conversion: the matter is remitted to the Minister by the Tribunal, a court orders the Minister to reconsider the application, a court declares or concludes that a decision of the Minister in relation to the pre-conversion application is invalid, void or of no effect, or a court quashes a decision of the Minister.

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90 Items 1403(3)(f) and 1403(4)(f) of Schedule 1 to the Regulations.
91 Item 1404(3)(e). In accordance with item 1404(4), regional areas are currently specified by the Minister in IMMI 18/081 (F2018L01668).
92 Regulation 2.08F is made under s.45AA of the Act, which permits the making of ‘conversion regulations’ which deem an application for one type of visa to be an application for a different type of visa in certain circumstances. Regulation 2.08F and s.45AA were inserted by the Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (No.135 of 2014). These changes were introduced to manage asylum seekers who have arrived in Australia illegally and ensure that those who are found to engage Australia’s protection obligations are not granted permanent protection visas: Explanatory Memorandum, Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Bill 2014 at 7.
93 Regulation 2.08F(2).
94 The Minister is also taken not to have made a decision in relation to a pre-conversion application in certain circumstances: r.2.08F(4), inserted by Migration Amendment (Conversion of Protection Visa Applications) Regulation 2015 (SLI 2015, No.164).
95 Regulation 2.08F, inserted by the Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (No.135 of 2014) and amended by Migration Amendment (Conversion of Protection Visa Applications) Regulation 2015 (SLI 2015, No.164). The amendment appears to overcome the effect of the High Court decision in Plaintiff S297/2013 v MIBP (2015) 255 CLR 231. In that judgment the Court held that r.2.08F(3)(a) (which converts an application upon which the Minister had not made a decision as at 16 December 2014) did not apply where a decision was in fact made by 16 December 2014, regardless of whether it was infected by jurisdictional error. Furthermore, as the applicant had sought the writ of mandamus rather than certiorari, the delegate's decision was not quashed and the conversion regulation in r.2.08F(3)(b)(iii), as it then was, which dealt expressly with the quashing of a legally infirm decision, was not triggered. Therefore, the application was not converted into one for a temporary protection visa.
Criteria for grant of a protection visa

The criteria for the grant of a protection visa are set out in s.36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Regulations. The s.36 criteria apply to the grant of all kinds of protection visa, while criteria for each subclass, including common criteria relating to health, public interest and national interest, and other criteria specific to each subclass, are prescribed in the Regulations.

Section 36 criteria

The core criteria for a protection visa are found in ss.36(1B), 36(1C) and 36(2) of the Act. Subsection 36(2) provides that the decision maker must be satisfied that the applicant is a non-citizen in Australia and is:

- a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations as a refugee (s.36(2)(a), the ‘refugee criterion’); or
- if not a person who meets the refugee criterion, a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations on complementary protection grounds (s.36(2)(aa), the ‘complementary protection criterion’); or
- a member of the same family unit as a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations and who holds a protection visa (ss.36(2)(b) and (c)).

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96 Note that where visa criteria are amended, the law that is applicable to any particular application will depend upon the terms of the amending legislation. Usually, but not always, the applicable criteria for the grant of a protection visa are those in force when the visa application was made.

97 s.36(1B) was inserted by the Migration Amendment Act 2014 (No. 30 of 2014) and s.36(1C) was inserted by the Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (No.135 of 2014).

98 For applications made prior to 16 December 2014, the criteria refers to a person ‘in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol’. Following amendments made by the Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (No.135 of 2014) applying to visa applications made on or after 16 December 2014, the criteria refers to a person ‘in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee’.

99Introduced by the Migration Amendment (Complementary Protection) Act 2011 (No.121 of 2011). This alternative criterion applies to all protection visa applications made on or after 24 March 2012, as well as those made prior to, but not finally determined at that date: Migration Amendment (Complementary Protection) Act 2012, s.35. Note however that amendments introducing this criterion do not appear to apply to visa applications lodged prior to 1 October 2001, as the amendments are not referable to the form of s.36 at that time. The criterion was also introduced into Part 866 of the Regulations and is applicable to all visa applications made on or after 24 March 2012 as well as those made prior to, but not finally determined as at that date: r.4: Migration Legislation Amendment Regulations 2012 (No.1) (SLI2012, No.35). These alternative criteria are reflected in Parts C and D of the application form: thus, an applicant either makes specific claims for protection by completing Part 866C, or claims to be a member of the same family unit as an applicant who has made protection claims by completing Part 866D. See above, under Application form and other Schedule 1 requirements. There is nothing to prevent an applicant completing both parts of the form and being considered on both bases.

100 Section 36(2)(b) introduced on 1 October 2001 by the Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No.6) 2001 (No.131 of 2001) and applicable to visa applications made on or after that date (no transitional arrangements). Amended by the Same-Sex Relationships (Equal Treatment in Commonwealth Laws-General Law Reform) Act 2008 (No.144 of 2008). The amendments to s.36(2)(b) apply to all applications for visas made on or after the commencement of the Part on 1 July 2009 and all applications made before that date but not decided before that date. Section 36(2)(b) is in similar terms to cl.866.221(3)(b) of Schedule 2 to the Regulations. Both 36(2)(b)(ii) and cl.866.221(3)(b) require that the visa must already be held by the relevant refugee member of the family at the time the Minister or delegate makes their decision in respect of the family member. MZXPK v MAC [2008] FMCA 1273 (Burchardt FM, 22 September 2008) at [39].

101 Section 36(2)(c) was introduced by the Migration Amendment (Complementary Protection) Act 2011 (No.121 of 2011) and applies to all protection visa applications made on or after 24 March 2012, as well as those made prior to, but not finally determined at that date: Migration Amendment (Complementary Protection) Act 2011, s.35. As with s.36(2)(aa), its operation appears limited to visa applications made on or after 1 October 2001 (see above).
The concept of ‘protection obligations’ in both ss.36(2)(a) and (aa) is qualified by subsections (3)-(6) which set out circumstances in which Australia is taken not to have protection obligations. These provisions call for consideration of whether an applicant has access to protection in any country apart from Australia.\(^{102}\)

The complementary protection criterion in s.36(2)(aa) is further qualified by s.36(2C) which prevents a person satisfying the complementary protection criterion if there are serious reasons for considering that the person has committed certain serious crimes.

The applicant must also satisfy the additional criterion in s.36(1B) which requires that the applicant is not assessed by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation to be directly or indirectly a risk to security (within the meaning of s.4 of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979).\(^{103}\) A further criteria in s.36(1C), applying only to applications made on or after 16 December 2014, requires that the applicant is not a person who the Minister considers, on reasonable grounds, to be a danger to Australia’s security or to have been convicted of a particularly serious crime and be a danger to the community.\(^{104}\)

**Schedule 2 criteria**

Parts 785, 790 and 866 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations set out the prescribed criteria for the Subclass 785 (Temporary Protection), Subclass 790 (Safe Haven Enterprise) and Subclass 866 (Protection) visas. These Parts also set out the circumstances applicable to the grant (including that the applicant must be in Australia at the time of visa grant),\(^{105}\) details as to when the visas are in effect,\(^{106}\) and visa conditions.\(^{107}\)

Parts 785, 790 and 866 refer to primary criteria and secondary criteria, however, there are no secondary criteria: all applicants must satisfy the primary criteria.\(^{108}\) These are divided into criteria to be satisfied at time of application\(^{109}\) and those to be satisfied at time of decision.\(^{110}\)

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\(^{102}\) These provisions are discussed in Chapter 9 of this Guide.

\(^{103}\) Subsections 36(1A) and (1B) as amended by the Migration Amendment Act 2014 (No. 30 of 2014), applying to visa applications made on or after 28 May 2014, or made before, but not finally determined as at that date.

\(^{104}\) Subsection 36(1C) was inserted by the Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (No.135 of 2014). This requirement is discussed further in Chapter 7 of this Guide.

\(^{105}\) Section 40 of the Act and r.2.04 deal with the circumstances applicable to the grant of a visa. The visa applicant must be in Australia: cl.785.411, cl.790.411, cl.866.411.

\(^{106}\) Subclass 866 is a permanent visa (as defined in s.30(1) of the Act) permitting the visa holder to remain indefinitely in Australia, and to travel to and enter Australia for a period of 5 years from date of grant (cl.866.511). Subclasses 785 and 790 are temporary visas permitting the holder to remain in Australia for a period of 3 and 5 years respectively (or longer pending the outcome of a further application): cl 785.511, cl.790.511.

\(^{107}\) Subdivision 866.2 is a permanent visa (as defined in s.30(1) of the Act) permitting the visa holder to remain indefinitely in Australia, and to travel to and enter Australia for a period of 5 years from date of grant (cl.866.511). Subclasses 785 and 790 are temporary visas permitting the holder to remain in Australia for a period of 3 and 5 years respectively (or longer pending the outcome of a further application): cl 785.511, cl.790.511.

\(^{108}\) Section 41 of the Act and r.2.05 of the Regulations deal with visa conditions.

\(^{109}\) Note to divs.785.2, 785.3, 790.2, 790.3, 866.2 and 866.3.

\(^{110}\) Subdivisions 785.21, 790.21 and 866.21. The ‘time of application’ criteria in Schedule 2 to the Regulations are to be distinguished from the requirements of a valid application as set out in Schedule 1. If a visa application is not valid, it cannot be considered: s.47(3) of the Act; if the ‘time of application’ criteria are not satisfied, the visa must be refused: s.65(1)(b) of the Act.

Subdivisions 785.22, 790.22 and 866.22.
Criteria to be satisfied at time of application

The criteria to be satisfied at the time of application generally reflect the requirements in s.36(2). Specifically, they require that the applicant either:

- claims that a criterion mentioned in paragraph 36(2)(a) or (aa) of the Act is satisfied in relation to the applicant and makes specific claims as to why that criterion is satisfied; or
- claims to be a member of the same family unit as a person:
  - to whom the above applies; and
  - who is an applicant for the same subclass of protection visa.\(^{111}\)

Criteria to be satisfied at time of decision

In addition to protection criteria, there are a number of other requirements that must be met at the time of decision, including health, public interest and national interest criteria.\(^{112}\)

Protection criteria

The principal ‘time of decision’ criteria are that the Minister is satisfied that:

- a criterion mentioned in ss.36(2)(a) or (aa) of the Act is satisfied in relation to the applicant,\(^{113}\) or
- the applicant is a ‘member of the same family unit’ as an applicant mentioned above (in subclause (2)) and that applicant has been granted a protection visa of the same subclass.\(^{114}\)

An applicant who is found not to meet one of the alternative criteria must be assessed against the others. In considering these criteria, the decision maker is not limited to considering the basis on which the claims were made in the protection visa application. Thus, a person originally claiming the visa on the basis of family membership may

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\(^{111}\) Clauses 785.211, 790.211 and 866.211. Clause 866.211 was amended from 16 December 2014 to remove references to the Refugees Convention and replace these with references to the criteria in s.36: Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (No.135 of 2014).

\(^{112}\) An additional criterion was previously in force that had the effect of preventing persons who entered Australia without a valid visa from being granted a permanent protection visa. Clause 866.222, inserted by the Migration Amendment (Unauthorised Maritime Arrival) Regulation 2013 (SLI 2013, No. 280), required that a Subclass 866 visa applicant held a visa that was in effect on their last entry into Australia, was not an unauthorised maritime arrival, and was immigration cleared on their last entry into Australia. It was disallowed by the Senate at 12.01 pm on 27 March 2014, with the effect that this criterion was repealed from that time: Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 27 March 2014, p.28, on motion by Senator Hanson-Young (see also ss.42(1) and 45(1) of the Legislation Act 2003). A similar criterion was inserted by the Migration Amendment (Temporary Protection Visa) Regulation 2013 (SLI 2013, No. 234), but this was also repealed on disallowance of that regulation on 2 December 2013.

\(^{113}\) Clauses 785.221(2), 790.221(2) and 866.221(2). Clause 866.211 was amended from 16 December 2014 to remove references to the Refugees Convention and replace these with references to the criteria in s.36: Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (No.135 of 2014). The previous complementary protection criterion in cl.866.221(4) was first inserted by Migration Legislation Amendment Regulations 2012 (No.1) (SLI 2012, No. 35), for all visa applications made on or after 24 March 2012 as well as those made prior to, but not finally determined as at that date. Unlike s.36(2)(aa) (see discussion at fn 99 above), the operation of cl.866.221(4) (or cl.866.211(2) from 16 December 2014) does not appear limited to visa applications made on or after 1 October 2001.

\(^{114}\) Clauses 785.221(3), 790.221(3) and 866.221(3).
nevertheless, in light of subsequent claims and evidence, meet the alternative criterion at time of decision – that they are a person to whom Australia has protection obligations.

**Health**

The applicant must have undergone a medical examination\(^{115}\) and, with exceptions, a chest x-ray examination.\(^{116}\) If a Commonwealth Medical Officer considers that the applicant has a disease or condition that is, or may result in the applicant being, a threat to public health in Australia or a danger to the Australian community, arrangements must have been made to place the applicant under the professional supervision of a health authority to undergo necessary treatment.\(^{117}\)

**Public interest**

The applicant must satisfy public interest criteria 4003A which is set out in Part 1 of Schedule 4 to the Regulations,\(^{118}\) and applicants who were over the age of 18 at the time of application must satisfy public interest criterion 4019.\(^{119}\) Ostensibly the applicant must also satisfy public interest criterion 4001,\(^{120}\) however recent *obiter* comments from the Federal Court indicate that the prescription of 4001 as a criterion for a protection visa is invalid.\(^{121}\) This question will likely be the subject of further judicial consideration.

Subject to this invalidity question, criterion 4001 is satisfied if the applicant satisfies the Minister that he or she passes the character test;\(^{122}\) or the Minister is satisfied, after appropriate inquiries, that there is nothing to indicate the applicant would fail to satisfy the Minister that he or she would pass the character test; or the Minister has decided not to refuse to grant a visa to the applicant despite reasonably suspecting that the applicant does

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\(^{115}\) Clauses 785.222, 790.222 and 866.223. The medical examination must be carried out by a ‘relevant medical practitioner’, i.e. a Medical Officer of the Commonwealth or an approved medical practitioner, or a medical practitioner employed by an approved organisation.

\(^{116}\) Clauses 785.223, 790.223 and 866.224. The x-ray examination must be conducted by a medical practitioner who is qualified as a radiologist in Australia.

\(^{117}\) Clauses 785.225, 790.225 and 866.224B. If a relevant medical officer who is not a Medical Officer of the Commonwealth considers that the applicant has such a disease or condition, he or she must refer any relevant test results and reports to a Medical Officer of the Commonwealth: cls.785.224, 790.224 and 866.224A.

\(^{118}\) Clauses 785.226(a), 790.226(a) and 866.225(a). See the definition of ‘public interest criterion’ in r.1.03 of the Regulations. Clause 866.225 previously referred to criterion 4002, which required that the applicant was not assessed by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) to be directly or indirectly a risk to security, within the meaning of s.4 of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979. However, the High Court held that for the purpose of cl.866.225, criterion 4002 was *ultra vires* and was therefore invalid: *Plaintiff M47-2012 v Director General of Security* (2012) 251 CLR 1. A criterion along similar lines as criterion 4002, s.36(1B), was subsequently inserted into the Act by the *Migration Amendment Act 2014* (No. 30 of 2014), and criterion 4002 in cl.866.225 was repealed with effect from 16 December 2014.

\(^{119}\) Clauses 785.226(b), 790.226(b) and 866.225(b). Clause 866.225(b) was introduced by Migration Amendment Regulations 2007 (No.12) (SLI 2007, No.314) Schedule 1, item [290]. The provisions apply to visa applications made on or after 15 October 2007, and certain applications deemed to be made after that date: r.4.

\(^{120}\) Clauses 785.226(a), 790.226(a) and 866.225(a).

\(^{121}\) In *BAL19 v MHA* [2019] FCA 2189 (Rares J, 24 December 2019), the Court made *obiter* comments that cl.785.226(a) is invalid in respect of its prescription of 4001 as a criterion for a protection visa as it is broader than, and therefore inconsistent with, s.36(1C): at [86]. This reasoning appears equally applicable to the analogous criteria for other protection visas, i.e. cls.790.226(a) and 866.225(a).

\(^{122}\) As defined in s.501(6) of the Act.
not pass the character test; or the Minister has decided not to refuse to grant a visa to the applicant despite not being satisfied that the applicant passes the character test.\textsuperscript{123}

Criterion 4003A\textsuperscript{124} requires that the applicant not be determined by the Foreign Minister, or a person authorised by the Foreign Minister, to be a person whose presence in Australia may be directly or indirectly associated with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Criterion 4019 requires that the applicant has signed what is known as a values statement.\textsuperscript{125} However, if compelling circumstances exist, the Minister may decide that the applicant is not required to satisfy this provision.\textsuperscript{126} Importantly for protection visa applicants, the relevant Explanatory Statement gives an example of a compelling circumstance as where Australia’s international obligations are engaged.\textsuperscript{127}

\textit{National interest}\n
The criteria also require that the Minister is satisfied that the grant of the visa is in the national interest.\textsuperscript{128}

\textit{Other criteria}\n
There are additional criteria that relate to children born to non-citizen visa applicants after the visa application is made.\textsuperscript{129} For permanent protection visas, there are further criteria concerning offers of temporary or permanent stay and Resolution of Status (Class CD) visas.\textsuperscript{130}

\textit{Visa conditions}\n
A Subclass 785 visa holder will not be entitled to be granted a substantive visa, other than a protection visa, while he or she remains in Australia.\textsuperscript{131} Holders of Subclass 785 and 790

\textsuperscript{123} Protection visas are rarely refused under s.65(1)(b) of the Act for failure to satisfy this criterion. Decisions to refuse a visa for failure to pass the character test are usually made under s.501 ‘Refusal or cancellation of visa on character grounds’. Such decisions are reviewable by the General Division of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal: s.500.

\textsuperscript{124} Item 4003A was introduced by Migration Amendment Regulations 2006 (No.1) (SLI 2006, No.10). As a criterion for protection visas it applies to visa applications made on or after 1 March 2006 and applications made, but not finally determined, before that date. Prior to 1 March 2006, the relevant criterion was item 4003 which referred to ‘a person whose presence in Australia is, or would be, prejudicial to relations between Australia and a foreign country’. Item 4003 was amended to refer to ‘…contrary to Australia’s foreign policy interests’ and at the same time removed as a criterion for a protection visa. The effect of substituting item 4003A for protection visa subclasses was to exclude refusal on grounds relating to Australia’s foreign policy interests as this could adversely affect Australia’s international legal obligations to persons to whom Australia may have protection or humanitarian obligations under international law.

\textsuperscript{125} Explanatory Statement to SLI 2007, No. 314, item [315]. Other examples mentioned are where an applicant is mentally or physically incapacitated.

\textsuperscript{126} Clauses 785.227, 790.227 and 866.226. This criterion does not permit the Minister to refuse the grant of a Protection (Class XA) visa solely on the ground that the application was made by an ‘unauthorised maritime arrival’ (where such a person has been allowed to apply for the visa), as the consequences that follow from this status are exhaustively prescribed by s.46A of the Act and cl.866.226 should not be construed as permitting additional consequences: \textit{Plaintiff S297/2013 v MIBP} (2015) 255 CLR 231.

\textsuperscript{127} Clauses 785.228, 790.228 and 866.230.

\textsuperscript{128} Clauses 866.227, 866.231 and 866.232.

\textsuperscript{130} Clause 785.611 and condition 8503.
visas must not enter a country by reference to which they were found to be a person to whom Australia has protection obligations or were found to be a member of the family unit of such a visa holder unless approved by the Minister.132 Such visa holders are also required to advise the Department within 14 days of changing their residential address.133

Subclass 866 is subject only to condition 8559, which imposes a restriction on the visa holder’s return to the country by reference to which they were found to be owed protection obligations.134

**Circumstances in which protection visa must be refused**

Even if an applicant satisfies the substantive criteria for the grant of a protection visa, s.65 requires the Minister to refuse the visa if its grant is prevented by certain provisions in the Act.135 Of these, three apply specifically to protection visas:

- s.91W – relating to requests for identity documents;
- s.91WA – relating to the provision of bogus identity documents or destruction of certain identity documents; and
- s.91WB – concerning applications for protection visas by members of the same family unit.

These provisions, discussed in further detail below, were introduced with effect from 18 April 2015.136

**Identity, nationality or citizenship documentation**

In certain circumstances, the Minister must refuse to grant a protection visa if an applicant does not provide evidence of their identity, nationality or citizenship, or provides bogus documents in this regard. There are two circumstances to which this applies. The first, covered by s.91W, relates to circumstances where an applicant has been expressly requested to provide such documentation, while the second, s.91WA, has a broader application.

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132 Clause 785.611, 790.611 and condition 8570.
133 Clause 785.611, 790.611 and condition 8565. Additional conditions apply for holders of Subclass 785 and 790 visas applied for and granted between 18 November 2017 and 17:56 on 5 December 2017. These require visa holders to: use the same name to identify themselves in all official Australian identity documents (condition 8304); not become involved in activities that endanger or threaten any individual, or activities disruptive to, or violence threatening harm to, the Australian community or a group within the Australian community (condition 8303); and not engage in criminal conduct (condition 8564). These conditions were inserted by the Migration Legislation Amendment (2017 Measures No.4) Regulations 2017 (F2017L01425), which was disallowed by the Senate at 17:56 on 5 December 2017: Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 5 December 2017, 87-89 and 92-97 on motion by Senator McKim.
134 Clause 866.611 of Schedule 2 and Condition 8559 of Schedule 8 to the Migration Regulations 1994. This condition applies only to protection visas granted on or after 3 June 2013: Migration Amendment (Permanent Protection Visas) Regulation 2013 (SLI 2013, No. 234).
135 Sections 65(1)(a)(iii) and (1)(b).
136 Migration Amendment (Protection and Other Measures) Act 2015 (No.35 of 2015), items 8-12 of Schedule 1 and (Migration Amendment (Protection and Other Measures) Commencement Proclamation 2015 dated 16 April 2015 (FRLI F2015L00541)).
A ‘bogus document’, relevant to both ss.91W and 91WA, is defined in s.5(1) of the Act as a document the Minister reasonably suspects is a document that:

- purports to have been, but was not, issued in respect of the person; or
- is counterfeit or has been altered by a person who does not have authority to do so; or
- was obtained because of a false or misleading statement, whether or not made knowingly.\textsuperscript{137}

Non-compliance with a request to provide identity documents – s.91W

Section 91W(1) of the Act gives the Minister or an officer the power to request a protection visa applicant to produce documentary evidence of the applicant’s identity, nationality or citizenship. If an applicant who has been given such a request refuses, fails to comply, or produces a bogus document in response, and does not have a reasonable explanation for doing so, then the Minister (or review body) must refuse to grant the visa.\textsuperscript{138} However, this will apply only if the applicant was warned of that consequence at the time the request was made.\textsuperscript{139}

There is an exception to the application of s.91W. The Minister will not be required to refuse the visa if satisfied, firstly, that the applicant has a reasonable explanation for refusing or failing to comply with the request or for producing a bogus document in response and, secondly, that the applicant has either produced the relevant evidence, or taken reasonable steps to do so.\textsuperscript{140} A reasonable explanation for the provision of a bogus document connotes an explanation that is not fanciful, that is believable in the circumstances, which has sufficient rational connection to how and why the bogus document was provided, and which is accepted as genuine.\textsuperscript{141}

Issues arising under s.91W need not be addressed separately and in advance of other issues relating to the substantive criteria for the visa – for example, a decision maker may need to consider whether or not the applicant is at risk of harm if this is relevant to the reasonableness of any explanation given.\textsuperscript{142}

\begin{enumerate}
\item In \textit{AIB16 v MIBP} (2017) 254 FCR 457 it was held that there is no relevant distinction, for the purposes of the definition of ‘bogus document’, between an ‘original’ and a copy of the same document: at [76].
\item Sections 91W(2)(a)-(c). In this context, ‘produces a document’ includes producing, giving, presenting or providing the document or causing the document to be produced, given, presented or provided: s.91W(4). The Department of Home Affairs’ ‘Policy: Refugee and humanitarian – Refugee Law Guidelines’ (the Refugee Law Guidelines) section 16.3, re-issued 1 July 2017 states that in some instances applicants will need to produce original documents so that their authenticity can be verified. While the language of s.91W does not suggest that an applicant will fail to comply with a request to produce ‘documentary evidence’ by producing a copy of an original document, a copy may need to be closely inspected to determine whether it is a ‘bogus document’.
\item Section 91W(2)(d). Prior to amendment by the \textit{Migration Amendment (Protection and Other Measures) Act 2015} (No.35 of 2015), s.91W allowed the Minister to draw an inference unfavourable to the applicant’s identity, nationality or citizenship in circumstances where the applicant failed to comply with such a request, but did not require the Minister to refuse the visa.
\item AIB16 v MIBP (2017) 254 FCR 457 at [91]-[92].
\item See \textit{AIB16 v MIBP} [2017] FCCA 231 (Judge Riethmuller, 17 February 2016), upheld on appeal: \textit{AIB16 v MIBP} (2017) 254
\end{enumerate}
Although the Tribunal on review can consider s.91W and would be bound to affirm a decision to refuse the visa if the circumstances of s.91W are made out, it does not appear that it was intended for the Tribunal itself to exercise the power to request documents.143

Provision of bogus identity documents and the destruction of identity documents – s.91WA

The broader provision in s.91WA is not dependent upon a request for documentation having been made. Rather, it will apply in any case where either:

- an applicant provides144 a bogus document as evidence of their identity, nationality or citizenship; or
- the Minister is satisfied that an applicant has destroyed or disposed of documentary evidence of the applicant's identity, nationality or citizenship, or has caused such documentary evidence to be destroyed or disposed of.145

As with s.91W, there is an exception in circumstances where the Minister (or the review body) is satisfied that the applicant has a reasonable explanation for providing the bogus document or for the destruction or disposal of the documentary evidence, and that the applicant has either provided evidence of identity, nationality or citizenship as relevant, or has taken reasonable steps to do so.146 A reasonable explanation for the provision of a bogus document connotes an explanation that is not fanciful, that is believable in the circumstances, which has sufficient rational connection to how and why the bogus document was provided, and which has been accepted as genuine.147

In BGM16 v MIBP, the Full Federal Court held that s.91WA(1)(a) is directed to the provision of bogus documents during or in connection with an application for a protection visa.148 In this case, the applicant’s provision of a false passport upon entering Australia, and in two subsequent tourist visa applications and a student visa application did not engage the terms

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143 Section 415(1) empowers the Tribunal to exercise the powers and discretions of the primary decision maker, but the references in s.91W to the decision maker ‘granting the protection visa’ (e.g. in s.91W(2)(d), which requires the applicant to be warned that the decision maker cannot grant the applicant the visa) suggest that the power to request the documents is one of the primary decision maker, as the Tribunal does not generally grant visas in any case.

144 A person provides a document if the person provides, gives or presents the document or causes it to be provided, given or presented: s.91WA(3).

145 Section 91WA(2). The reasoning of the Federal Circuit Court in BES16 v MIBP [2017] FCCA 820 (Judge Driver, 21 June 2017) suggests that in considering whether an applicant has a reasonable explanation for providing a bogus document, the Tribunal is entitled to have regard to an applicant’s intention, knowledge or capacity, and that a ‘reasonable explanation’ is not limited to the innocent, unintended or accidental provision of such a document: at [80]-[81]. Although that judgment was considering s.91W, the reasoning appears to apply to the similar exception in s.91WA.

146 BGM16 v MIBP (2017) 252 FCR 97 per Mortimer and Wigney JJ at [81]; per Siopis J at [8]. The Court overturned the decision of the Federal Circuit Court in BGM16 v MIBP [2016] FCCA 2297 (Judge Street, 2 September 2016), which previously held that there was no warrant for reading in a temporal limitation to s.91WA. In reaching its conclusion, the Federal Court emphasised that an individual’s identity, nationality and citizenship are critical in the assessment of a protection visa application, that it would be a drastic result if s.91WA(1)(a) was construed to include the provision of a bogus document to anyone at any time, and that the use of the present tense ‘provides’ imposes a temporal limit: per Mortimer and Wigney JJ at [63], [70] and [81] (see similar comments by Siopis J at [4]).
of s.91WA.\textsuperscript{149} However, it is not clear from the judgment in \textit{BGM16} whether s.91WA(1)(a) applies in the case of a bogus document provided in connection with a protection visa application made before 18 April 2015.\textsuperscript{150}

Additionally, while s.91WA(1)(a) requires a connection to a protection visa application, it is not limited to those cases where the false information contained in the ‘bogus document’ is relied upon by an applicant. There is no requirement for a decision-maker to ascertain the manner in which a bogus document is given and relied upon, and which information in the document is false and which is accurate.\textsuperscript{151}

Although the Court in \textit{BGM16} was primarily addressing the construction of s.91WA(1)(a), aspects of its reasoning suggest that destruction or disposal of documents for the purposes of s.91WA(1)(b) must also have some connection to the making of a protection visa application.\textsuperscript{152} However, the Federal Circuit Court has more recently rejected such an argument, finding that the temporal nexus between the protection visa application process and the destruction of identity documents is realistically non-existent because of the difference between s.91WA(1)(b), which is written in the past tense (i.e. ‘destroyed’, ‘disposed’ and ‘caused’) and s.91WA(1)(a), which is written in the present tense (i.e. ‘provides’). The Court was of the view that any unfairness associated with this approach is removed, or at least ameliorated, by the provisions of s.91WA(2).\textsuperscript{153} Nonetheless, given the Full Federal Court’s observations in \textit{BGM16} about the ‘drastic result’ of a broad interpretation of the scope of s.91WA(1)(b), this issue is likely to be the subject of further judicial consideration.\textsuperscript{154}

\textbf{Applications made by family members of protection visa holders}

Section 91WB prevents the Minister from granting a protection visa to an applicant on the basis of the family unit criteria in ss.36(2)(b) or (c) if the applicant applies for the visa \textit{after} their family member has already been granted a protection visa.

\textsuperscript{149} \textit{BGM16 v MIBP} (2017) 252 FCR 97 per Mortimer and Wigney JJ at [105].

\textsuperscript{150} Item 15(3) of Schedule 1 to the \textit{Migration Amendment (Protection and Other Measures) Act 2015}, stated that s.91WA applies to protection visa applications not finally determined at the time the provision commenced, but as ‘provides’ is expressed in the present tense and the section commenced on 18 April 2015, it is unclear whether it applies to bogus documents provided at an earlier time.


\textsuperscript{152} In \textit{BGM16 v MIBP} (2017) 252 FCR 97 at [70], Mortimer and Wigney JJ remarked in relation to s.91WA(1)(b) (similarly to s.91WA(1)(a)) that it would be a drastic consequence if the scope of the provision extended to the destruction or disposal of identity documents at any time, and anywhere.

\textsuperscript{153} \textit{EDI18 v MHA} [2019] FCCA 631 (Judge Vasta, 15 March 2019) at [29]-[30] and [38]-[39].

\textsuperscript{154} See also the Minister’s Second Reading speech, referred to by the Court in \textit{EDI18} (at [40]-[41]), which commented that the provision was intended to address the common practice of identity documents being destroyed or discarded by those seeking to enter Australia unlawfully or by people smugglers on their behalf: \textit{Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates}, House of Representatives, 25 June 2014, 7279 (Scott Morrison, Minister for Immigration and Border Protection).
PERSONS IN RESPECT OF WHOM AUSTRALIA HAS PROTECTION OBLIGATIONS

As noted above, a protection visa may be granted on the basis that the non-citizen meets either the refugee (s.36(2)(a)) or complementary protection criteria (36(2)(aa)).

For the purpose of s.36(2)(a), the definition of ‘refugee’ that is applicable to a particular case depends upon the date of the protection visa application. For applications made prior to 16 December 2014, an applicant will meet the criterion in s.36(2)(a) if they are ‘a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol’.

However, for applications made on or after 16 December 2014, the *Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014* amended s.36(2)(a) to refer instead to a person ‘in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee’. Refugee is defined in s.5H of the Act.

Unlike the pre 16 December 2014 criterion, which directly links the visa grant to the discharge of Australia’s obligations under the Refugees Convention, the post 16 December 2014 definition of ‘refugee’, does not reference the Convention. However, that criterion is nonetheless intended to codify Australia’s obligations under the Convention, rather than resile from them.155 Similarly, although s.36(2)(aa) does not reference Australia’s obligations under human rights instruments, it is intended to provide a mechanism to enhance the integrity of Australia’s arrangements for meeting its non-refoulement obligations under the ICCPR, the Second Optional Protocol, the CAT, and CROC.156

Protection obligations as a refugee

The definitions used to determine whether Australia has protection obligations in respect of a person because they are a ‘refugee’, for the purpose of s.36(2)(a) of the Act, depend upon when the visa application was made.

Protection obligations under the Refugees Convention (pre 16 December 2014)

If an applicant who applied for a protection visa prior to 16 December 2014 is claiming to be a refugee, the decision maker must be satisfied, pursuant to s.36(2)(a) of the Act, that the applicant is a person ‘in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations’ under the Refugees Convention and Protocol.

156 Explanatory Memorandum, Migration Amendment (Complementary Protection) Bill 2011 at 1.
Generally speaking, Australia has protection obligations to persons who satisfy the definition of ‘refugee’ in Article 1 of the Refugees Convention. Therefore, the criterion in s.36(2)(a) of the Act calls for consideration of that definition. However, the concept of ‘protection obligations’ in s.36(2)(a) is qualified by s.36(3), which provides that Australia is taken not to have protection obligations in respect of a non-citizen in certain specified circumstances, and ss.91R, 91S and 91T, which explain or qualify some aspects of the Convention definition.

The Refugees Convention – Historical background and structure
Since early in the twentieth century the international community has assumed responsibility for protecting and assisting refugees. Prior to World War II a number of international agreements were drawn up for the benefit of refugees. At present the primary international instruments dealing with refugee status are the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol. The Refugees Convention was drafted in the aftermath of the Second World War and originally only permitted a person to be declared a refugee as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951, and allowed for contracting states to limit its application to events in Europe. However, the Protocol removed the time and geographical limits in the Convention’s definition of a refugee. The Convention and Protocol thus extend to all persons who are refugees because of events occurring at any time.

Chapter 1 of the Convention comprises the General Provisions, including the definition of the term ‘refugee’ (Article 1), general obligations on the refugee (Article 2), and obligations on Contracting States (Articles 3 to 11). The remaining chapters relate mainly to matters such as the specific rights and obligations which should be accorded to refugees by the Contracting State and more general administrative matters relating to the Convention itself.

It should be noted that the Act does not incorporate into municipal law the Convention in its entirety. The phrase ‘in respect of whom…Australia has protection obligations under [the Convention]’ in s.36(2)(a) describes no more than a person who is a refugee within the meaning of Article 1.

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157 For example, the Arrangements of 12 May 1926 and 30 June 1928, the Conventions of 28 October 1933 and 10 February 1938, the protocol of 14 September 1939 and the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization, all of which established the status of ‘statutory refugee’ for certain individuals, which status is preserved in Article 1A(1) of the 1951 Convention. There are also a number of regional instruments relating to refugees, including the 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. In addition, the Statute of the Office of the UNHCR gives the UNHCR authority to provide protection to refugees falling under its competence; see UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status and Guidelines on International Protection (UNHCR, re-issued February 2019) at [13]-[23].

158 Articles 1A and 1B.

159 Including Chapter II - Juridical Status; Chapter III - Gainful Employment; and Chapter IV - Welfare.

160 Including Chapter V - Administrative Measures; Chapter VI - Executory & Transitory Provisions and Chapter VII - Final Clauses which includes clauses dealing with signature, ratification and accession, territorial application, reservations and entry into force.

161 NAGV and NAGW of 2002 v MIMIA (2005) 222 CLR 161 at [42]. The High Court has elsewhere emphasized that the Act is not concerned to enact in Australian municipal law the various protection obligations of Contracting States found in
It should also be noted that the Convention does not deal with the matter of granting asylum or the mechanism by which this might occur. The manner of granting asylum to refugees under the Refugees Convention is a matter for each State’s municipal laws.

The Convention definition of ‘refugee’

The term ‘refugee’ is defined in Article 1 of the Refugees Convention. In particular, Article 1A(2) of the Convention, read with the Protocol, defines a refugee as a person who:

owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

In the case of a person who has more than one nationality, the term “the country of his nationality” shall mean each of the countries of which he is a national, and a person shall not be deemed to be lacking the protection of the country of his nationality if, without any valid reason based on well-founded fear, he has not availed himself of the protection of one of the countries of which he is a national.

Other provisions of Article 1 are also relevant to an assessment of whether a non-citizen is a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Convention and Protocol. In particular, there are provisions which deal with circumstances in which a person may cease to be a refugee or be excluded from the benefits of refugee status. Elements of this definition have been qualified by the Act.

The statutory qualifications: sections 91R, 91S, 91T

The question whether Australia has protection obligations to a person also involves consideration of ss.91R, 91S and 91T of the Act. These sections make detailed provision with respect to matters which would otherwise fall for consideration solely by reference to the terms of the Convention.

These qualifications are contained in Subdivision AL of Part 2 Division 3 of the Act, ‘Other provisions about protection visas’. Section 91R qualifies the concept of persecution in Article 1A(2); s.91S limits the application of the Convention ground ‘membership of a particular social group’ in Article 1A(2) in relation to members of a family; and s.91T qualifies the concept of ‘non-political crime’ in Article 1F(b) of the Convention.

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163 The grant of ‘asylum’ is mentioned briefly in the Preamble but nowhere else in the Refugees Convention.
165 Article 1C, see Chapter 7 of this Guide.
166 Article 1D, E and F, see Chapter 7 of this Guide.
167 Section 91R is discussed in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 of this Guide; s.91S in Chapter 5; and s.91T in Chapter 7.
Protection obligations as a statutory refugee (post 16 December 2014)

For protection visa applications made on or after 16 December 2014, s.36(2)(a) refers to Australia having protection obligations to a person because they are a ‘refugee’. The term ‘refugee’ is defined in s.5H(1) of the Act as follows:

1. For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person in Australia, the person is a refugee if the person:
   (a) in a case where the person has a nationality—is outside the country of his or her nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or
   (b) in a case where the person does not have a nationality—is outside the country of his or her former habitual residence and owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to return to it.

This definition, which draws on terms used in the Convention, was intended to codify Article 1A(2) as interpreted in Australian case law.\(^{168}\) The term ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ is further defined in the Act, incorporating other concepts derived from the Convention, including the requirement that the persecution be for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.

Just as Article 1A(2) of the Convention is qualified by Article 1F, s.5H(1) is qualified by s.5H(2), which provides s.5H(1) will not apply if the Minister has serious reasons for considering that an applicant has committed certain grave crimes.\(^{169}\)

The statutory qualifications: sections 5J, 5K, 5L and 5LA

The definition of ‘refugee’ in s.5H(1) is part of a statutory framework relating to refugees based upon the Government’s interpretation of terms and concepts derived from the Refugees Convention as they apply in Australia.\(^{170}\) The concept of ‘well-founded fear of persecution’, which forms part of the definition of ‘refugee’ is further defined in s.5J of the Act, incorporating some concepts arising from Article 1A(2) as interpreted by the Australian courts, while qualifying others. Further definitions relevant to ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ are set out in ss.5K-LA.

Protection obligations on complementary protection grounds

A person in respect of whom Australia does not have protection obligations under the refugee criterion may nevertheless be granted a protection visa, if he or she satisfies the ‘complementary protection’ criterion in s.36(2)(aa).\(^{171}\) Unlike the pre 16 December 2014

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\(^{168}\) Explanatory Memorandum, Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Caseload Legacy) Bill 2014 at 169 [1167].

\(^{169}\) Article 1F and s.5H(2) are discussed in Chapter 7 of this Guide.

\(^{170}\) Explanatory Memorandum, Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Caseload Legacy) Bill 2014 at 169 [1165].

\(^{171}\) The criterion in s.36(2)(aa) can only be met once the decision maker is satisfied that the non-citizen is not a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention in accordance with s.36(2)(a): MIA v SZQRB (2013) 210 FCR 505 per Lander and Gordon JJ at [71].
refugee criterion in s.36(2)(a), s.36(2)(aa) does not link directly to any international instrument although, as noted above, Australia’s obligations under a number of such instruments provide the context for its introduction.

Section 36(2)(aa) requires that the non-citizen be a person in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the person being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk he or she will suffer significant harm. A person will suffer significant harm if he or she will be arbitrarily deprived of their life; or the death penalty will be carried out on the person; or the person will be subjected to torture; or to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or to degrading treatment or punishment. ‘Cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment’, ‘degrading treatment or punishment’, and ‘torture’, are further defined in the Act.

However, there will not be a real risk that the person will suffer significant harm if any one of the conditions in s.36(2B) are established, relating to internal relocation, state protection and generalised risk of harm. Furthermore, a person will be ineligible for the grant of a protection visa on complementary protection grounds if he or she has committed certain crimes, or if he or she can access protection in a third country.

Importantly, s.36 requires that the complementary protection criterion can only be considered after the non-citizen has been assessed as not meeting the refugee criterion. This ensures that the primacy of the Refugees Convention is maintained.

The statutory qualifications: sections 36(2B) and 36(2C)

The complementary protection criterion is subject to the qualification contained in subsection 36(2B). That is, there is taken not to be a real risk of significant harm if the non-citizen could reasonably relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk of such harm, or that protection could be obtained from an authority of the country such that there would not be a real risk of harm, or the risk is faced by the population of the country generally, and not the non-citizen personally.

In addition, under s.36(2C) of the Act, a person is ineligible for the grant of the visa if there are serious reasons for considering that he or she has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, a crime against humanity, or a serious non-political crime; or there are reasonable grounds for considering the non-citizen would be a danger to Australia’s security, or the Australian community (having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime). These grounds of ‘ineligibility’ broadly mirror: the exclusion provision in

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172 Section 36(2)(aa) as inserted by the Migration Amendment (Complementary Protection) Act 2011 (No. 121 of 2011).
173 Sections 5(1) and 36(2A).
174 Section 5(1).
175 Explanatory Memorandum, Migration Amendment (Complementary Protection) Bill 2011 at 11.
176 The qualifications in s.36(2B) are discussed in Chapter 10 of this Guide.
Article 1F of the Refugees Convention, which effectively serves to exclude persons from the definition of refugee; and Article 33(2) of the Refugees Convention, which qualifies a signatory's obligation under the Convention in respect of persons who have committed certain crimes. These qualifications to the complementary protection criterion are designed to provide the same exclusions to the complementary protection regime as applies to those making a protection visa application claiming protection as a refugee, although it should be noted that Article 33 (or its s.36(1C) equivalent) is not part of the consideration under s.36(2)(a) of the Act. Article 33 arises in respect of persons who have already been recognised as refugees, whereas s.36(1C) is specified as a separate criterion for a protection visa.

**Common statutory qualifications: s.36(3)**

Section 36(3) qualifies the concept of ‘protection obligations’ in s.36(2)(a) (both pre and post 16 December 2014) and s.36(2)(aa) by setting out circumstances in which Australia is taken not to have protection obligations in respect of a non-citizen.

Section 36(3) is itself qualified by subsections (4), (5) and (5A). The effect of these provisions is that Australia is to be taken not to have protection obligations in respect of a non-citizen who has not taken all possible steps to avail himself or herself of a right to enter and reside in any country other than Australia (the third country) unless:

- the non-citizen has a well-founded fear of being persecuted for a Convention reason in that country (s.36(4)(a));
- the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen availing him or herself of that right, there would be a real risk the non-citizen would suffer significant harm in that country (s.36(4)(b));
- the non-citizen has a well-founded fear the third country would return the non-citizen to another country where he or she would be persecuted for Convention reasons (s.36(5)); or
- the non-citizen has a well-founded fear that the third country will return him or her to a country where the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the person availing themselves of the right to enter and reside in the third country, there would be a real risk of suffering significant harm in the other country (s.36(5A)).

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177 Explanatory Memorandum, Migration Amendment (Complementary Protection) Bill 2011 at 14. Section 36(2C), Article 1F and Article 33(2) are discussed in Chapter 7 of this Guide.

178 Note that although, in most cases where s.36(3) does not apply to prevent an applicant meeting s.36(2)(a) because of one of the exceptions, it will be the ‘refugee’ exceptions in ss.36(4)(a) and (5) which will be applicable. However, there appears to be nothing to prevent s.36(3) not applying to an applicant who meets s.36(2)(a) on the basis of ss.36(4)(b) or (5A), which refer to a real risk of significant harm. That is, an applicant who has a well-founded fear of being persecuted for a Convention reason, but who has a right to enter and reside in a third country, may not be excluded from protection if, although having no well-founded fear in that country, has a real risk of suffering significant harm there. Similarly, an
Section 36(3) was intended to deal with circumstances of attempts to choose Australia as a preferred place of asylum over other places where the applicant would have no well-founded fear, or ‘forum shopping’ and is usually considered in relation to ‘safe third countries’.

**INTERPRETATIVE PRINCIPLES**

The relevant principles of interpretation relating to protection visas were explained by the High Court in *MIMIA v QAAH of 2004*. As the majority explained, the relevant law is found in the Act and Regulations, which are governed by Australian principles of statutory interpretation and in particular, the *Acts Interpretation Act 1901* (Cth) (the Interpretation Act).

Section 15AA of the Interpretation Act requires that in the interpretation of a provision of an Act, regard must be had to the purpose or object of the Act. Section 15AB permits recourse to extrinsic materials to confirm that the meaning of the provision is the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text, taking into account its context in the Act and the purpose or object underlying the Act, or to determine its meaning where the provision is ambiguous or obscure or where the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text leads to a result that is manifestly absurd or is unreasonable. The materials that may be considered for these purposes include any relevant explanatory memorandum or second reading speech and any treaty or other international agreement referred to in the Act.

applicant who has a real risk of suffering significant harm, but who has a right to enter and reside in a third country, may not be excluded from protection if, although having no real risk of significant harm in that third country, has a well-founded fear of being persecuted there (with the effect that ss.36(4) or (5) are applicable).

179 Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, Border Protection Legislation Amendment Bill 1999.

180 The operation of s.36(3) in this context is considered in detail in Chapter 9 of this Guide. The Full Federal Court has held that s.36(3), as qualified by subsections (4) and (5), is not confined to ‘third countries’ as it expressly encompasses the country of nationality as among those in respect of which it can apply: *NBGM v MIMIA* (2006) 150 FCR 522 per Black CJ at [12], Mansfield J at [44], Allsop J at [210], Marshall J agreeing with Allsop J. See also per Emmett J at first instance [2004] FCA 1373 (Emmett J, 25 October 2004) at [55]-[59]. This aspect of the Full Court’s reasons was not disturbed on appeal to the High Court: somewhat surprisingly, and notwithstanding its emphasis on the primacy of the statutory provisions, the High Court did not consider the effect of s.36(3): see *NBGM v MIMA* (2006) 231 CLR 52. However, in light of the High Court’s interpretation of the Convention definition, the provisions of ss.36(3)-(5) would probably operate in the same way as Article 1A(2) in relation to the country of flight and therefore need not be given separate consideration in relation to that country.
Further, Australian courts will favour a construction of the Act and Regulations which conforms to Australia’s obligations under an international treaty, or convention.\textsuperscript{188}

**Interpreting international instruments**

Where a provision of a treaty is transposed into a statute to enact it as part of domestic law, the prima facie legislative intention is that the transposed text should bear the same meaning in the domestic statute as it does in the treaty.\textsuperscript{189} As already mentioned, s.36(2)(a) of the Act as applicable to applications made prior to 16 December 2014 focuses upon the definition of ‘refugee’ in Article 1 of the Convention. Thus, s.15AB(2)(d) of the Interpretation Act permits the Convention to be considered for the purposes of interpreting s.36(2)(a) as it applies to such applications.\textsuperscript{190} In a similar manner, to the limited extent that the Act references other international instruments (for example in the definitions of some of the forms of ‘significant harm’ for the purposes of the complementary protection criterion) similar principles apply.\textsuperscript{191}

For applications made on or after 16 December 2014, the interpretation of ‘refugee’ in s.36(2)(a) should be made by reference to the relevant definitions in the Act rather than to the Convention. However, to the extent that those definitions replicate terms from the Refugees Convention, existing Australian case law interpreting such terms will remain applicable, subject to any legislative intention to the contrary.

**Treaty interpretation**

It is well established that the Refugees Convention should be interpreted in accordance with the principles of international treaty interpretation as set out in the *Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties* (‘Vienna Convention’).\textsuperscript{192} The general rule of interpretation of treaty

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\textsuperscript{188} *MIMA v QAAH of 2004* (2006) 231 CLR 1 at [34]; see also *MIEA v Teoh* (1995) 183 CLR 273 per Mason CJ and Deane J at 287-8. However, an international treaty that does not form part of Australia’s domestic law cannot operate as a direct source of individual rights and obligations. In particular, there is no requirement on the Tribunal to consider the best interests of an applicant child, as per the *Convention on the Rights of the Child*, in determining whether or not that applicant meets either the refugee or complementary protection criteria under the Migration Act: *FMN17 (by his litigation guardian) v MICMA* [2018] FCCA 3499 (Judge Street, 28 November 2018) at [20].

\textsuperscript{189} Section 15AB(1) provides that in the interpretation of a provision of an Act, if any material not forming part of the Act is capable of assisting in the ascertainment of the meaning of the provision, consideration may be given to that material (a) to confirm that the meaning of the provision is the ordinary meaning conveyed by its text taking into account its context in the Act and the purpose or object underlying the Act; or (b) to determine the meaning of the provision when the provision is ambiguous or obscure or the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text leads to a result that is manifestly absurd or is unreasonable. Subsection (2)(b) provides that the material that may be considered includes any treaty or other international agreement that is referred to in the Act.

\textsuperscript{190} This would only appear to be applicable to provisions which directly reference international instruments, such as references to the ‘Covenant’ (ICPR) in s.5(1) of the Act. Although the list of significant harms in s.36(2A) contains terms drawn from international instruments, it is clearly intended that these be further qualified by the definitions in s.5(1).

\textsuperscript{191} *Applicant A v MIEA* (1997) 190 CLR 225 at [231] per Brennan CJ.

\textsuperscript{192} *Applicant A v MIEA* (1997) 190 CLR 225 at 239-240 per Dawson J, at 252 per McHugh J (Brennan CJ agreeing) and at 277 per Gummow J. That case concerned earlier statutory provisions which defined ‘refugee’ as having ‘the same meaning as it has in Article 1 of [the Convention]’; however the discussion of the applicable principles of interpretation would be equally relevant to s.36(2)(a) as that provision is to be understood: see *NAGV and NAGW v MIMA* (2005) 222 CLR 161 at [37]-[43]; and *MIMA v QAAH of 2004* (2006) 231 CLR 1 per Gummow ACJ, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ at [34] and Kirby J at [74]. The Vienna Convention was ratified by Australia on 13 June 1974 and came into force on 27 January 1980; see *QAAH* at fn 27. On the relevance of the Vienna Convention to the interpretation of the Refugees Convention, see also *MIMA v Savvin* (2000) 98 FCR 168 per Drummond J at [14]-[15], Katz J at [93]-[94].
provisions appears in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, paragraph 1 of which provides that:

A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.

The subsequent paragraphs of Article 31 provide guidance on what comprises the context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty and other relevant matters to be taken into account. Article 32 of the Vienna Convention states that where the interpretation according to Article 31 leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure or leads to a result that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable:

Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning.

The High Court has held that Article 31 calls for a holistic approach in which '[p]rimacy is to be given to the written text of the Vienna Convention but the context, object and purpose of the treaty must also be considered'. This approach would be equally applicable to interpretation of other international instruments referred to in the legislation (such as the reference to ICCPR in the definitions of the various form of significant harm in s.5(1)).

Considered decisions of foreign courts, and the work of foreign jurists, can also provide guidance.

Refugee law and complementary protection in other jurisdictions

Australian Courts have observed that it is desirable to strive for uniformity of interpretation of international instruments. Thus, Australian Courts would seek to adopt, if available, a construction of the Refugees Convention definition that conforms with any generally accepted construction in other countries subscribing to the Convention, subject to the terms of the Act. However, the relevance of foreign authority for Australian decision makers in relation to the Refugees Convention is limited by the wealth of domestic jurisprudence on the operation of the Convention definition in the Australian context. It is also limited by the

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193 See paragraphs (2) and (3). Paragraph (4) states that 'a special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended': Applicant A v MIEA (1997) 190 CLR 225 per McHugh J at 254 following Zeika J in Golder v United Kingdom (1975) 1 EHRR 524 and Murphy J in the Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1 at 177; see also the discussion of the principles and the authorities by McHugh J at 251-6, and Brennan CJ at 231, Dawson J at 240, Gummow J at 277 and Kirby J at 292-6. In Morrison v Peacock (2002) 210 CLR 274, Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ explained at [16]: The need to give the text primacy in interpretation results from the tendency of multilateral treaties to be the product of compromises by the parties to such treaties. However, treaties should be interpreted in a more liberal manner than that ordinarily adopted by a court construing exclusively domestic legislation.' As to ascertaining the object and purpose of a treaty, while the text of the treaty may assist, assistance may also be obtained from extrinsic sources: Applicant A v MIEA (1997) 190 CLR 225 per Brennan CJ at 231.


particular way the Convention is implemented in Australian legislation, particularly in the case of applications to which the refugee definition in s.5H applies. Further, differing approaches among jurisdictions to the interpretation of the Refugees Convention also means that foreign case law may not always be particularly helpful within the Australian context.

The complementary protection criterion in s.36(2)(aa) was intended to introduce greater efficiency, transparency and accountability into Australia’s arrangements for adhering to its non-refoulement obligations under the ICCPR, Second Optional Protocol, CAT and CROC but it does not itself represent an incorporation of those obligations. As such the need to directly consider the terms of these international instruments is limited. The express references to ‘Article 7 of the [ICCPR]’ and ‘Articles of the [ICCPR]’ in the definitions of ‘torture’, ‘cruel and inhuman treatment and punishment’ and degrading treatment or punishment will require consideration of the meaning of these articles, which may be guided by the views expressed in the commentary of the relevant international human rights treaty bodies. As the criterion in s.36(2)(aa) and related provisions do not directly mirror tests used in other jurisdictions, foreign case law may be of only limited relevance to the interpretation of that criterion.

In sum, decision makers in Australia must first and foremost be guided by the domestic legislation and the legal principles developed by the Australian courts. While foreign case law may provide assistance in matters where there is no Australian jurisprudence, care should be exercised when drawing upon it.

Use of the UNHCR Handbook and other commentaries

The UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status and Guidelines on International Protection (the Handbook) and other commentaries on the Refugees Convention published by the UNHCR and others can provide useful guidance

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197 As was pointed out in NAGV and NAGW of 2002 v MIMIA (2005) 222 CLR 161 at [18], other Contracting States have adopted criteria drawn from the Convention in different ways in their migration laws. Their Honours observed that the legislative methods adopted in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States all differ.

198 For example, the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Canada in Attorney-General (Canada) v Ward [1993] 2 SCR 689; (1993) 103 DLR (4th) 1 appears to have been influenced by the provisions of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms; and the reasoning of the US Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit in Canas-Segovia v INS 902 F 2d 717 (9th Cir 1990) was evidently influenced by particular principles of US constitutional law. See Applicant A v MIEA (1997) 190 CLR 57 FCR 225 per Dawson J at 245-7, Gummow J at 281, and Kirby J at 296, Ram v MIEA (1995) 57 FCR 565 at 567, and Mehenri v MIMA [1999] FCA 789 (Lehane J, 24 June 1999) at [20].

199 Explanatory Memorandum, Migration Amendment (Complementary Protection) Bill 2011 at 1.

200 Although the language of s.36(2)(aa) and related provisions draws from obligations arising under these four international instruments, specific legislation would be required in order to give effect to and incorporate the obligations arising from the instruments themselves into Australian law. This is the position, for example, with respect to the ICCPR: Dietrich v R (1992) 177 CLR 292 per Mason CJ and McHugh J at [17]; Minogue v Williams [2000] FCA 125 (Ryan, Merkel and Goldberg JJ, 17 February 2000) at [24]-[25].

201 In MIAC v MZYYL (2012) 207 FCR 211 at [20] the Court stated that it is not necessary or useful to assess how the international instruments would apply to the circumstances of a case. The Court emphasised that the complementary protection regime in the Act uses definitions and tests different from those referred to in the international human rights treaties and commentaries on those treaties: at [18].

202 Explanatory Memorandum, Migration Amendment (Complementary Protection) Bill 2011 at [52].

203 UNHCR, re-issued February 2019.

on aspects of the Refugees Convention in the absence of binding authority, and have been referred to, where relevant, in this Guide. In areas where there is little or no Australian authority these commentaries can provide useful insight.

However, it should be remembered that the Handbook and other commentaries on the Convention (and other international treaties) should not be taken to be determinative of any question of interpretation, or as a substitute for the words of the Convention properly interpreted. Some of the views expressed in the Handbook and other commentaries have been approved by Australian courts while others have not and the courts have emphasised that the Handbook is not binding. Further, the refugee criterion in s.36(2)(a) (for all applications) is subject to statutory qualifications not reflected in the Handbook. For all these reasons, recourse to Australian case law and legislation will be more helpful than the Handbook.