INTRODUCTION

The principles discussed in the previous chapters of this Guide must be applied to a wide range of circumstances and claims. Simply because conduct is characterised as being of a particular type - such as revenge, extortion, domestic violence, application of a generally applicable law, or breach of a human right - or in a particular context, such as civil war - this does not answer the question as to whether the conduct constitutes persecution in the relevant sense. The question to be asked is whether, in the circumstances of the particular case, the conduct in question is discriminatory and referable in the relevant sense to one or more of the refugee nexus grounds. If so, the further question that may arise is whether the discrimination, if official, is appropriate and adapted to achieving a legitimate object of the
country concerned or, if perpetrated by private citizens, whether an appropriate level of state protection is available.

Further, the Federal Court has cautioned that decisions on the facts of one case do not really aid the determination of another case. Whether the circumstances come within the refugee definition is largely a question of fact for the decision maker based upon all the available evidence. Each case must be determined on its individual merits. There can be no formulaic approach. Nevertheless the approach of the courts in certain commonly arising fact situations can provide guidance. This chapter considers some of the cases involving claims relating to breaches of human rights standards, civil disturbances, laws and law enforcement, self-expression, personal and family relationships, criminal conduct, and vulnerability.

The focus of this chapter is on the application of the law to particular situations in the context of the refugee definition in Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (the ‘Convention’), as qualified by s.91R of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act), which are relevant to protection visa applications made before 16 December 2014. Applications made on or after that date are subject to the codified refugee definition in s.5H of the Act. Section 5H draws on concepts from the Convention definition, but does not replicate it, and is qualified by a number of different provisions. This chapter does not purport to reconcile the case law with the codified refugee definition (or with the complementary protection provisions as discussed in Chapter 10 of this Guide). To the extent that the principles discussed in this chapter are derived from terminology used in the Convention definition which is similar to that in the codified definition, it may be expected that similar principles would apply. However, in the absence of judicial authority on point, decision-makers should exercise caution and pay close regard to the precise wording of the Act in applying these concepts to the codified provisions.

**FAILURE TO ADHERE TO BASIC STANDARDS OF HUMAN RIGHTS**

The Convention has been recognised in Australia and elsewhere as an instrument embodying principles for the protection of basic human rights and freedoms and it is uncontroversial that ‘persecution’ in the Convention sense can include serious violations of such rights and freedoms. Nevertheless, the protection of the Convention will not normally

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2. The Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Caseload Legacy) Act 2014 (SLI 2014, No. 135) amended s.36(2)(a) of the Act to remove reference to the Refugees Convention and instead refer to Australia having protection obligations in respect of a person because they are a ‘refugee’. ‘Refugee’ is defined in s.5H, with related definitions and qualifications in ss.5(1) and 5J-SLA. These amendments commenced on 18 April 2015 and apply to protection visa applications made on or after 16 December 2014: table items 14 and 22 of Schedule 5, Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Commencement Proclamation dated 16 April 2015 (FRLI F2015L00543).

be attracted where the harm feared, no matter how serious, amounts to an indiscriminate or non-selective infringement of human rights. In Applicant A, Brennan CJ held that:

...the object and purpose of the Convention is not simply the protection of those who suffer a denial of enjoyment of their fundamental rights and freedoms; they must suffer that denial by prescribed kinds of persecution, that is, persecution "for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion".4

The general principle that persecution must involve discriminatory conduct, for one or more of the Convention reasons, is reflected in s.91R(1) of the Act. As the Full Federal Court has held, any failure to protect 'core human rights' would not amount to persecution unless the requirements of s.91R are satisfied.5

Nevertheless, international human rights standards are relevant in determining whether prosecution and penalties under the laws of a country are persecutory.6

CIVIL DISTURBANCES

The Convention definition of ‘refugee’ does not encompass those fleeing generalised violence, internal turmoil or civil war.7 However, it cannot be assumed that civil disturbances, or civil or clan warfare, which results in a general state of indiscriminate violence or general danger affecting a whole community, necessarily precludes the existence of Convention-based persecution in an individual case. Conversely, in a context of pervasive political violence in the applicant’s country, a finding that activities engaged in by an applicant carry a high risk of violence would not automatically lead to a refugee finding. It may be necessary to consider, for example, whether the violence has the necessary selective or discriminatory quality, whether the applicant’s activities are legitimate (such as participation in peaceful street processions that may attract violence from malicious political opponents) and if so, whether an appropriate level of state protection is available against such violence.8

Where persecution occurs in a context of widespread conflict, it would be wrong to require a claimant to establish a risk of persecution over and above the risks faced by others caught up in the conflict. The principle of ‘differential impact’ was espoused by the House of Lords in

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4 Applicant A v MIEA (1997) 190 CLR 225 at 232-233. In that case, the appellants had emphasised that the persecution of parents with one child by forcible sterilisation involved the infringement of fundamental human rights. Dawson J stated that he did not see how those considerations assisted the applicants, since they merely suggest that the persecution feared was serious and may infringe internationally recognised human rights, whereas the issue was whether that persecution was for one of the five Convention reasons: at 244. His Honour stated that although the Convention clearly is concerned with the protection of ‘fundamental rights and freedoms’, it would be wrong to depart from the language and context of the Convention definition by invoking its humanitarian objectives without appreciating the limits it places on the achievement of them: at 245-6.

5 NADO v MIMIA [2003] FCAFC 169 (French, Sackville and Hely JJ, 8 August 2003) at [26].


Adan v SSHD. It held that, in circumstances of civil war such as inter-clan fighting in Somalia, the individual or group had to show a well-founded fear of persecution over and above the risk to life and liberty inherent in the civil war or a fear of persecution for Convention reasons over and above the ordinary risks of clan warfare. The High Court has however ruled that the ‘differential impact’ principle does not form part of Australian law and should not be used. Justice McHugh explained:

It is not the degree or differentiation of risk that determines whether a person caught in a civil war is a refugee under the Convention definition. It is a complex of factors that is determinative – the motivation of the oppressor; the degree and repetition of harm to the rights, interests or dignity of the individual; the justification, if any, for the infliction of that harm and the proportionality of the means used to achieve the justification.

The expression ‘differential operation’ may evoke some elements of the concept of ‘persecution’, and depending upon the factual issues raised, it may be helpful to consider whether treatment of a certain kind is discriminatory, or ‘differential’. However it is the language of the Convention as well as the requirements of s.91R(1) which must be applied.

In sum, whether the relevant test is satisfied will depend on the totality of the circumstances, and not on the context in which the allegedly persecutory conduct occurs.

The observations of the High Court on the concept of ‘differential impact’ reinforce the principle that, apart from any requirements imposed by statute, no extra gloss should be placed on the words of the Convention definition.

LAWS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT

Laws and their enforcement give rise to a wide variety of situations that often require close scrutiny in the Convention context. In particular, consideration needs to be given to whether the law in question is discriminatory, or is applied in a discriminatory way towards a person or group for one or more of the Convention reasons, and if so, whether the discriminatory treatment is appropriate and adapted to achieving some legitimate object of the country concerned.

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10 Adan v SSHD [1998] 2 WLR 702 per Lord Slynn at 705; at 711 per Lord Lloyd (with whom the remaining members of the House agreed).
12 MIMA v Haji Ibrahim (2000) 204 CLR 1 at [70]. Note that in the context of a civil war, while it is necessary to establish the motivation of the allegedly persecutory conduct: MIMA v Haji Ibrahim (2000) 204 CLR 1 per McHugh J at [102] and similarly under s.91R(1)(a) of the Act, the High Court in Haji Ibrahim rejected the proposition that a decision maker would be required, as a critical step in the process, to look to the objective of the war and determine whether it is directed against persons because of race, religion or group membership: at [102] per McHugh J, at [146] per Gummow J, Gleeson CJ and Hayne J agreeing. Justice Gummow observed at [146]-[147] that the reasons for a particular conflict might be virtually unfathomable and that ‘[t]he notions of “civil war”, “differential operation” and “object” or “motivation” of that “civil war” are distractions from applying the text of the Convention definition’.
Laws of general application

It is well established that enforcement of a generally applicable law does not ordinarily constitute persecution for the purposes of the Convention, for the reason that enforcement of such a law does not ordinarily constitute discrimination.14 As Brennan CJ stated in Applicant A:

… the feared persecution must be discriminatory. … [It] must be “for reasons of” one of [the prescribed] categories. This qualification … excludes persecution which is no more than punishment of a non-discriminatory kind for contravention of a criminal law of general application. Such laws are not discriminatory and punishment that is non-discriminatory cannot stamp the contravener with the mark of “refugee”.15

Consistently with Australian law, the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (UNHCR Handbook) states:

56. Persecution must be distinguished from punishment for a common law offence. Persons fleeing from prosecution or punishment for such an offence are not normally refugees. It should be recalled that a refugee is a victim - or potential victim - of injustice, not a fugitive from justice.16

Examples of circumstances which have been found to involve non-discriminatory enforcement of generally applicable laws outside the scope of the Convention include enforcement of China’s former ‘one child policy’ as applied to parents who ‘having only one child, either do not accept the limitations placed on them or who are coerced or forced into being sterilised’,17 application of Sri Lanka’s Prevention of Terrorism Act for pro-LTTE activities,18 temporary detention pursuant to Sri Lanka’s Immigrants and Emigrants Act based upon unlawful departure,19 punishment for avoiding military service obligations,20 punishment for breach of China’s migration controls by way of illegal departure,21 punishment under a general law outlawing flag-burning,22 punishment for killing a cow under a Nepalese law against ‘bovicide’,23 failure of a state to give legal significance to marriage ceremonies conducted by Sikh Priests,24 potential separation of a family by reason of

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15 Applicant A v MIEA (1997) 190 CLR 225 at 233.
17 Applicant A v MIEA (1997) 190 CLR 225; see also Lin v MIMA [1999] FCA 573 (Emmett J, 30 April 1999) at [20].
19 MZAPO v MIBP [2015] FCCA 96 (Judge Street, 13 January 2015). The Court held that, on its face, the character of the law was one that appeared appropriate and adapted to a legitimate object for the benefit of the people of the State, and it did not purport to apply for a Convention reason: at [28]. See also SZWAU v MIBP [2015] FCCA 199 (Judge Street, 29 January 2015) at [26] and [31].
20 For example, MIMA v Israeli, heard with and reported as MIMA v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 per Gaudron J at [55], per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [97].
21 Wu Guo Xiong v MIEA (unreported, Federal Court of Australia, Tamberlin J, 9 August 1995), upheld by the Full Federal Court: Wu v MIMA (1997) 72 FCR 524. Similarly, in MIEA v Guo (1996) 191 CLR 559 the High Court found no error in the Tribunal’s finding on the facts of that case that the applicant would not face persecution because of his illegal departure; rather, if he were charged it would be the application of a generally applicable law.
22 Sidhu v Holmes [2000] FCA 776 (Madgwick J, 9 June 2000). His Honour agreed with the Tribunal that a general law outlawing flag burning would appear to have a ‘perfectly legitimate purpose, namely, the prevention of defacing national symbols’ at [19], upheld on appeal: Sidhu v Holmes [2000] FCA 1653 (Heerey, Moore, Goldberg JJ, 28 November 2000).
24 Singh v MIEA (1996) 67 FCR 433. In finding that this did not amount to persecution, Moore J recognised that there are matters which are appropriately determined by a State, independent of any religious significance. His Honour stated at 439: ‘Freedom of religion can exist when there is regulation by the state of matters as part of the proper government of a community … In so far as laws might be made concerning marriage, it is ordinarily a matter for the state to determine how
application of the Nationality Law of China, arrest for engaging in violent demonstrations with damage to property and loss of life, enforcement of laws about Islamic dress code and tattooing in Iran, and punishment for desertion from the Sepah, for sexual relations between unmarried Muslims, and for having left Iran illegally.

The principle that, ordinarily, non-discriminatory application of generally applicable laws does not constitute persecution applies whether or not a particular law is oppressive or repugnant to the values of our society. In Applicant A Dawson J agreed with the observations of the Full Federal Court in that case that:

Since a person must establish well-founded fear of persecution for certain specified reasons in order to be a refugee within the meaning of the Convention, it follows that not all persons at risk of persecution are refugees. And that must be so even if the persecution is harsh and totally repugnant to the fundamental values of our society and the international community. For example, a country might have laws of general application which punish severely, perhaps even with the death penalty, conduct which would not be criminal at all in Australia. The enforcement of such laws would doubtless be persecution, but without more it would not be persecution for one of the reasons stated in the Convention.

Whether a law is properly characterised as a law of general application turns on identifying those members of the population to whom it applies. In some circumstances, it may be necessary to look behind a law that is generally expressed, to establish whether the law itself is in truth discriminatory in its intent or whether it has a discriminatory impact on members of a group recognised by the Convention.

The High Court in Chen Shi Hai v MIMA confirmed that laws or policies which target, or only apply to, or impact adversely upon, a particular section of the population are not properly described as laws or policies of general application:

Laws or policies which target or apply only to a particular section of the population are not properly described as laws or policies of general application. Certainly, laws which target or impact adversely upon a particular class or group - for example, “black children”, as distinct from children generally - cannot properly be described in that way. ... To say that, ordinarily, a law of general application is not discriminatory is not to deny that general laws, which are apparently non-discriminatory, may impact differently on different people and, thus, operate discriminatorily. Nor is it to overlook the possibility that selective enforcement of a law of general application may result in discrimination. As a general rule, marri

28 Tahavoori v MIMA [2001] FCA 1245 (Emmett J, 31 July 2001) at [41]-[44]. The decision was set aside on appeal, but not on this issue. See also MZYSL v MIAC [2012] FMCA 582 (Riethmuller FM, 6 July 2012) at [17],[19] where the Court found no error in the Reviewer’s findings that Sharia law in Iran prohibiting premarital sex was non-discriminatory in its application and implementation. The Court also commented that it could not be said that the law was not for a real social purpose, and the fact that the strictures of the law are far greater than those in Australia does not make it a law for an improper purpose or a law to effect persecution.
30 Applicant A v MIEA (1997) 190 CLR 225 at 245 citing with apparent approval MIIEA v Respondent A and B (1995) 57 FCR 309 at 319. Note that the description of harsh punishment under a generally applicable law as ‘persecution’ is inconsistent with High Court authority which holds that persecution necessarily involves discrimination, as do the requirements of persecution in s.91R(1)(a) and (c).
31 See Weheliye v MIMA [2001] FCA 1222 (Goldberg J, 31 August 2001) at [50].
Thus, for example, notwithstanding that China’s ‘two child policy’ may be reflected in laws of general application which limit the number of children that a couple may have, that does not mean that the laws or practices applied to children born in contravention of that policy, as distinct from children generally, are laws or practices of general application. Similarly, depending upon the circumstances, the imposition of severe penalties on ‘parents of black children’ may amount to persecution for reasons of membership of a particular social group.

In MMM v MIMA Madgwick J considered the application to homosexuals of a general law against ‘unnatural acts’. His Honour held that enforcement of a law of that kind could constitute persecution of homosexuals:

In some circumstances, the existence of the law, provided it seems likely to be enforced, even though the actual enforcement may not be selective, may indicate that the legislature as well as the executive of the country in question, was intending serious harm to a particular social group.

A law of the kind in question here, although generally expressed to apply to anyone who commits certain acts considered to be “against the order of nature”… is in reality targeted at homosexuals … Ordinarily, homosexuals would constitute a social group and the law is targeted at them as such … Such a law, although in form one of general application, is in substance one of selective harassment. … If a criminal law, though generally expressed, is in the judgment of a competent Australian tribunal, in reality, nevertheless targeted at a “particular social group”, that may, depending on the general character of the law, its severity and the actual prospects of enforcement of it, suffice. (emphasis added)

Whether something amounts to a law of general application is a finding of fact for the decision-maker, based on the evidence. While the amount of evidence necessary to support the finding will vary depending on the nature of the law in question, the absence of a clear evidentiary basis for a finding that a law is a ‘law of general application’ may give rise to an error. For example, in Applicant S v MIMA the Tribunal had found that the Taliban

32 Chen Shi Hai v MIMA (2000) 201 CLR 293, per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [19] to [21]. See also per Kirby J at [72] and Wang v MIMA (2000) 105 FCR 548 at [50]-[68] where Merkel J (Wilcox and Gray JJ agreeing) discussed what the High Court and courts in other jurisdictions have said about ‘laws of general application’.


34 VTAO v MIMA [2004] FCA 927 (Merkel J, 19 July 2004). Justice Merkel in that case emphasized that Applicant A did not decide whether parents who have breached China’s family planning laws can constitute a particular social group. Referring to Applicant S v MIMA (2004) 217 CLR 387, his Honour stated that whether ‘parents of a “black child” can constitute a particular social group depends on a combination of legal and social factors, rather than on whether the harm the parents fear, and are likely to suffer, arises as a result of their breach of laws of general application. However it would still be necessary to establish that the laws operate in a discriminatory way. His Honour referred to country information which in his view suggested that the (previous) one-child laws operated or impacted discriminatorily on certain groups (at [38],[39]), however it is not apparent how this information could establish a Convention nexus.

35 MMM v MIMA (1998) 90 FCR 324 at 330-331. See also WAFL of 2002 v MIMA [2002] FCAFC 292 (Lee, Hill and Hely JJ, 16 September 2002), where the Tribunal had found that the rules in Iran about music were rules of general application and therefore punishment pursuant to such rules would not be persecution for a Convention reason. The Court observed that at some times and in some places, music has been part of the language of political dissent, and stated that it may be too broad a generalisation to assert that the playing of Western music at a wedding in Islamic Iran is necessarily outside the scope of the Convention.


37 See Aata v MIMA (2002) FCAFC 204 (Gray, Carr and Goldberg JJ, 21 June 2002), WAEZ of 2002 v MIMA [2002] FCAFC 341 (Lee, Hill and Hely JJ, 8 November 2002). In SJKB v MIMA [2005] FMCA 1536 (Lindsay FM, 16 December 2005) at [16]-[42] Lindsay FM stated that one need not know the precise terms of any relevant penal provision to make an assumption that such an activity [theft of military documents] would contravene the law of the land, but held that further
practised ad hoc, random, forcible recruitment of young men for military service in Afghanistan, where the only apparent criterion for recruitment was that the young men be able-bodied. A majority of the High Court rejected the Minister’s submission that the facts revealed a ‘law of general application’. In their joint judgment, Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Kirby JJ held that there was no evidence before the Tribunal that the actions of the Taliban amounted to a law of general application; rather, the policy of conscription was ad hoc and random.38

How far a decision-maker must go in determining whether a generally applicable law has a persecutory purpose (such that it is not properly described as a law of general application) will depend upon the circumstances of each case. In Moradgholi v MIMA the Court noted that there had been no evidence before the Tribunal to suggest that an Iranian anti-pornography law, while expressing Islamic values, was intended to impose the Islamic religion upon non-Muslims. It held that it was not incumbent upon the Tribunal to address the question whether motivation for making anti-pornography laws was persecutory within the Convention sense when there was nothing before it to suggest it was.39

**Selective enforcement of a law of general application**

While the implementation of laws of general application does not ordinarily constitute persecution, there is no rule that the implementation of such laws can never amount to persecution. A law of general application is capable of being implemented or enforced in a discriminatory manner.40

Where laws of general application are selectively enforced, in that the motivation for prosecution or punishment for an ordinary offence can be found in a Convention ground, or the punishment is unduly harsh for a Convention reason, then Convention protection may be attracted.

Noting that the Full Federal Court in Applicant A did not identify the additional features which would render enforcement by a country of one of its generally applicable criminal laws persecution for a Convention reason, Katz J in ‘Z’ v MIMA inferred that:

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what they had in mind was either selective prosecutions under the relevant law, the criterion of selection of persons for prosecution being those persons’ race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, or the imposition of punishments on persons convicted under the relevant law, such punishments being greater than they would otherwise have been by reason of the convicted
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38 Findings, including that a person would not face a real chance of Convention related harm in this context, required evidence. Applicant S v MIMA (2004) 217 CLR 387 per Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Kirby JJ at [41]. Justice McHugh stated at [83] that given the Tribunal’s findings, and if the Tribunal had found that ‘able-bodied men’ were a particular social group, it was open to the Tribunal to find that the Taliban was not applying a law of general application, but instead was forcibly apprehending members of the particular social group in an ad hoc manner that constituted persecution. Military conscription is considered in more detail below.

39 Moradgholi v MIMA [2000] FCA 13 (Lindgren J, 12 January 2000) at [65]. See also Alamdar v MIMA [2001] FCA 1244 (Emmett J, 30 July 2001), which involved an Iranian applicant who claimed to have acted in, produced and distributed pornographic films in Iran and who feared punishment, including the death penalty, under a law which prohibited such activity. The Court found no error in the Tribunal’s findings on the evidence before it that it was a law of general application.

persons’ race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.\(^41\)

For example, it may be wrong to assume that acquisition of land under Zimbabwe’s Land Acquisition Act would be simply the imposition of a law of general application if there is evidence that there had been targeted attacks upon the farms owned by non-Africans and that the Land Acquisition Act had been applied in a racially and politically discriminatory way.\(^42\)

In sum, questions that may need to be considered in claims arising from enforcement of laws are whether or not the law in question is in truth discriminatory (such that it is not properly described as a law of general application) or whether there is a real chance that a generally applicable law is going to be enforced against an applicant in a discriminatory manner. If a law of general application is enacted for a selective purpose, or enforced selectively, and such selectivity can be attributed to a Convention ground then this may come within the scope of the Convention.

**General laws that impact adversely upon a particular group**

The High Court in *Chen Shi Hai* stated that laws or policies which ‘… impact adversely upon a particular class or group’ could not properly be described as laws of general application and ‘[t]o say that, ordinarily, a law of general application is not discriminatory is not to deny that general laws, which are apparently non-discriminatory, may impact differently on different people and, thus, operate discriminatorily.’\(^43\) This has been treated as supporting the view that the enforcement of a law that is general in its terms and not intended to target a particular group, but which impacts adversely upon a person with a Convention-related attribute, may amount to persecution. This approach has been relied upon even where there is no evidence of selective or discriminatory enforcement of the law.\(^44\)

However, this approach is difficult to reconcile with the requirements of persecution under the Convention as qualified by s.91R(1) of the Act; in particular, the requirements that the persecution involves systematic and discriminatory conduct and the essential and significant reason for such conduct is one or more of the Convention grounds.\(^45\)

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\(^{41}\) *Z* v MIMA (1998) 90 FCR 51 at 58; and see *MIMA v Darboy* [1998] FCA 931 (Moore J, 6 August 1998); *Lama v MIMA* [1999] FCA 1620 (Branson, Sackville, Kiefel JJ, 19 November 1999); *AA v MIMA* [2000] FCA 13 (Lindgren J, 12 January 2000). See also UNHCR, Handbook, above n 16 at [81], [94], [85] and [86] on the potential for ‘criminal laws’ to be applied for reasons of political opinion.

\(^{42}\) *SZALM v MIMA* [2004] FMCA 262 (Driver FM, 7 May 2004) at [21]. See also *SZDOS v MIMA* [2005] FMCA 121 (Smith FM, 28 February 2005) at [30]-[48].

\(^{43}\) *Chen Shi Hai v MIMA* (2000) 201 CLR 293, per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [19] to [21]. See *Erduran v MIMA* (2002) 122 FCR 150, where Gray J, referring to *Wang v MIMA* (2000) 105 FCR 548 per Merkel J at [55], stated ‘even if a law is a law of general application, its impact on a person who possesses a Convention-related attribute can result in a real chance of persecution for a Convention reason’: at [28]. The judgment in *Erduran* was subsequently set aside on appeal. However, in allowing the Minister’s appeal, the Full Federal Court did not directly deal with his Honour’s discussion of Convention nexus: *MIMA v VFAI of 2002* [2002] FCAFC 374 (Black CJ, North and Merkel JJ, 25 November 2002). The ‘test’ in *Erduran* has also been followed in other cases involving conscription laws. For further discussion see below under ‘Conscription laws’.

\(^{44}\) The Tribunal decision considered in *Chen Shi Hai* was made prior to the introduction of s.91R by the *Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No.6)* 2001 (No.131 of 2001), which applied to Tribunal decisions finalised on or after 1 October 2001. The Tribunal decision considered in *Erduran* was also made prior to the introduction of s.91R. The guiding jurisprudence on
Where the law is discriminatory in its terms (e.g. banning a particular religious group) or, is general on its face but has a discriminatory intent (e.g. laws prohibiting sodomy), it is clear that the making of the law and its enforcement constitutes the relevant discriminatory conduct and is evidence of the relevant Convention-related motivation. Where the law is general in its terms, but is enforced in a selective and discriminatory manner for a Convention reason (e.g. large public gatherings without approval are illegal, but only opposition political groups are prosecuted) the law itself may not be persecutory, but the way it is enforced would constitute the discriminatory conduct and is evidence of the authorities having the relevant Convention-related motivation. However, where the law is general in its terms and its intent and there is no evidence of selective or discriminatory enforcement, but the law adversely impacts on a person with a Convention-related attribute (e.g. conscription laws and a person with pacifist religious beliefs) it is difficult to identify the relevant discriminatory conduct that is occurring for the essential and significant reason of one or more of the Convention grounds.46

The focus on adverse impact upon a particular group is also difficult to reconcile with cases considering ‘value-laden’ laws (i.e. laws that are general in terms but which reflect some religious value). Such laws have, in the absence of evidence of selective or discriminatory enforcement, been accepted as laws of general application that were not persecutory, although they affected or impacted upon people differently.47

If mere discriminatory impact of a law is sufficient to amount to relevant discriminatory treatment such that the law is not a law of general application, or the law is otherwise discriminatory in its terms or application, the next question is whether the law is appropriate and adapted to achieving a legitimate state object. However, if the law is found not to contain the necessary discriminatory quality, that question does not arise.48

The legitimacy threshold

Even if a law or its application results in discriminatory treatment, such treatment will not necessarily constitute persecution. It is settled law in Australia that where a law or policy results in discriminatory treatment of persons of a particular race, religion, nationality or political opinion or who are members of a particular social group, the question of whether the discriminatory treatment constitutes persecution for that reason ultimately depends on whether that treatment is ‘appropriate and adapted to achieving some legitimate object of the country [concerned]’.49

persecution and laws of general application predates the introduction of s.91R.

46 For detailed discussion of Convention nexus, see Chapter 5 of this Guide.


48 SZTFR v MIBP [2015] FCA 545 (Bennett J, 2 June 2015) at [53].

Whether a law or its enforcement is ‘appropriate and adapted’ to achieving a legitimate object involves consideration of proportionality of the means used to achieve that object. A legitimate object will ordinarily be an object the pursuit of which is required in order to protect or promote the general welfare of the State and its citizens. Thus, enforcement of a generally applicable criminal law, or the enforcement of laws designed to protect the general welfare of the state, would not ordinarily constitute persecution. While the implementation of these laws may place additional burdens on the members of a particular race, religion or nationality, or social group, the legitimacy of the objects, and the apparent proportionality of the means employed to achieve those objects, are such that the implementation of these laws is not persecutory.

However, a law or its purported enforcement will be persecutory if its real object is not the protection of the state but the oppression of the members of a race, religion, nationality etc. Generally, sanctions aimed at persons for reasons of race, religion or nationality will not be an appropriate means for achieving a legitimate government object and are likely to amount to persecution. Where political opinion or particular social group are involved, the issue of legitimacy and proportionality may be more complex. In Applicant A, McHugh J explained:

… where a racial, religious, national group or the holder of a particular political opinion is the subject of sanctions that do not apply generally in the State, it is more likely than not that the application of the sanction is discriminatory and persecutory. … Only in exceptional cases is it likely that a sanction aimed at persons for reasons of race, religion or nationality will be an appropriate means for achieving a legitimate government object and not amount to persecution.

In cases concerned with political opinion and the membership of particular social groups, the issue of persecution may often be difficult to resolve when the sanctions arise from the proper application of enacted laws. Punishment for expressing ordinary political opinions or being a member of a political association or trade union is prima facie persecution for a Convention reason. Nevertheless, governments cannot be expected to tolerate political opinion or conduct that calls for their violent overthrow. Punishment for expressing such opinions is unlikely to amount to persecution. Nevertheless, even in these cases, punishment of the holders of the opinions may amount to persecution. It will certainly do so when the government in question is so repressive that, by the standards of the civilised world, it has so little legitimacy that its overthrow even by violent means is justified. One who fled from the regime of Hitler or Pol Pot could not be denied the status of refugee even if his or her only claim to that status relied on a fear of persecution for advocating the violent overthrow of that regime.

In determining whether prosecution and penalty under a national law can properly be regarded as appropriate and adapted to achieving a legitimate object of the country,
Applying those general principles to the Taliban’s conscription policy, the High Court in Applicant S explained that while the objective of a conscription policy to protect the nation is generally speaking a legitimate national objective, the position of the Taliban as an authority which was apparently considered by international standards a ruthless and despotic political body founded on extremist religious tenets would affect the legitimacy of that policy. Further, even if the Taliban’s object of conscription was a legitimate national objective, as it was implemented in a manner that would not be condoned internationally, it could not be considered appropriate and adapted to achieving that objective.\(^5\)

In Applicant A101/2003 v MIMA the Federal Court considered a claim of fear of arrest under Pakistan’s Criminal Procedure Code for demonstrating against the government. The Court stated that when it is alleged that the enforcement or manner of enforcement of a generally applicable law is discriminatory by reference to political opinion, a complex inquiry may need to be engaged in:

Where such a law is, or is said to be, one having the purpose of protecting a State or its institutions (i.e. it has a “political” purpose), the nature and reach of the law itself and the actual manner of its application will require consideration for the reason that its reach or use in suppressing political opinion may go beyond, or be inconsistent with, what is appropriate to achieve a legitimate government object according to the standards of civil societies ... It is not unheard of, for example, for a State to utilise sedition-like and public security offences to silence its opponents.

The less such a law has an overtly political character (as where for example, its concern is with ordinary criminal acts in a society), the more attention will turn on the integrity of the enforcement process itself and on the risks to which a person might be exposed, e.g. ill-treatment or torture, in the course of that process. Is that process used selectively against critics of the State or against the advocates of particular political views? Is it fraudulently invoked for punitive purposes? Does its improper use expose a person to adverse consequences, e.g. torture in detention, even if that person is not later charged or tried with an offence?\(^5\)

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\(^5\) Chen Shi Hai v MIMA (2000) 201 CLR 293 per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [29], cited with approval in Applicant S v MIMA (2004) 217 CLR 387 per Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Kirby JJ at [45]. Chen’s case concerned China’s former one child policy as it applied to ‘black children’. See also VTAO v MIMA [2004] FCA 927 (Merkel J, 19 July 2004), where Merkel J considered the general principle as it applied to parents who had contravened the policy. Referring to Chen, his Honour criticised the Tribunal’s approach for failing to enquire whether the harm feared by the applicant parents was appropriate and adapted to achieving the legitimate object of population control, and added that a law of general application mandating the imposition of severe penalties on the mother irrespective of her personal circumstances may be regarded as inappropriate and adapted to achieving the legitimate object.

\(^5\) Applicant S v MIMA (2004) 217 CLR 387 at [47]-[49]. See also the discussion of McHugh J at [83]. This would give support to the UNHCR view that in a case involving punishment for desertion or draft evasion, where the type of military action, with which an individual does not wish to be associated, is ‘condemned by the international community as contrary to basic rules of human conduct, punishment for desertion or draft-evasion could, in the light of all other requirements of the definition, in itself be regarded as persecution’: UNHCR, Handbook, above n 16 at [171]. However, neither Applicant S nor UNHCR’s discussion suggests that this by itself is enough. There is still a requirement of different treatment, for a Convention reason.

\(^5\) Applicant A101/2003 v MIMA [2004] FCA 556 (Finn J, 6 May 2004) at [24].[25]. His Honour held that the Tribunal’s failure to address these issues constituted a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction.
In NAVZ v MIMIA the Tribunal had recognised that Russia’s ‘Law on Religion’ discriminated against certain religious groups including Scientologists, but was satisfied that it was appropriate and adapted to achieving the legitimate object of protecting the welfare of Russia’s citizens. The Federal Court held that the Tribunal had seriously misunderstood the nature of the relevant interest, namely a human right not to be subjected to seriously discriminatory harm in relation to certain matters vital to human dignity, which the Convention seeks to protect. The Court indicated that great care needs to be taken in characterising any law, let alone its alleged enforcement, as non-discriminatory when it is, in terms, aimed at some religions but not others.58

These cases indicate that laws that are aimed at persons for one of the Convention reasons will require particularly close scrutiny before it can safely be concluded that either the law or its enforcement is appropriate and adapted to achieving some legitimate object of the country concerned and there must be material before the decision-maker to support such a conclusion.59

**Discriminatory laws that are not enforced**

On the other hand, the mere existence of a law that might in truth be discriminatory may not constitute persecution if there is no real chance that it would be enforced. In MMM v MIMA, the Federal Court held that a criminal law which penalises homosexual acts could amount to persecution. However, in that case, all that was shown was the existence of the law. There was no evidence as to its enforcement, nor any indication that there was a real chance that it would be enforced in the future.60 That is not to say that the mere existence of a criminal law could never constitute persecution. For example, the Full Federal Court has held that living under the shadow of the mere possibility of a death sentence for apostasy in Iran, regardless of how remote that possibility might be, could itself constitute persecution.61 Further, as members of the High Court have pointed out in relation to laws against homosexual conduct in Bangladesh, the existence of such a law, even if not enforced, may give rise to a real chance that a homosexual person will suffer serious harm – for example bashings or blackmail – that the government of the country will not or cannot adequately suppress.62

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58 NAVZ v MIMIA [2005] FCA 13 (Madgwick J, 21 January 2005) at [53] and [56]. On the importance of religion as a fundamental human right, see also Applicant NABD of 2002 v MIMIA [2005] HCA 29 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Kirby, Hayne and Heydon JJ, 26 May 2005) per Kirby J at [108]-[132].

59 For example, see SZKUG v MIAC [2008] FMCA 1 (Driver FM, 22 February 2008) at [28]-[36] where the Tribunal concluded that Israeli security law was a law of general application, but, even if the law was applied selectively against Palestinian males it was a legitimate and proportionate response to a serious security concern. The Court held the finding was open on the material before the Tribunal. See also SJDTH v MIAC [2008] FCA 1258 (Dowsett J, 19 August 2008) at [74]. The Court upheld the Tribunal decision on the information before it that Indonesia’s laws restricting proselytisation, which the appellant claimed would prevent her from completely practising her Christian religion, were general laws appropriate and adapted to a legitimate purpose. See also SZNCK v MIAC [2009] FMCA 399 (Driver FM, 28 May 2009) at [47].


61 SGKB v MIMIA [2003] FCAFC 44 (Spender, Dowsett and Selway JJ, 18 March 2003) at [21], endorsed by Kirby J in Applicant NABD of 2002 v MIMIA [2005] HCA 29 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Kirby, Hayne and Heydon JJ, 26 May 2005) at [94]. This point was not argued in Appellant S395/2002 v MIMA (2003) 216 CLR 473 and the question was left open in that case: see per Gleeson CJ at [13], McHugh and Kirby JJ at [46], and Callinan and Heydon JJ at [109].

62 Appellant S395/2002 v MIMA (2003) 216 CLR 473 at [47]; see also per Gleeson CJ at [12].
Detention and mistreatment in detention

Detention of itself does not necessarily constitute persecution, even where it is targeted towards certain members of the society. Consistently with High Court authority, the Full Federal Court in *Nagaratnam v MIMA* held that the detention of members of a particular race engaged in a civil war for the purposes of interrogation was not persecution where it was designed to protect the general welfare of the state.

Nevertheless, such action may lose its legitimacy where the detainees are subsequently subjected to mistreatment. When those who detain such persons in accordance with a law or government policy are aware that the probable consequence of detention will be physical mistreatment in custody, even where that physical mistreatment is applied indiscriminately to all detainees, the act of detention may amount to persecution for a Convention reason.

This issue arose for consideration by the Full Federal Court in *Paramananthan v MIMA*. While there were obvious differences in emphasis between the three judgments in that case, the Full Court in *Nagaratnam v MIMA* held that *Paramananthan* stood for the following proposition:

> When, in accordance with some law or government policy, persons are selected for detention upon a ground which equates to one of the Convention reasons, the act of detaining such persons may or may not amount to persecution for a Convention reason, depending upon the circumstances in which the law or government policy is being implemented. It may be implemented, for instance, in circumstances of war, whether foreign or domestic. If so and the criterion of selection of persons for detention is seen as appropriate and adapted to the successful prosecution of that war, then the act of detention will not be persecution for a Convention reason. However, when those who detain such persons in accordance with such law or government policy are aware that the probable consequence of such detention will be the physical mistreatment of those detained, even though those detained will not be selected for such physical mistreatment by those who administer that physical mistreatment upon a ground which equates to one of the Convention reasons and even though those selecting the detainees are unwilling that such physical mistreatment should occur, then those who detain such persons will be taken to have caused such physical mistreatment. As such persons have been selected for detention upon a ground which equates to one of the Convention reasons, the act of detaining such persons will amount to persecution for a Convention reason.

The principles in these cases are clearly applicable *where the authorities are aware* that the probable consequence of detention will be physical mistreatment. Where this is not the case, close scrutiny may need to be given to whether the mistreatment itself is inflicted for a Convention reason.

The principle in *Paramananthan* was applied and taken further by Burchett J in *El Merhabi v MIMA*. His Honour held that the Tribunal’s finding that the bashing by Syrian officer(s) of a Lebanese applicant while detained for questioning was ‘the random callous act by an individual’ rather than systematic motivated harm involved the same error which was exposed in *Paramananthan* and other cases. He also made it clear that the principle set out

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66 Nagaratnam v MIMA (1999) 84 FCR 569 at 579.
in that case should not be ‘narrowly confined’ to interrogation situations. The Tribunal had found that the rape of the applicant’s wife by a Syrian soldier, in the company of other Syrian soldiers who stood guard, was not Convention related. The Court held that had the applicant’s wife been raped during interrogation the judgment in Paramananthan made it clear that it would have been an act of persecution, and that the Tribunal had erred in law by ‘quarantining’ the rape from the whole suppression by the Syrian forces:

If, for reasons of nationality, political opinion or religion, or (as in this case) all three, an official policy of suppression is pursued, whether by means of arrest and interrogation of individuals, or by the stationing of troops to control a civilian population, or by some similar means, and those who execute the policy commit persecutory acts in the course of doing so, persecution may generally be shown. The policy colours what is done by its agents, although they may behave wantonly. For a causal connection will be likely to exist, to adopt the reasoning of Wilcox J in Paramananthan …, between the cruelty suffered and the nationality, political opinion or religion; and official toleration of that cruelty, or inability to control it, may be found. To adapt what Burchett and Lee JJ said in Perampalam…, abuse by an occupying soldier of his position, or his personal cruelty or lust, cannot quarantine his particular act from the whole activity of suppression of which it forms part. In the present case, the uniformed and armed Syrian soldiers whose presence made resistance impossible were not divorced, by their actions or [the assailant’s], from the role in which they had been sent to Lebanon.68

Conscription laws

In Australian law, enforcement of laws providing for compulsory military service, and for punishment for desertion or avoidance of such service, will not ordinarily provide a basis for a claim of persecution within the meaning of the Refugees Convention.69 This is primarily because it lacks the necessary selective quality.70

Without evidence of selectivity in its enforcement, conscription will generally amount to no more than a non-discriminatory law of general application. Whether this is the proper conclusion, however, will depend on the evidence in the particular case.71 Considering guidance in the UNHCR Handbook, the Court in Mehenni v MIMA noted that the Handbook does not suggest that that the mere requirement that a person serve in the armed forces is done by its agents, although they may behave wantonly. For a causal connection will be likely to exist, to adopt the reasoning of Wilcox J in Paramananthan …, between the cruelty suffered and the nationality, political opinion or religion; and official toleration of that cruelty, or inability to control it, may be found. To adapt what Burchett and Lee JJ said in Perampalam…, abuse by an occupying soldier of his position, or his personal cruelty or lust, cannot quarantine his particular act from the whole activity of suppression of which it forms part. In the present case, the uniformed and armed Syrian soldiers whose presence made resistance impossible were not divorced, by their actions or [the assailant’s], from the role in which they had been sent to Lebanon.

69 See e.g. Mijoljevic v MIMA [1999] FCA 834 (Branson J, 25 June 1999) at [23], referring to Murillo-Nunez v MIEA (1995) 63 FCR 150; Tirmic v MIMA [1998] FCA 1750 (Einfield J, 23 December 1998). Claims based on objection to undertaking military service have also been raised by asylum claimants in other jurisdictions. In Davidov v SSHD [2005] ScotCS CSIH 51 (Scottish Court of Session, 23 June 2005) at [5] Lord Hamilton, delivering the opinion of the Court, observed that the significance (for Convention purposes) of an objection to undertaking compulsory military service had been the subject of legal treatment in the United Kingdom in the recent years preceding that judgment.
71 Mehenni v MIMA [1999] FCA 789 (Lehane J, 24 June 1999) at [19]. Note that the status of the Handbook in Australian law is generally as a practical guide to determining refugee status, rather than as authority as to the correct interpretation of the Convention: see Mason CJ in Chan v MIEA (1989) 169 CLR 379 at 392. However, the Handbook may still be given weight...
Persecution for failure to be conscripted is not necessarily persecution for a Convention reason. ... Imprisonment for resistance may be motivated by punishment for failing to comply with a lawful obligation to join not for a political view or arising from membership of a group. But it does not follow from this ... that in all circumstances persecution for failure to accept conscription might not amount to persecution for a Convention reason. All the facts must be considered.\(^{73}\)

Whether or not an applicant is a conscientious objector, the enquiry must be directed to whether the applicant’s refusal to serve will mean that there is a real chance of discriminatory treatment for a Convention reason. Circumstances may arise where this will be the case, for instance where those imposing the punishment do so on the basis that the individuals concerned were being punished as conscientious objectors to compulsory military service; that is, on the basis of their political or religious opinion, or their membership of a particular social group.\(^{74}\)

Similarly, selection for recruitment may be discriminatory for a Convention reason. In Applicant S, for example, the Tribunal had accepted that the Taliban had practised ad hoc, random, forcible recruitment of young men, the only apparent criterion for recruitment being that the young men be able bodied. The High Court held that the Tribunal had erred in failing to consider whether ‘able-bodied young men’ comprised a particular social group.\(^{75}\)

However, the mere holding of a political opinion or membership of a particular social group by an applicant facing the prospect of harm (including serious harm) is not sufficient to bring that person within the Convention definition. The Federal Court has fairly consistently held that liability for conscription - even of conscientious objectors - will not of itself found a Convention claim.\(^{76}\) Consistently with that view, the Court in Mehenni firmly rejected the approach taken in some United States cases where it was held that it is enough if a person suffers disproportionately when forced to serve under a conscription law because of his or her religious principles.\(^{77}\) As French J stated in Aksahin v MIMA, referring to the High Court’s decision in Chen Shi Hai:

The [High] Court expressly approved the proposition that the apprehended persecution which attracts Convention protection must be motivated by the possession of the relevant Convention attributes on the part of the person or group persecuted (par 34). The accident that the particular political or ethnic sympathies of a person may cause him or her to disobey a law of general application, does not render the sanction for non-compliance persecution for a Convention reason.\(^{78}\)

\(^{73}\) as extrinsic material in interpreting the Convention, per Kirby J MIMA v QAAH of 2004 (2006) 321 CLR 1 at [76]. For discussion on interpretation of the Convention in Australia see Chapter 1 of this Guide.


\(^{78}\) Mehenni v MIMA [1999] FCA 789 (Lehane J, 24 June 1999) at [20][21], referring to Canas-Segovia v INS 902 F 2d 717 (9th Cir 1990). His Honour observed that that view was based partly on a different view of the Handbook from his own, and also on particular principles of United States constitutional law.

In other words, it is not sufficient that there be a nexus between feared persecution and a Convention ground, such as political opinion, if there is no relevant ‘motivation’ on the part of the alleged persecutors. Nevertheless, a line of cases has emerged that reflects the broader approach that was rejected by the Court in Mehenni. The following cases are illustrative of the differing approaches to this issue.

In Mijoljevic v MIMA the Tribunal had found that the obligation to perform military service was universal upon all males in the applicant’s country, and that the relevant laws punishing those who avoided military service were laws of general application. The Tribunal concluded on this basis that the applicant’s pacifist views did not provide a basis upon which it could be satisfied that he was a person to whom Australia owes protection obligations under the Refugees Convention. Justice Branson held that the Tribunal’s conclusion was open to it on the evidence and material before it and that there was no error in the Tribunal’s approach.

In Israeli’s case, the Tribunal had found that if, on his return to Armenia, Mr Israeli was punished for not meeting his obligation to give military service it would be ‘the application of a law of common application, imposed by the authorities regardless of ... any political opinion’. It was contended that the Tribunal had failed to consider whether the applicant was a member of a particular social group comprised of deserters and/or draft evaders. The High Court held that on the facts of the case, it was open to the Tribunal to conclude that the implementation by Armenia of its laws of general application was not capable of resulting in discriminatory treatment. Justice Gaudron stated:

The Tribunal's conclusion that the punishment Mr Israeli would face "for avoiding his call-up notice ... would be the application of a law of common application" necessarily involves the consequence that that punishment would not be discriminatory and, hence, would not constitute persecution. In that context, the question of Mr Israeli's membership of a particular social group comprised of deserters and/or draft resisters became irrelevant.

A similar conclusion was reached by Jarrett FM in SZAOG v MIMIA, where the Tribunal had found that the applicant genuinely objected to the Chechen conflict and the Russian military methods of dealing with that conflict. It found, however, that while the applicant had those beliefs, there was no independent evidence to suggest that persons who objected to the conflict were treated any differently or that any punishment imposed upon such objectors was enforced in a discriminatory manner. Having regard to the case law, the Court held that those findings were open to the Tribunal and that on that basis the applicant could not succeed.

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81 Heard together with MIMA v Yusuf and reported as MIMA v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323.
82 MIMA v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 32 at [55], referring to Chan v MIEA (1989) 169 CLR 379 at 388 and 429-430 and MIEA v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 570. See also per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [94]-[97].
83 SZAOG v MIMIA [2004] FMCA 125 (Jarrett FM, 22 March 2004). This decision was the subject of appeal in SZAOG v MIMIA [2004] FCADC 316 (Beaumont, North and Emmett JJ, 26 November 2004). While the majority dismissed the appeal (North J dissenting), the Full Court seems to have taken a broader view than that taken by Jarrett FM of the circumstances in which punishment for conscientious objection might constitute persecution. The Full Court’s decision is discussed briefly below.
In *MIMA v Applicant M*, the Full Federal Court held that the Tribunal was not obliged to consider whether the applicant would be ‘singled out from other objectors to conscription on the basis that he was a conscientious objector and thus held a political opinion for which he would be persecuted’ when the applicant had never suggested that he articulated or demonstrated any principled opposition to conscription so that a political opinion might be imputed to him, and there was no evidence that the applicant would have a political opinion attributed to him.\(^{84}\)

In *NAEU of 2002 v MIMIA*, the Full Federal Court agreed with the primary judge that lawful punishment for desertion from the Sri Lankan police force, where the applicant’s desertion was subjectively motivated, in part, by his political opinion, did not establish refugee status where there was no evidence that the desertion was or would be objectively considered by the Sri Lankan authorities as an expression of political opinion.\(^{85}\) The Court held that the applicant must establish that his persecutors had actual or imputed knowledge of his political opinion and would exact punishment at least partly because of that political opinion:

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\text{[It is not sufficient ... that the appellant need only establish that there was a fear of harm and a Convention reason (in this case, his political opinion) for that harm to qualify for protection under the Convention. The appellant was also required to establish that his persecutors had actual or imputed knowledge of his political opinion and would exact punishment at least partly because of that political opinion. ...}
\]

Counsel for the appellant, correctly in my view, conceded that the act of desertion per se is politically neutral, that is, no inference of any particular political opinion should be drawn from it. Thus, to establish that the appellant was a person to whom Australia owed protection obligations, it was necessary for the appellant to point to evidence that would establish that any punishment for his desertion would be exacted, in part or in whole, because of his political opinion. This required that there be material showing that the Sri Lankan authorities (the alleged persecutors) were aware of the applicant’s claimed political opinion or had imputed such an opinion to him. There simply is no evidence to support the existence of such knowledge or imputation. ...\(^{86}\)

Nevertheless, there are cases that lend some support to a broader approach which emphasises the motivation of the conscientious objector rather than the claimed persecutor, and the differential *impact* of the application of generally applicable laws. This approach was first expressed in *Applicant N403 of 2000 v MIMA*, where Hill J stated:

The draft laws as implemented in Australia during the Vietnam War permitted those with real conscientious objections to serve, not in the military forces, but rather in non-combatant roles. Without that limitation a conscientious objector could have been imprisoned. The suggested reason for their imprisonment would have been their failure to comply with the draft law, a law of universal operation. But if the reason they did not wish to comply with the draft was their conscientious objection, one may ask what the real cause of their imprisonment would be. It is not difficult, I think, to argue that in such a case the cause of the imprisonment would be the conscientious belief, which could be political opinion, not merely the failure to comply with a law of general application. It is, however, essential that an applicant have a

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\(^{84}\) *MIMA v Applicant M* [2002] FCAFC 253 (Whitlam, North and Stone JJ, 23 August 2002). Note that the Court’s reasoning on membership of a particular social group is no longer good law in light of the High Court’s decision in *Applicant S v MIMA* (2004) 217 CLR 387.


\(^{86}\) *NAEU of 2002 v MIMIA* [2002] FCAFC 259 (Mdagwick, Merkel and Conti JJ, 24 October 2002) at [14]-[15] per Madgwick J, Merkel and Conti JJ agreeing. See also *SZAHQ v MIMIA* [2004] FCA 953 (Hely J, 26 July 2004) at [23] and *VCAI and VCAJ v MIMIA* [2004] FMCA 443 (Walters FM, 5 August 2004). In *NACM of 2002 v MIMIA* (2003) 134 FCR 550 Madgwick J doubted the correctness of his decision in *NAEU of 2002 v MIMIA* on this issue, suggesting that rather than asking whether the motivation of the persecutor is the applicant’s actual or perceived political opinion, the relevant question should be whether the applicant’s actual or perceived political opinion accounts for the feared persecution. However his Honour declined, as a single judge, to give effect to his doubts.
real, not a simulated belief.87

Similarly, in Erduran v MIMA, Gray J held that when an issue of refusal to undergo compulsory military service arises, it is necessary to look further than the question whether the law relating to that military service is a law of general application:

It is first necessary to make a finding of fact as to whether the refusal to undergo military service arises from a conscientious objection to such service. If it does, it may be the case that the conscientious objection arises from a political opinion or from a religious conviction. It may be that the conscientious objection is itself to be regarded as a form of political opinion. Even the absence of a political or religious basis for a conscientious objection to military service might not conclude the inquiry. The question would have to be asked whether conscientious objectors, or some particular class of them, could constitute a particular social group. If it be the case that a person will be punished for refusing to undergo compulsory military service by reason of conscientious objection stemming from political opinion or religious views, or that is itself political opinion, or that marks the person out as a member of a particular social group of conscientious objectors, it will not be difficult to find that the person is liable to be persecuted for a Convention reason. It is well-established that, even if a law is a law of general application, its impact on a person who possesses a Convention-related attribute can result in a real chance of persecution for a Convention reason.88 (emphasis added)

His Honour adopted a similar approach in Applicant VEAZ of 2002 v MIMIA, concluding in that case that the Tribunal erred in treating Turkish laws relating to national service as laws of general application. His Honour stated:

The Tribunal seems to have assumed that, because a law of general application applied to all Turkish citizens, regardless of their ethnic origins, it could not result in persecution of any such citizen for a Convention-related reason. It was made clear in Wang v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1599 (2000) 105 FCR 548 at [63] and [65] per Merkel J, that the equal application of the law to all persons may impact differently on some of those persons. The result of the different impact might be such as to amount to persecution for a Convention reason.89

In VCAD v MIMIA, Gray J’s analysis in Erduran was accepted by both parties as correct, and accepted by the Court in the absence of argument to the contrary. Accordingly the Court held that the Tribunal had proceeded on the mistaken basis that a law of general operation, which did not expressly discriminate or inflict disproportionate punishment, could not support a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. Justice Kenny held that this was ‘plainly erroneous’, adding that there may well be a well-founded fear of persecution because a law, neutral on its face, has an indirect discriminatory effect or indirectly inflicts disproportionate injury, for a Convention-related reason.90

89 Applicant VEAZ of 2002 v MIMIA [2003] FCA 1033 (Gray J, 2 October 2003) at [26]. See also Okere v MIMA (1999) 87 FCR 112. In relation to Wang v MIMA, as Madgwick J pointed out in NAEU of 2002 v MIMA [2002] FCAFC 259 (Madgwick, Merkel and Conti JJ, 24 October 2002) at [18], that case involved a law that was itself persecutory (the law made practising in an unregistered church in China a crime).
90 VCAD v MIMIA [2004] FCA 1005 (Kenny J, 4 August 2004) at [31];-35. On appeal in VCAD v MIMIA [2005] FCAFC 1 (Gray, Sundberg and North JJ, 26 August 2005) Gray J at [25] followed his earlier decision in Erduran finding that Kenny J was correct in this approach. Sundberg and North JJ did not address the issue. Justice Kenny’s approach was followed and the same error identified in VWIPZ v MIMIA [2005] FMCA 1552 (McInnis FM, 28 October 2005); see also SZMFJ v MIAC (No.2) [2009] FCA 95 (Jagot J, 16 February 2009). In SZMFJ v MIAC [2009] FMCA 771 (Nicholls FM, 12 August 2009) at [188] it was held that the ‘test’ in Erduran was not relevant where the Tribunal had rejected the applicant’s claims to be a conscientious objector; see also AZAAB v MIAC [2008] FMCA 1380 (Lindsay FM, 8 October 2008).
In SZAOG v MIMIA, Emmett J (Beaumont J agreeing) expressed the opinion, consistently with Gray J's opinion in Erduran, that:

[while it may be possible for conscientious objection itself to be regarded as a form of political opinion, the question would still need to be asked whether the conscientious objection to military service had a political or religious basis or whether conscientious objectors, or some particular class of them, could constitute a particular social group. If a person would be punished for refusing to undergo military service by reason of conscientious objection stemming from political opinion or a religious view, or the conscientious objection is itself political opinion, it may be possible to find that the person is liable to be persecuted for a Convention reason.]

Referring to both Erduran and Israelian's case, Gordon J in MZYTT v MIAC, concluded that consideration of whether a refusal to do military service gives rise to protection obligations requires a two-step inquiry, namely:

1. what is the applicant's reason for his or her refusal to do military service (ie, is the applicant a "conscientious objector" or a member of some other group holding beliefs against compulsory military service)?; and

2. what are the consequences for a failure or refusal to complete military service (ie, can the applicant demonstrate a well founded fear of persecution by reason of his or her membership of that group)?

While the law on this issue remains somewhat unsettled, the approach identified in N403, Erduran and subsequent cases appears to be contrary to High Court authority on the meaning of 'for reasons of' in the Convention definition. While the reason for the claimant avoiding military service may be relevant to determining whether punishment is attributable to a Convention reason (such as religion or political opinion), it would be contrary to established authority for it to be the sole determining factor, irrespective of whether the law is enforced in a discriminatory manner for a Convention reason.

Further, a test that focuses on discriminatory impact would appear to be inapplicable in the context of s.91R(1)(c) of the Act which requires that the persecution involve systematic and discriminatory conduct.

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91 SZAOG v MIMIA [2004] FCAFC 316 (Beaumont, North and Emmett JJ, 26 November 2004) at [46]. The majority of the Full Federal Court held that there was no error in the Tribunal's failure to address this issue, as it had not been part of the applicant's case. Justice North, dissenting, held that the applicant had made a conscientious objection claim on the basis that he objected to service in the Chechen conflict because the army in which he was required to serve had been involved in breaches of humanitarian law and human rights abuses, and that the Tribunal erred in failing to deal with the issue.

92 MZYTT v MIAC [2013] FCA 76 (Gordon J, 12 February 2013) at [25]. Note that the Court's acceptance of the decision-maker's finding that the consequences faced by the appellant would be the result of the operation of a "law of general application", and therefore not persecutory (at [28]) suggest that consistently with Israelian's case, the Court nevertheless considered the motivation of the persecutor to be paramount.

93 As North J observed in SZAOG v MIMIA [2004] FCAFC 316 (Beaumont, North and Emmett JJ, 26 November 2004) at [19], declining to express an opinion on the issue.


95 [2002] 122 FCR 150.

96 In particular, Applicant A v MIEA (1997) 190 CLR 225 at 240-242 per Dawson J, at 258 per McHugh J and at 284 per Gummow J; see SZDJQ and SZQJR v MIMIA [2006] FCA 533 (Bennett J, 11 May 2006) at [40]. In Sepet v SSHD [2003] 1 WLR 856, Lord Bingham of Cornhill at [17] mentioned Erduran v MIMIA [2002] 122 FCR 150, commenting that that case did not sit altogether comfortably with the decision of the majority of the High Court in MIMIA v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323. Consistently with High Court authority, his Lordship emphasised at [21]-[23] that the reason must be the reason which operates in the mind of the persecutor. For detailed discussion of Convention nexus, see Chapter 5 of this Guide.

In any event, assuming that the discriminatory (and severity) element is made out in the context of generally applicable conscription laws, it will still be necessary to consider whether the discriminatory treatment involved is 'appropriate and adapted to achieving some legitimate object of the country [concerned]'\(^9\). As was stated in Applicant S v MIMA, the objective of a conscription policy is, generally speaking, an entirely legitimate national objective. However, where the type of military action in which an applicant does not wish to be involved is contrary to international law, discriminatory punishment for desertion or draft evasion could be regarded as persecution, for the reason that enforcement of the law in those circumstances may not be appropriate and adapted to achieving a legitimate national objective.\(^9\)

A more difficult question arises where under the non-discriminatory application of a law of general application, a person is obliged to render military service in a conflict in which they will or might be forced to engage in human rights abuses or breaches of international humanitarian law, such as reflected in the Geneva Conventions or Nuremberg Principles.

The House of Lords judgment of Sepet v SSHD stated in obiter dicta that:

> There is compelling support for the view that refugee status should be accorded to one who has refused to undertake compulsory military service on the grounds that such service would or might require him to commit atrocities or gross human rights abuses or participate in a conflict condemned by the international community ...\(^1\)

This passage has been referred to in two Australian cases involving claims relating to the Chechen war. In both cases the Tribunal had rejected the claims on the basis that military service in Russia resulted from a law of general application, and there was no evidence that the law was applied in a discriminatory way against the applicant. In SZAIC v MIMIA Raphael FM held that punishment for refusing to be conscripted into a military force that is likely to require the applicant to breach the Nuremberg Principles could constitute persecution for a Convention reason and that this was a matter the Tribunal was required to consider.\(^1\) A similar conclusion was reached by North J in his dissenting judgment in SZAOG v MIMA.\(^1\) His Honour held that the Tribunal had erred by failing to address the applicant’s conscientious objection claim on the basis that he objected to service in the Chechen conflict because the army in which he was required to serve had been involved in breaches of humanitarian law and human rights abuses.

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98 Chen Shi Hai v MIMA (2000) 201 CLR 293 at [27]-[28]. On the ‘legitimacy’ threshold, see above.
100 [2003] 1 WLR 856 at [8] per Lord Bingham of Cornhill, with whom Lords Steyn, Hutton and Rodger of Earlsferry agreed, referring to Zolfagharkhani v Canada (MEI) [1993] FC 540; Ciric v Canada (MEI) [1994] 2 FC 65; Canas-Segovia v INS (1990) 902 F 2d 717, and the UNHCR Handbook, above n 16 at [169], [171]. Lord Bingham’s judgment elsewhere emphasises the Convention nexus requirement, but appears to consider the circumstances set out in the passage quoted as arguably falling within a separate category. The issue was not considered further, as the applicants could not, on the facts as found, bring themselves within that category.
The concept of objection to a particular war as a basis for recognition as a Convention refugee has been considered in several Canadian cases. In those cases it has been referred to as ‘partial’ objection. While acknowledging that conscientious objection of itself will not bring a person within the Convention and that there is no internationally recognised right to object to a particular war, the Canadian cases recognise an exception to this in the circumstances identified in paragraph 171 of the UNHCR Handbook. The exception is that where an applicant objects to the military service because of political, religious or moral convictions or for sincere reasons of conscience and there is objective evidence that the military action with which the person does not wish to be associated is condemned by the international community as contrary to the basic rules of human conduct, the applicant could be considered a Convention refugee.

While the approach taken in Canadian cases and the view expressed in Sepet would seem to be consistent with the purpose and overall framework of the Convention, including in particular the exclusion clauses in Article 1F, the circumstances in which non-discriminatory application of conscription laws could constitute persecution within the meaning of Article 1A(2) as qualified by s.91R of the Act remain unclear.

The joint judgment in Applicant S suggests that, given the nature of the Convention, the notion of a ‘law of general application’ may involve consideration as to whether a law that offends the standards of civil societies may not be deserving of recognition as a law at all. On that view, conscription laws that offend the standards of civil societies by, for example, requiring a person to commit gross human rights abuses may fall outside the concept of ‘laws of general application’ in the relevant sense. If so, claims relating to military conscription in cases of this kind may require a different kind of analysis.

‘Value-laden’ laws

In a number of cases relating to religion it has been held that the mere fact that a law of general application may reflect some religious value does not necessarily mean it is persecutory within the meaning of the Convention. To come within the Convention it still

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103 Zolfagharkhani v Canada (MEI) [1993] 3 FC 540 (Court of Appeal); Hinzman v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2006 FC 420 (Mactavish J, 31 March 2006); Lebedev v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2007 FC 728 (de Montigny J, 9 July 2007). Justice de Montigny reviewed jurisprudence in Canada and other countries, including Sepet, on military service evasion as a ground for refugee protection.

104 Lebedev v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2007 FC 728 (de Montigny J, 9 July 2007) at [51]-[82]. It includes discussion of what would be necessary to constitute international condemnation of the relevant kind. The analysis in Lebedev and Hinzman relies heavily on interpretation of paragraphs 170 and 171 of the UNHCR Handbook, above n 16, in conjunction with the views of academic scholars and the interaction between Article 1A(2) and Article 1F, rather than deriving from the language of the Convention definition itself. The consideration of the issue also occurs in the context of the relevant legislation, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001.

105 See Kratov v SSHD [2004] 1 WLR 1825. Article 1F is discussed in Chapter 7 of this Guide.

106 Note that regardless of the position under the Convention, persecution under s.91R(1)(c) necessarily involves discriminatory conduct. Unfortunately, while the Tribunal decisions in SZAIC and SZAOG were both made after the introduction of s.91R, in neither case did their Honours discuss the question of Convention nexus in relation to the issue as to whether the non-discriminatory application of a law of general application could constitute persecution in certain circumstances.

needs to be shown that the law, no matter how harsh, discriminates for a Convention reason.

In *MIMA v Darboy* the applicant had claimed that the enforcement of an Iranian law which criminalised adultery amounted to persecution for reasons of religion because the law had its origins in Islamic law. The Federal Court referred to the following passage from the High Court's judgment in *The Church of the New Faith*:

> The freedom to act in accordance with one's religious beliefs is not as inviolate as the freedom to believe, for general laws to preserve and protect society are not defeated by a plea of religious obligation to breach them. ... Conduct in which a person engages in giving effect to his faith in the supernatural is religious, but it is excluded from the area of legal immunity marked out by the concept of religion if it offends against the ordinary laws, i.e. if it offends against laws which do not discriminate against religion generally or against particular religions or against conduct of a kind which is characteristic only of a religion.\(^\text{108}\)

The Federal Court held that if the harm feared arose out of the application of a law of general application then, notwithstanding that the law may have its origin in religious tenets, the Tribunal must ascertain whether the law is applied in a discriminatory manner so as to constitute persecution. The Court stated:

> It appears the Tribunal was proceeding on the basis that [the law whose operation the applicant would be exposed to if he was to return to Iran] was a law of general application notwithstanding its genesis in Islamic law and even if it was given effect to by judges who were also clerics. Given that it was a law of general application it was necessary for the Tribunal to inquire whether sanctions arising from the operation of the law applied generally and not in a way that was discriminatory. That is, in a way that would constitute persecution.\(^\text{109}\)

The reasoning in *Darboy* was applied in *Lama v MIMA*, where the applicant had claimed to fear persecution for his religion in Nepal because he had contravened a Hindu-based law against killing cows. Justice Tamberlin held that it was open to the Tribunal to find that the law did not selectively punish the applicant as a non-Hindu. His Honour stated:

> … it is apparent that the laws of a nation, both legislative and judicial, to a large extent reflect the values of that nation. Some of these religious or ethical values will be of an abiding nature and others will vary from time to time due to changes arising from social, scientific, educational or technological developments. However, the fact that the law of a country may enshrine particular religious values does not mean that such laws can be described as targeting members in that society who do not adhere to the religion in question. In the present case, the law does not impact on the applicant in any way different to that in which it impacts upon other members of Nepalese society. It is a law of general application and the evidence does not support a conclusion that the law is applied in a discriminatory way. Although it is unlikely that a Hindu may kill a cow, in the event that he or she does so, the prescribed penalties apply. What is governed by the law is the act of killing the cow and not the social or political or religious beliefs of the person who commits the killing.\(^\text{110}\)

Similarly, Lindgren J in *Moradgholi v MIMA* found there was no suggestion an anti-pornography law in Iran, despite expressing Islamic values, was intended to impose the religion of Islam itself on non-Muslims.\(^\text{111}\) His Honour stated:

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\(^\text{108}\) *The Church of the New Faith v The Commissioner of Pay-Roll Tax (Victoria) (1982-1983) 154 CLR 120 at 135-136, per Mason ACJ and Brennan J.*

\(^\text{109}\) *MIMA v Darboy* (1998) 52 ALD 44 at 45.


The law in question, like the anti-bovicide law in *Lama*, was directed against acts inconsistent with the religion of that theocratic society. It would apply indiscriminately to, for example, a Christian within the territorial boundaries of Iran, but not because that person was a Christian, and there would be no attempt to proselytise that person, whether or not he or she complied with the law.\(^{112}\)

Likewise, in *MZZHY v MIBP*, the Court found no error in the Reviewer’s findings that even though laws about tattooing and Islamic dress code in Iran sought to promulgate Islamic values, they were generally applicable laws governing the act of offending a moral or religious value in public, and were not enforced in a discriminatory manner in that instance.\(^{113}\)

**Positive discrimination**

It is unlikely that positive discrimination in favour of one group will amount to persecution of another group. In *Gunaseelan v MIMA*, French J expressed the opinion that:

> … the establishment of a state policy of positive discrimination in favour of a particular ethnic group will not necessarily amount to persecution of other groups not the beneficiaries of that policy. The resolution of that question may depend, in each case, upon the nature and extent of the adverse or detrimental impact of the policy upon the non-advantaged groups.\(^{114}\)

In light of *Applicant S v MIMA*,\(^{115}\) the resolution of the question as to whether positive discrimination in favour of a group amounts to persecution of another group will also depend upon whether the discrimination is appropriate and adapted to achieving a legitimate government objective.

**Denial of the right to return / expulsion**

In some circumstances expulsion from, or the denial of a right to return to, a country may amount to persecution. This issue may need to be considered if an applicant claims refugee status on this basis, or if the issue fairly arises on the facts. Questions of degree and fact will be involved in considering the question. Whether or not the asylum seeker is a national of the country in question will also be relevant to whether any expulsion or denial of a right to return can be considered persecutory.

There is little case law on this issue and what exists is of limited assistance. In *Diatlov v MIMA* the Federal Court indicated a stateless person’s inability to return to a country of former habitual residence will not amount to persecution, Sackville J stating that:

> on the authorities, whatever significance the applicant’s possible inability to return to [the country of former habitual residence] may have for the application of the *Stateless Persons Convention*, it does not enable

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\(^{112}\) *Moradgholi v MIMA* [2000] FCA 13 (Lindgren J, 12 January 2000) at [64].

\(^{113}\) *MZZHY v MIBP* [2013] FCCA 1246 (Judge Burchardt, 7 October 2013) at [18]-[22], [28]-[34]. See also *MZTZW v MIBP* [2014] FCCA 2083 (Judge Burchardt, 19 September 2014), where the Court accepted a submission that a law with respect to Islamic dress that patently sought to promulgate Islamic value in Iranian society applied to all Iranians and did not constitute persecution: at [62] (judgment upheld on appeal in *MZTZW v MIBP* [2015] FCA 475 (Jessup J, 19 May 2015)).

\(^{114}\) *Gunaseelan v MIMA* (1997) 49 ALD 594 at 601.

him to satisfy the definition of “refugee” in article 1A(2) of the Refugees Convention.\textsuperscript{116}

In \textit{DZABG v MIAC}, applying \textit{Diatlov}, the Federal Magistrate observed:

it would be erroneous for an individual’s subsequently arising statelessness to be regarded as adding to his disadvantageous circumstances such that he or she could be regarded as a refugee rather than as a stateless person.\textsuperscript{117}

Different considerations arise, however, where the relevant fear is of expulsion from, or denial of a right to return to, the applicant’s country of nationality. That issue arose in \textit{Tesfamichael v MIMA}, where the Federal Court held that expulsion of a person from his or her country of nationality would ‘fall within the category of harm sufficient to constitute persecution’.\textsuperscript{118}

Disabilities such as expulsion from or the loss or lack of a right to return to a country should be considered according to the usual criteria for determining persecution, that is, whether or not in the particular case it amounts to serious harm imposed for a Convention reason, and whether or not it is appropriate and adapted to achieving a legitimate government object.

It may be noted, however, that cases where an applicant has a well-founded fear of expulsion from his or her country of nationality, or even claims to have such a fear, are likely to be rare. Conversely, it will rarely be the case that inability to return to a country of former habitual residence will be persecution for a Convention reason, as distinct from application of non-discriminatory and generally applicable migration laws. As with all claims, a Convention reason will need to be established to bring the expulsion and/or lack of right to return to a country within the Convention.

\textbf{SELF EXPRESSION AND SUPPRESSION OF OPINIONS, BELIEFS AND IDENTITY}

Frequently, when considering whether a fear of persecution is well-founded, questions may arise as to the consequences of activity that an applicant claims he or she will pursue in the future (for example religious or political activity, or publically acknowledging their sexuality). Resolution of such questions will usually require a finding as to whether the applicant will in fact engage in the activity in question.\textsuperscript{119} In considering this factual question, it is important to bear in mind that asylum seekers are not required, and cannot be expected, to take

\textsuperscript{116} \textit{Diatlov v MIMA} [1999] FCA 468 (Sackville J, 25 October 1999) at [40]. Following Diatlov, the Federal Circuit Court stated in \textit{BZA DW v MIA C} [2013] FCCA 1229 (Judge Jarrett, 3 September 2013) at [71] that ‘the inability to re-enter a country where a person was habitually resident because that person has no right of entry does not, without more, constitute persecution’; upheld on appeal \textit{(BZA DW v MIBP} [2014] FCA 541 (Dowsett J, 26 May 2014)).

\textsuperscript{117} \textit{DZABG v MIAC} [2012] FMCA 36 (Brown FM, 25 January 2012) at [132] (undisturbed on appeal: \textit{DZABG v MIAC} [2012] FCA 827 (Dowsett J, 7 August 2012)). The Court further commented at [137] that it is unnecessary to consider the circumstances an individual may face because of his or her statelessness which might arise upon his or her return as a consequence of the absence of any necessary documents such as a passport. The Court also observed at [135] that, although statelessness may be a significant disadvantage, the absence of nationality per se is insufficient to satisfy the requirements for protection.

\textsuperscript{118} \textit{Tesfamichael v MIMA} [1999] FCA 1661 (Mansfield J, 2 December 1999) at [54].

\textsuperscript{119} For example, in \textit{ADZ16 v MIBP} [2016] FCCA 3246 3246 (Judge Riley, 15 December 2016) the Court held that the Tribunal erred in considering what the applicant should, rather than would, do upon return to their home country (at [19]-[21]). In that case, the Tribunal had found there was no particular reason why the applicant should not comply with a law of Iran rather than consider what would happen if he did or did not.
reasonable steps to avoid persecutory harm, or to live 'discreetly' to avoid such harm.\textsuperscript{120} If, when considering what the applicant will do in the future, the decision-maker finds that an applicant has lived or would in fact live discreetly, it will generally be necessary to consider why, and in particular, whether the 'discreet' behaviour was or would be the result of fear of harm. If the decision-maker finds that an applicant has acted or will act discreetly in order to avoid harm, then it will be necessary to consider whether the fear is well-founded and is a fear of persecution. This in turn would require consideration of what might happen to the applicant if he or she does not act with discretion.

In \textit{Appellant S95/2002 v MIMA} the Tribunal had found that the applicants were homosexuals, that homosexual men in Bangladesh were a particular social group, and that such people could not live openly without facing a range of problems including, for example, the possibility of being bashed by the police. However, it found that the applicants had lived discreetly without experiencing any more than minor problems with anyone outside their own families and that they would live discreetly in the future if returned to Bangladesh. Consequently, they would not suffer serious harm and therefore did not have a well-founded fear of persecution. By majority,\textsuperscript{121} the Court held that the Tribunal had erred by failing to consider whether the need to act discreetly to avoid the threat of serious harm constituted persecution, and further, by failing to consider whether the appellants might suffer serious harm if members of the Bangladesh community discovered that they were homosexuals.

Justices McHugh and Kirby explained the error in this way:

In cases where the applicant has modified his or her conduct, there is a natural tendency for the tribunal of fact to reason that, because the applicant has not been persecuted in the past, he or she will not be persecuted in the future. The fallacy underlying this approach is the assumption that the conduct of the applicant is uninfluenced by the conduct of the persecutor and that the relevant persecutory conduct is the harm that will be inflicted. In many – perhaps the majority of – cases, however, the applicant has acted in the way that he or she did only because of the threat of harm. In such cases, the well-founded fear of persecution held by the applicant is the fear that, unless that person acts to avoid the harmful conduct, he or she will suffer harm. It is the threat of serious harm with its menacing implications that constitutes the persecutory conduct. To determine the issue of real chance without determining whether the modified conduct was influenced by the threat of harm is to fail to consider that issue properly.\textsuperscript{122}

Their Honours held that the Tribunal had failed to give proper attention to what might happen to the appellants if they lived openly in the same way as heterosexual people in Bangladesh live. If the Tribunal had found that their fear of discrimination had caused them to be discreet in the past, it would have been necessary then to consider whether their fear of harm was well-founded and amounted to persecution. That would have required the Tribunal to consider what might happen to the appellants if they lived openly as homosexuals.\textsuperscript{123}

\textsuperscript{120} In \textit{Appellant S95/2002 v MIMA} (2003) 216 CLR 473, McHugh and Kirby JJ held that in so far as decisions in the Tribunal and the Federal Court contain statements that asylum seekers are required, or can be expected, to take reasonable steps to avoid persecutory harm, they are wrong in principle and should not be followed.

\textsuperscript{121} \textit{Appellant S95/2002 v MIMA} (2003) 216 CLR 473, McHugh, Kirby, Gummow and Hayne JJ, with Gleeson CJ, Callinan and Heydon JJ dissenting essentially because of their different view of the case the appellants had sought to make.

\textsuperscript{122} \textit{Appellant S95/2002 v MIMA} (2003) 216 CLR 473 at [43]. For discussion of the assessment of claims relating to sexual identity, see UNHCR, \textit{Guidelines on International Protection No, 9, Claims to Refugee Status based on Sexual Orientation and/or Gender Identity within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees} (UNHCR, 2012). Note, however, that the Guidelines are non-binding and should not be
According to Gummow and Hayne JJ:

The Tribunal did not ask why the appellants would live "discreetly". It did not ask whether the appellants would live "discretely" because that was the way in which they would hope to avoid persecution. That is, the Tribunal was diverted from addressing the fundamental question of whether there was a well-founded fear of persecution by considering whether the appellants were likely to live as a couple in a way that would not attract adverse attention. ... It did not consider whether the adverse consequences to which it referred sufficed to make the appellants' fears well founded. All that was said was that they would live discreetly.\textsuperscript{124}

Although there are subtle differences in the analyses in the two joint majority judgments in S395, the unifying principle underlying those judgments is that asylum seekers are not required, nor can they be expected, to take reasonable steps to avoid persecutory harm.\textsuperscript{125}

While that case involved membership of a particular social group, it is clear that the principle is equally applicable to each of the Convention grounds. Justices McHugh and Kirby explained that:

[the Convention would give no protection from persecution for reasons of religion or political opinion if it was a condition of protection that the person affected must take steps – reasonable or otherwise – to avoid offending the wishes of the persecutors. Nor would it give protection to membership of many a "particular social group" if it were a condition of protection that its members hide their membership or modify some attribute or characteristic of the group to avoid persecution. Similarly, it would often fail to give protection to people who are persecuted for reasons of race or nationality if it was a condition of protection that they should take steps to conceal their race or nationality.\textsuperscript{126}

The Federal Court has emphasised that, on the reasoning of the High Court in S395, the harm in question is the threat of persecution, rather than the impact of repressed behaviour.\textsuperscript{127} The principle in S395 has been judicially considered and applied in relation to religion,\textsuperscript{128} political opinion,\textsuperscript{129} ethnicity,\textsuperscript{130} and membership of a particular social group.\textsuperscript{131}

\textsuperscript{124}Appellant S395/2002 v MIMA (2003) 216 CLR 473 at [98].
\textsuperscript{125}Falun Gong practitioners in China: For example homosexuals: VAFC v MIMA [2004] FCA 367 (Weinberg J, 31 March 2004) at [32]. The discreet or modified behaviour to which the principle in S395 applies is that of the visa applicant, and not of someone else: MZAJR v MIBP [2016] FCCA 1787 (Judge Wilson, 15 July 2016) at [143].
\textsuperscript{126}SZBQV v MIMIA (2005) 216 CLR 477 (Weinberg J, 31 March 2004); NASJ v MIMA [2005] FMCA 124 (Barnes FM, 25 February 2005); and SZRGA v MIAC [2012] FMCA 1222 (Nicholls FM, 19 December 2012) at [66], [71], in which Nicholls FM held that following S395/2002 v MIMA, the Tribunal was required to consider: whether charitable acts undertaken by the applicant were expressions of his Alevi faith, as claimed; whether the reduction of such activities upon return to Turkey was because of the persecution faced; and what may happen to the applicant on return if he resumed the same level of charitable activities. This reasoning was not disturbed on appeal: SZRGA v MIBP [2015] FCA 1200 (Griffiths J, 9 November 2015). In SZTML v MIBP [2014] FCCA 2664 (Judge Manousaridis, 18 November 2014), the Court held that in light of the applicant’s claim that as a Mormon he was required to preach, the Tribunal was required to consider whether the intended to proselytise and if so, whether there was a real chance he would suffer serious harm for doing so. The Tribunal instead assumed that the applicant would not or could not proselytise because of an agreement between the Mormon Church and Chinese government, and assessed the harm he might suffer as an inability to proselytise, not what the Chinese government might do to him if he proselytised: at [18]; [24].
\textsuperscript{128}SZAKO v MIMA (No. 2) [2005] FMCA 717 (Driver FM, 10 June 2005). In that case the Tribunal was held to have erred in dealing with the issue of relocation, by expecting the applicant to conceal her (Roma) ethnicity through relocation.
The fear of persecution for a Convention reason need not be the sole reason for the discreet behaviour.\(^\text{132}\)

The cases make it clear that the outcome will depend upon the factual findings in relation to all the circumstances, including the applicant's particular circumstances in light of conditions in his or her country.

For example, in *SZACV v MIMIA* the Tribunal found that the applicant was probably a Falun Gong practitioner and may have been picked up by the police, but that he was of no adverse interest to the Public Security Bureau in China. It then relied on country information to conclude that 'there is nothing prohibiting the applicant from returning to China and practising his beliefs on a private basis'. The Court held that that was the answer to the question 'Could the applicant live in that country without attracting adverse consequences?' which was identified as the wrong question by Gummow and Hayne JJ in *S395*.\(^\text{133}\)

On the other hand, in *SZASI v MIMIA* the Court found that the Tribunal did not err in finding that, if the applicant continued as a Falun Gong practitioner in China, he would continue to act in the same 'low and discreet' manner as before, and would not come to the adverse attention of the Chinese authorities. The Court held that this did not involve the kind of error identified in *S395*, as the Tribunal’s conclusion was based on its finding that the applicant’s discreet behaviour was not due to a threat of persecution but rather a lack of greater commitment.\(^\text{134}\)

In *NASJ v MIMIA* the applicant had been harassed in Russia for handing out Scientology leaflets. The Tribunal recognised that restrictions on the right to proselytise may amount to persecution where proselytising is an integral part of practising a religion, but found that proselytising was not an integral part of the practice of Scientology. It found that the applicant could openly practise her religion in Russia and that if she did not hand out leaflets she could openly practise her religion in Russia and that if she did not hand out leaflets in the future the chance of any further harm would be remote. The Court found no error in the Tribunal's approach. There was no suggestion that the applicant was being required to

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\(^\text{132}\) Convention grounds of religion and political opinion.

In *MZZMA v MIJP* [2015] FCCA 125 (Judge Riethmuller, 23 January 2015), the Court held that the assessor applied the wrong test in finding that the applicant would not 'necessarily' be politically active in future because of his political resentment, and that his inactivity would not be 'solely' because of a fear of persecution: at [22][30]. The reasoning suggests that there is no requirement when applying the principle in *S395* that the fear of persecution must be the sole reason for the discreet conduct. It also suggests that it is important to bear in mind the 'real chance' test for a well-founded fear, which does not require certainty about the future conduct.

\(^\text{133}\) *SZACV v MIMIA* [2004] FCA 469 (Gyles J, 22 April 2004). Other cases in which errors of the kind identified in *S395* have occurred include *VFAC v MIMIA* [2004] FCA 367 (Weinberg J, 31 March 2004), *SZAHV v MIMIA* [2004] FMCA 28 (Driver FM, 28 January 2004), *NAHW v MIMIA* [2004] FCA 399 (Allsop J, 8 April 2004); *VWSR v MIMIA* [2005] FMCA 977 (Riethmuller FM, 15 July 2005); *SZAPC v MIMIA* [2005] FCA 995 (Madgwick J, 27 July 2005); *SZCCS v MIMIA* [2005] FMCA 1120 (Raphael FM, 11 August 2005); and *SZQUP v MIAC* [2012] FMCA 276 (Raphael FM, 4 April 2012) (although the Tribunal’s decision was upheld on an independent basis).

\(^\text{134}\) *SZASI v MIMIA* [2004] FMCA 339 (Raphael FM, 20 May 2004). See also *SZDRB* [2005] FMCA 10 (Lloyd-Jones FM, 29 April 2005) where the decision maker had accepted that the applicant may have been a member of the Awami League in Bangladesh but found that he was not in danger of being persecuted for that reason alone. While the Court had some concerns regarding the delegate’s reasoning that the applicant could remain committed to his political beliefs without resorting to violent activities or being involved in actions which may provoke violence, and avoid being harmed by rival groups by not resorting to provocative acts, his Honour held that the delegate did not fall into error, distinguishing *S395* on the facts. Importantly, the applicant had not claimed that he had personally engaged in any violent political activities or that he had encouraged anyone else to do so. It may be that in different circumstances, reliance on an applicant avoiding violent activities or activities which may provoke violence could give rise to error of the kind established in *S395*. 
modify her religious beliefs or opinions, or hide her membership of the Church of Scientology. Thus, the Court regarded it as implicit in the Tribunal findings that if the applicant were to be prosecuted for proselytising this would not be persecution because of her religion.  

Modification of conduct not arising from a Convention-protected attribute

There is a divergence in the case law over whether or not the principles in S395 are engaged where an applicant’s claims involve modification of behaviour that is not related to a Convention attribute, where such modification would not of itself be persecutory, or where the harm to be avoided is not persecutory in any event.

A number of judgments of the Federal Court and Federal Circuit Court have held that S395 is not engaged in such circumstances. For example, in MZYUV v MIAC the Federal Court held that:

the [Reviewer’s] conclusion that the appellant might have to modify his behaviour in order to protect himself, not for a Refugee Convention reason but generally, does not impose a requirement that the appellant is required, or expected, to take reasonable steps to avoid persecutory harm. Rather, it is a requirement, or expectation, that the appellant will take reasonable steps to avoid harm generally, which does not offend S395.

Similarly, in SZSML v MIMAC the Federal Circuit Court, referring to MZYUV, found that the Tribunal will only commit an error of the type identified in S395 where the behavioural modification concerns a Convention attribute or otherwise results in Convention persecution. The finding that the applicant may need to modify or change his business practices to avoid particular dangers he feared outside Kabul did not amount to an impermissible behaviour modification as it did not concern any Convention characteristic and

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135 NASJ v MIMIA [2005] FMCA 124 (Barnes FM, 25 February 2005) at [19]. In MIMIA v VWBA [2005] FCAFC 175 (Sundberg, Marshall and North JJ, 26 August 2005) by majority with Marshall J dissenting, similar to NASJ, the majority found no error in the Tribunal finding that the ‘restriction’ of practising Falun Gong privately did not amount to persecution in the circumstances of the case.


137 On appeal: SZTEO v MIBP (2016) 239 FCR 1. Similarly, in SZKKB v MIAC [2011] FMCA 1000 (Raphael FM, 14 December 2011) (undisturbed on appeal: MIAC v SZKKB [2012] FCA 1189 (Yates J, 30 October 2012) at [25] the Court found that the decision-maker’s finding that the applicant could avoid persecution by using an alternate but safer route from one town to another, where no claim was made that the more dangerous route would normally be taken for lifestyle reasons, did not amount to ‘modification of lifestyle’ in the S395 sense. Although the Court’s use of the expression ‘lifestyle’ is ambiguous, its emphasis on the fact that no claim had been made that the more dangerous route would be taken ‘for lifestyle reasons’ suggests that the Court’s reasoning was that it would amount to error of the type identified in S395 to require a person to modify an attribute or behaviour which is related to one of the Convention grounds, but not in respect of modifying their behaviour in a more general sense. See also MZYOI v MIAC [2012] FCA 868 (Dodds-Streeton J, 16 August 2012) at [135]–[136] where the Court rejected a similar argument.
there was no suggestion that the modification of business practices would be considered persecutory.\textsuperscript{138}

In \textit{SZSZM v MIBP}, the Federal Court accepted the Minister's submission that the principles in \textit{S395} only apply to modifications or suggested modifications which involve the surrender of the rights protected by the Convention.\textsuperscript{139} The Court referred to the judgment in \textit{NALZ v MIMIA}, which concerned an applicant who claimed that his activities in selling electrical goods to Sri Lankan nationals had brought him to the adverse attention of Indian authorities due to suspected LTTE connections. A majority of the Full Federal Court in that case held that the Tribunal's finding that he could avoid further arrests by not selling electrical goods to Sri Lankans, and that it would not be unreasonable for him to avoid arrest by so doing, was not inconsistent with the principles in \textit{S395}.\textsuperscript{140}

In \textit{SZTEO v MIBP}, the Full Federal Court rejected the appellant’s argument that it is not a pre-condition that 'concealment' relates to a Convention reason for the principles in \textit{S395} to be engaged, observing that those principles require consideration of whether it is a fear of harm (which must be for a Convention reason) that will influence an asylum seeker to live in a different manner upon return.\textsuperscript{141}

In \textit{AGU16 v MIBP}, the Federal Court found no error in the Tribunal's finding that the appellant could avoid persecution as a returnee from a Western country by taking steps to conceal his association with Australia, on the basis that the need to take such precautions did not itself amount to persecution.\textsuperscript{142}

Aspects of McHugh and Kirby JJ’s reasoning in \textit{S395} also suggest that the principle in that case is directed at situations where, in order to avoid harm, a person would be required to modify or conceal an attribute or characteristic that is related to one of the Convention

\textsuperscript{138} \textit{SZSML v MIMIA} [2013] FCCA 1253 (Driver FM, 2 September 2013) at [34].

\textsuperscript{139} \textit{SZSZM v MIBP} [2014] FCA 984 (Katzmann J, 12 September 2014).

\textsuperscript{140} \textit{NALZ v MIMIA} (2004) 140 FCR 270. Justice Emmett observed that requiring an applicant to relocate to avoid harm did not offend the principle in \textit{S395} as it did not involve modifying beliefs or opinions or hiding membership of a particular social group, and noted that in this case the applicant was not expected to cease behaviour that caused the authorities to impute a political opinion to him or to identify him as a member of a particular social group – at most, he was expected to cease behaviour that caused the authorities to impute illegal conduct to him: at [46], [50]. Justice Cowdroy observed that a proper claim for protection was not made out as the applicant was not a member of any protected class but was wrongly suspected of being a member, particularly where the applicant could take steps to avoid that perception by choosing not to trade unlawfully: at [58]. Justice Madgwick in dissent expressed the view that the approach taken in \textit{S395} cannot be confined to cases of actual as distinct from imputed membership of a Convention class: at [12]. Note, however, that the Full Federal Court has since distinguished \textit{NALZ} on the basis that the reasoning in that case turned on the fact that the activities in which the applicant had engaged were illegal: \textit{MIBP v SZSCA} (2013) 222 FCR 192 per Robertson and Griffiths JJ at [62]-[91] (Flick J dissenting); though this judgment was overturned on appeal in \textit{MIBP v SZSCA} (2014) 254 CLR 317.

\textsuperscript{141} \textit{SZTEO v MIBP} (2016) 239 FCR 1at [31], though the Court did not need to decide this question because of the Tribunal’s findings that the applicant would not be subject to persecution in any case, and any difficulties potentially faced did not relate to a choice to live differently from any fear of harm of any kind: at [24]-[32]. The Court accepted the primary judge's analysis to the effect that if a person with a well-founded fear of being persecuted because of Convention characteristics can take steps to conceal those characteristics, they still have a well-founded fear if the reason for concealing Convention characteristics is the desire to avoid persecution because of those characteristics: at [33]. See also the primary judgment in \textit{SZTEO v MIBP} (2015) FCCA 2228 (Judge Manousaridis, 21 August 2015), where the Court rejected the proposition that the \textit{S395} principles require the Tribunal to ignore a person's ability to avoid persecution \textit{in general}, finding no error in the Tribunal's finding that the applicant would act in a way to avoid harm on account of his being a documented stateless Faili Kurd, as the activity would not involve concealing that characteristic: at [17]-[18]. The Court held that the \textit{S395} principles only apply when a person has the ability to or intends to take action that will conceal their Convention characteristics, for the purpose of avoiding persecution because of those characteristics: at [21].

\textsuperscript{142} \textit{AGU16 v MIBP} (2017) FCA 441 (Nicholas J, 2 May 2017).
grounds. In **SZATV v MIAC**, Kirby J again emphasised the purpose of the Convention in protecting certain attributes, describing the Convention as denying ‘as unreasonable, an “adjustment” that would involve undermining the central purpose of the Refugees Convention of protecting the important, but limited, grounds of “persecution” specified in the Refugees Convention’. Other cases also suggest that not all instances of modifying behaviour to avoid harm will offend the principle in **S395**.

It is apparent from these cases that expecting an applicant to modify their behaviour to avoid being imputed with a Convention attribute will not offend the principle in **S395**, unless it involves the surrender of Convention-protected rights.

In contrast, in **MIBP v SZSCA**, a majority of the Full Federal Court held that there was an **S395**-type error in the Tribunal’s reasoning that a truck driver who had been imputed with a political opinion by the Taliban due to his work driving trucks could avoid persecution by changing his occupation. On appeal, although the majority of the High Court did not address the **S395** principle in detail (finding that there was no **S395**-type error), Gageler J in dissent held that:

The **S395** principle... directs attention to why the person would or could be expected to hide or change behaviour that is the manifestation of a Convention characteristic. The principle has no application to a person who would or could be expected to hide or change such behaviour in any event for some reason other than a fear of persecution.

The **S395** principle similarly has no application to a person who would or could be expected to hide or change behaviour that is not the manifestation of a Convention characteristic. That is so even if the person would or could be expected to change that behaviour in order to avoid a real chance of persecution by reason of the perpetrators of persecution wrongly imputing a Convention characteristic to the person.

It has been noted that as the majority of the High Court dealt with **SZSCA** on a different basis, its reasoning does not overturn that of the Full Federal Court. However, given that the High Court dealt with the matter on a different basis, the law on this point does not seem...
settled. Decision-makers should therefore exercise caution in determining that an applicant may avoid persecution by changing their behaviour in a way that does not require modification of a Convention-related attribute. Particular caution should be exercised in cases involving particular social groups, as requiring an applicant to modify an attribute which is central to the characterisation of the group may offend the principle arising from S395.149

CLAIMS ARISING FROM PERSONAL AND FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS

While the paradigm case of persecution contemplated by the Convention is persecution by the state or agents of the state, it is accepted in Australia that the serious harm involved in what is found to be persecution may be inflicted by persons who are not agents of the state.150 However, discrimination that is aimed at a person as an individual and not for a Convention reason will not, of itself, bring a person within the Convention definition of a refugee.151 Further, Australia’s protection obligations will not be engaged if the country of nationality has taken reasonable measures to protect the lives and safety of its citizens, including an appropriate criminal law, and the provision of a reasonably effective and impartial police force and system of justice.152 This does not mean that, simply because the claimant may be the only person subject to the discriminatory conduct, they do not meet the Convention definition.153 Furthermore, there is no special test where the authors of persecution are members of the asylum seeker’s family.154 In each case, all the elements of the Convention definition must be established.

149 In SZATV v MAC (2007) 233 CLR 18, Callinan J expressed the view that it is ‘too categorical to hold that discretion with respect to membership, or an attribute of a social group, properly defined as a necessarily unreasonable requirement or expectation, or, if it has to be exercised to avoid persecution, will mean in all circumstances that the member is a persecuted person’: at [107]. In DZADC v MAC (No.2) [2012] FMCA 778 (Raphael FM, 3 September 2012) the Court found that the Reviewer erred by expecting the claimant to take reasonable steps to avoid persecution by changing his profession of hairdresser. The Court held that, having accepted the applicant was a member of the particular social group of Iraqis performing ‘un-Islamic’ behaviour and following and encouraging Western culture, the Reviewer could not require him to cease to do the very thing that places him within that group so as to avoid persecution. See also MZXML v MIAC [2007] FMCA 392 (Riley FM, 8 May 2007), where the S395 error was identified as not considering whether maintaining secrecy about being an informer in the past in order to avoid serious harm in the future was harm amounting to persecution. No consideration was given as to whether this was suppression of the kind of Convention-related characteristic envisaged by the High Court in S395.


151 Applicant A v MIEA (1997) 190 CLR 225, per McHugh J at 257. For example, in Kaur v MIMA [2001] FCA 719 (Conti J, 14 June 2001) the RRT had found that harm experienced by the applicant at the hand of her de facto husband’s legal wife and her brothers was due to personal animosity, as distinct from being the result of her caste or for any other Convention reason. The Court stated at [14] that in light of those findings and the observations of McHugh J in Applicant A, ‘it is readily apparent that where a situation involves conduct that leads to the harm of another, and such conduct is motivated by personal animosity arising from the perceived or alleged victims of an extramarital relationship as distinct from persons who are persecuted for supposed or perceived characteristics, namely their race, religion, political opinion or social group, such conduct does not constitute persecution in the Convention sense’.

152 MIMA v Respondents S152/2003 (2004) 222 CLR 1 at [21], [22], [25]-[29] per Gleeson, Hayne and Heydon JJ and [110], [115] per Kirby J.

153 Applicant A v MIEA (1997) 190 CLR 225 at 258. In Brahmbhatt v MIMA [2000] FCA 1686 (Whitlam J, 22 November 2000) the applicant’s case was based on her homosexuality. The Tribunal had found that even if her fears of being killed by her family were well-founded, ‘such fear arises not because of an element of motivation on the part of her family members to harm homosexuals, but due to some private reason relating to her family not wishing the applicant to be a homosexual. Consequently there is no, or insufficient, nexus between the harm and the Convention ground’. Referring to MIMA v Haji Ibrahim (2000) 204 CLR 1, the Court said that no such gloss on the element of motivation was warranted and that there is no special test where the authors of persecution are members of the asylum claimant’s family: ‘Whatever may be the scope offered by the Refugees
Where claims involve personal relationships, an issue will often arise as to whether there are any Convention related motivating factors for the harm feared or whether an applicant is being targeted as an individual and not for a Convention reason. If there are Convention related motivating factors, it will usually be necessary to consider whether the authorities provide a reasonable level of protection against the harm feared. Conversely, if there are no Convention related motivating factors, it may be necessary to consider whether there is a failure to protect for a Convention reason.

Familial rejection and familial pressure to marry

Rejection or ostracism by one’s own family would not of itself usually constitute persecution. In *MMM v MIMA* the applicant claimed that his family would disown him if they discovered his homosexuality. The Court held that such treatment could not be regarded as persecution within the meaning of the Convention as it is a purely private matter, and the general standards of civilised countries do not suggest that adults not under a disability have a right to protection when, for private reasons, their families reject them:

Persecution for the purposes of the Convention connotes some official approbation of the feared conduct, or at least official failure or inability to do something about it, when the general standards of civilised countries would entitle the putative refugee to the protection of the State ... There is nothing in such general standards to suggest that adults not under a disability have such an entitlement when, for private reasons, their families reject them.

Clearly, a family’s ‘private reasons’ in a ‘purely private matter’ may well relate to one or more of the Convention grounds. The point is that familial rejection, for any reason, is not the kind of detriment against which the state can be expected to provide protection. As Madgwick J observed, it is unlikely that any state would accept the responsibility of affording any person in the applicant’s shoes either civil redress against his family or other amelioration of such a personal rift.

The applicant in *MMM* also claimed his family would force him to marry and have children in accordance with Bangladeshi society and tradition. The Court held that while the impact of familial pressure to marry would be likely to fall harder on an unwilling homosexual man than on an unwilling heterosexual man, it appeared to be correct, as the Tribunal found, that the pressure was nevertheless not exerted for reasons of membership of the social group of homosexuals. In that case it did not appear that the pressure to marry was applied differently as between heterosexuals and homosexuals.

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While that case did not involve consideration of the statutory test for persecution as set out in s.91R(1) of the Act, his Honour’s reasoning would suggest that familial rejection and familial pressure to marry would be likely to fall well short of the statutory requirements.

**Violence arising from personal relationships**

A number of cases have come before the courts involving claims of domestic violence. In these cases, putting aside the question whether there is an appropriate level of state protection from such violence, the primary issue will often be whether the motivation of the aggressor can be attributed to a Convention reason.

For example, in *Basa v MIMA* the applicant feared violence from her former lover. The Tribunal found the harm feared was not for a Convention reason but arose from the applicant’s former relationship. Sackville J held that the Tribunal’s finding was justified, perhaps inevitable, on the material before it, adding:

> The applicant did not face persecution because she was a Filipino woman, but because of the unfortunate circumstances of her relationship with [her former lover] and his apparent propensity for violence.  

While providing useful illustrations, this and similar cases dealing with family violence depended on their own facts and are not authority for the proposition that domestic violence can never amount to persecution within the Convention.

In *A v MIMA* the applicant’s husband had converted to religion B and wanted the applicant and her children to convert to religion B. He became violent and followed her to another country where he and his co-religionists continued to threaten her. The Full Federal Court upheld a decision of the Tribunal which was based, in part, on a finding that the harm the applicant feared from her husband and his associates was for reasons of religion. A’s case illustrates that where domestic violence is motivated by a Convention reason there is no reason in principle why the Convention definition might not be met.

Further, even if the domestic violence was not motivated by a Convention reason, where a state withholds protection for a Convention reason the claim may still be brought within the Convention. In the case of *MIMA v Khawar* the applicant feared harm from her violent husband. The Tribunal found that he was not motivated to harm her for a Convention reason; rather, his reasons for being violent towards her were personal. The applicant had also claimed that the police refused to provide her with protection against her husband’s violence. A majority of the High Court agreed with the primary judge and Full Federal Court that the Convention test may be satisfied by the selective and discriminatory

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withholding of state protection for a Convention reason from serious harm that is not Convention related.\textsuperscript{164}

The members of the High Court gave slightly differing analyses of the relationship between persecution and state protection;\textsuperscript{165} however, it is clear that in cases involving serious harm that is not itself Convention related, a decision-maker should consider whether the circumstances of the case give rise to an issue of the discriminatory and systematic withholding of state protection for a Convention reason. Comments by members of the High Court provide some guidance as to the circumstances in which a failure to protect might constitute persecution within the meaning of the Convention. For example, Gleeson CJ considered that it would not be sufficient to show maladministration, incompetence, or ineptitude by local police; but if an applicant could show state tolerance or condonation of domestic violence, and systematic discriminatory implementation of the law, then the Convention test may be satisfied.\textsuperscript{166}

**CRIMINAL CONDUCT**

In claims involving fear of criminal conduct, proper consideration should be given to the question as to whether motivation for the conduct involves a Convention ground. The difficulties of such claims are often compounded in circumstances where, for instance, the harm feared is from persons who themselves have some link to a Convention ground, e.g. political guerilla groups. Claims involving revenge, extortion and corruption often include issues of selectivity that need to be assessed for the requisite Convention nexus. Importantly, there is no dichotomy between criminal activity and persecution on account of political opinion (or another Convention reason). That is, the fact that the harm feared amounts to criminal conduct does not, of itself, prevent such harm being categorised as persecution for reasons of political opinion.\textsuperscript{167} Whether it is or not is a matter of fact for the decision maker. But it should not be assumed that characterising conduct as (for example) ‘revenge’, ‘extortion’ or ‘crime’ automatically equates to a finding that the conduct was not for a Convention reason.\textsuperscript{168} Further, even if there is no Convention nexus to the criminal conduct feared, a nexus will nonetheless be established where the state withholds protection for a Convention reason.\textsuperscript{169}

\textsuperscript{164}MIMA v Khawar (2002) 210 CLR 1 per Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ, with Callinan J not deciding the issue. The majority found that the Tribunal had failed to make the necessary findings with respect to the applicant’s membership of a particular social group, the state’s failure to protect her, and the reason for that failure. See also the House of Lords decision in R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, Ex parte Shah [1999] 2 AC 629 which is generally consistent with the High Court’s approach.

\textsuperscript{165}See Chapter 4 of this Guide for further discussion.

\textsuperscript{166}MIMA v Khawar (2002) 210 CLR 1 at [26]; see also Callinan J’s comment at [155] that inactivity or inertia of itself does not constitute persecution. The discriminatory withholding of state protection in the context of Convention nexus is discussed further in Chapter 4 of this Guide.


\textsuperscript{168}Findings as to motivation for persecution should be made in accordance with s.91R(1)(a), i.e. ‘essential and significant reason’, which is discussed in detail in Chapter 5 of this Guide.

\textsuperscript{169}As per the principle in MIMA v Khawar (2002) 210 CLR 1. See for example SZEBJ v MIMA [2005] FCA 771 (Hill J, 10 June 2005), where the applicant feared that members of a criminal family / gang would seek revenge on him for exposing their
Revenge

Fear of revenge does not come within the scope of the Convention unless it can be shown that the retaliation is linked with a racial, religious or other Convention reason.

For example, in *Magyari v MIMA* the applicant was a passenger in a motor vehicle that was involved in an accident in which a young gypsy boy suffered serious injuries. The applicant feared revenge from the gypsies. The Federal Court held:

[The applicant] has been hounded by the gypsies because of what he, in their perception, has done. They see him as the party, or one of the parties, responsible for the injuries that the child has suffered. The applicant's alleged fear derives from these circumstances which have nothing whatsoever to do with any of the five convention reasons. The gypsies are not concerned with his race, religion or nationality, or with his membership of any social group or with his political opinion. Rather they are concerned to exact some form of retribution from him for what has happened to the child. ... If the applicant has a well founded fear of being persecuted by the gypsies ... the Tribunal was correct in concluding that the fear has no connection with any one of the convention reasons.

*Magyari* is a useful illustration but does not represent authority for the proposition that revenge can never come within the Convention. As the Full Federal Court stated in *MIMA v Abdi*:

Fear of revenge, without more, will normally not be sufficient to amount to persecution for a Convention reason. For example, a fear of revenge for the killing of a member of another group will usually not be sufficient unless it can be shown that the retaliation is linked with a racial, religious or other Convention reason. Of course, if it can be shown to be related to such a purpose then the fear of revenge may well come within the definition.

In *MIMA v Singh*, a case involving the application of Article 1F of the Convention, the Tribunal had found that the crime committed by the applicant was an act of revenge for the torture of a member of his group by police, and that there was no direct causal connection between the crime and the political objectives of the group. A majority of the High Court upheld the decision of the Full Federal Court that the Tribunal had erred in drawing the conclusions it did solely from the characterisation of the applicant’s crime as ‘an act of revenge’. Justice Kirby said:

By accepting an erroneous dichotomy between crimes of revenge and “political crimes”, the Tribunal misunderstood the legal criterion which it was obliged to apply. The misunderstanding was highly material to the respondent’s case because it excluded from consideration, erroneously, acts which might be both political and motivated by an element of vengeance.

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170 *Magyari v MIMA* (unreported, Federal Court of Australia, O’Loughlin J, 22 May 1997) at 16-17. *Velmurugu v MIEA* [1996] FCA 1499 (Olney J, 23 May 1996) provides another example of revenge which was found to be unrelated to a Convention ground.

171 See, for example, *Daljit Singh v MIMA* [1999] FCA 1599 (Mansfield J, 19 November 1999), where the Court held that revenge may be personal or it may be political: at [35].

172 *MIMA v Abdi* (1999) 87 FCR 280 at [44].

173 *MIMA v Singh* (2002) 209 CLR 533 per Gleseson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby JJ, McHugh and Callinan JJ dissenting; upholding the Full Federal Court’s judgment in *Singh v MIMA* (2000) 102 FCR 51. Despite his dissenting judgment, Callinan J also agreed with the Full Court that he would not necessarily hold a crime to be non-political simply because it may have been motivated in part by a desire for revenge at [167].

174 *MIMA v Singh* (2002) 209 CLR 533 at [136]. While that case involved consideration of the concept of ‘non-political crime’ in Article 1F of the Convention, the discussion of ‘revenge’ is equally relevant to the questions of motivation that arise under Article 1A(2).
Again, in *SHKB v MIMIA*, the Federal Court held that the Tribunal had erroneously drawn a dichotomy between Convention grounds and acts of retribution. The applicant had claimed a fear of persecution from Zulus who were angry that coloured families, such as his own, had taken their land from them. The Tribunal found that the reason why persons wished to injure him was to seek retribution for a person who had been killed at the applicant’s farm. The Court held that even if the threat was personal to the applicant and even if those making it were motivated by the desire for retribution, that did not preclude a conclusion that the threat was ‘for reason of race’, as the applicant had claimed.\(^{175}\)

Similarly, in *SZFZN v MIAC* the Federal Magistrates Court held that the Tribunal erred by failing to explain its paradoxical findings that the applicant’s friend’s father was not motivated by the applicant’s membership of a particular social group (homosexuals), but rather by a desire for personal revenge, despite appearing to accept that the father was compelled by society’s hostility to homosexuality when procuring persecution of the applicant.\(^{176}\)

The issue of revenge often arises in relation to claims involving Albanian ‘blood feuds’. The essence of these claims is fear of revenge because a member of the applicant’s family killed a member of another family. As such, in cases of this kind it may be difficult to avoid the effect of s.91S of the Act.\(^{177}\)

In sum, care should be taken when categorising harm as acts of revenge. It is insufficient for decision makers to reject a claim for refugee status simply by classifying the alleged persecutory conduct as revenge. Decision makers will also be required to consider whether those acts of revenge are Convention related, bearing in mind the requirement of s.91R(1)(a) that the ‘essential and significant reason … for the persecution’ be found in one or more of the Convention grounds, and the boundaries of s.91S where the claim relates to membership of a family.

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\(^{175}\) *SHKB v MIMIA* [2004] FCA 545 (Selway J, 5 May 2004), not disturbed on appeal: *SHKB v MIMIA* [2005] FCAFC 11 (Cooper, Marshall and Mansfield JJ, 18 February 2005). See also *MIMA v Sarrazola* (1999) 95 FCR 517 where the Full Federal Court found that the Tribunal erred by finding that criminals who were motivated by a desire to recover money owing to them by the applicant’s deceased brother was inconsistent with a Convention related motive.

\(^{176}\) [2006] FMCA 1153 (Smith FM, 31 August 2006) at [17].

\(^{177}\) Under s.91S, a person who is pursued because he or she is a member of the family of a person who is targeted for a non-Convention reason (such as criminal pursuit for repayment of debts) does not fall within the grounds for persecution covered in the Convention. See Chapter 5 of the Guide for discussion of s.91S. In most of the Albanian ‘blood feud’ cases the Tribunal has found, without legal error, that the only Convention nexus is membership of a particular social group constituted by the applicant’s family and that s.91S of the Act applied to preclude the claim. See, for example *SDAR v MIMIA* (2002) 124 FCR 436, *SCAL v MIMIA* [2003] FCA 548 (von Doussa J, 5 June 2003), *STXB v MIMIA* (2004) 139 FCR 1, *SVXB v MIMIA* [2004] FCA 923 (Finn J, 14 July 2004), *MIMIA v SVBB* [2005] FCAFC 12 (Spender, Heerey and Lander JJ, 22 February 2005). Although there may be other ways of characterising the reason for the applicant’s fear apart from family membership (such as ‘persons subject to the traditional laws of the Kanun’, ‘persons subject to blood feuds’, ‘men in Albania’, or ‘Albanian women without male protection’), it may be difficult to establish the necessary elements of the Convention definition and s.91R; see for example, *SCAL v MIMIA* [2003] FCAFC 301 (Carr, Finn and Sundberg JJ, 18 December 2003), *STYB v MIMIA* [2004] FCA 705 (Selway J, 4 June 2004) upheld on appeal *STYB v MIMIA* [2004] FCAFC 295 (Cooper, Marshall and Mansfield JJ, 12 November 2004), *STXB v MIMIA* (2004) 139 FCR 1, and *SVJB v MIMIA* [2004] FCA 932 (Lander J, 19 July 2004).
Extortion

Similarly, the mere fact that conduct can be characterised as extortion does not mean that it cannot come with the Convention definition of persecution. Again, the motivation of the persecutor must be considered in determining the 'essential and significant reason' for the persecution.

In Ram v MIEA the applicant claimed that he was being extorted on the basis that he was a member of a particular social group - namely villagers who had gone abroad and returned with money, or other wealthy Sikhs. The Full Federal Court rejected this contention. Justice Burchett stated:

In the present case, quite apart from the difficulty of seeing wealthy Punjabis living in circumstances which make them vulnerable to extortion as a sufficient group, it is the greater difficulty of saying that the attacks feared by the appellant would be for reasons of his membership of that group which, it seems to me, he cannot overcome. Plainly, extortionists are not implementing a policy, they are simply extracting money from a suitable victim. Their forays are disinterestedly individual. ... [The appellant] does not fear persecution for reasons of membership of a particular social group, but extortion based on a perception of his personal wealth and aimed at him individually.\(^{178}\) (original emphasis)

In Chenafa v MIMA the Federal Court observed that:

There are a considerable number of authorities in this court to the effect that extortion of funds from victims is not necessarily evidence of persecution for a Convention reason, in view of the consideration that there may be many other grounds on which money is sought to be extracted in a criminal way from citizens of a country.\(^ {179} \)

However, this is not to say that the possession of wealth is incapable of forming the basis of a particular social group, or that extortion can never amount to persecution for a Convention reason.\(^{180}\) In Perampalam v MIMA, in considering the issue of extortion of Tamils by the LTTE, a majority of the Full Federal Court held that:

Extortion directed at those members of a particular race from whom something might be extorted cannot be excluded from the concept of persecution within the Convention, and Ram does not suggest it can. ... The words “persecuted for reasons of” look to the motives and attitudes of the persecutors ... and if the LTTE practices extortion, with violence and threats of violence, against Tamils, the government being unable to provide protection, because the LTTE holds that Tamils must be coerced into supporting it, the terms of the Convention are satisfied.\(^{181}\)

This judgment illustrates that, if a Convention purpose can be identified in conduct of an ordinarily criminal nature, then harm feared arising out of such conduct can come within the Convention. In Perampalam the majority (Moore J dissenting) found there may be a purposive approach in the LTTE’s criminal conduct arising out of the belief that Tamils

\(^{178}\) Ram v MIEA (1995) 57 FCR 565 at 569.

\(^{179}\) Chenafa v MIMA [1999] FCA 1432 (Tamberlin J, 13 October 1999) at [12].


\(^{181}\) Perampalam v MIMA (1999) 84 FCR 274, per Burchett and Lee JJ at 283 (Moore J, dissenting, held that it was open to the Tribunal to find that the LTTE was simply extorting money from a suitable victim and was not motivated by the applicant’s Tamil ethnicity). See also SZQII v MIAC [2012] FCA 402 (North J, 22 February 2012) at [22], where the Court held that the Reviewer’s finding that the motivation of a Sinhalese gang whom the appellant feared was to obtain money failed to address the claim that the appellant was a suitable target for extortion because he was a young Tamil male. See also Kathiravelu v MIMA [2000] FCA 1279 (Lindgren J, 11 September 2000) where the Court upheld the Tribunal’s finding that the applicant would not be targeted and persecuted by pro-government Tamil groups and police on the basis of her Tamil
should support the LTTE. In *Jayawardene v MIMA*, on the other hand, the Federal Court found that it was open to the Tribunal to find on the facts of that case that the applicants were being extorted, not for any Convention reason, but because they were comparatively well off.  

These cases, as well as the Full Federal Court decision of *Rajaratnam v MIMA*, highlight the potentially multi-facetted nature of extortion. The majority in that case stated:

> In a particular setting … extortion can be a multi-facetted phenomenon exhibiting elements both of personal interest and of Convention-related persecutory conduct. For this reason the correct character to be attributed to extensive conduct practised upon an applicant for refugee status is not to be determined as of course by the application of the simple dichotomy: "Was the perpetrator's interest in the extorted personal or was it Convention related?" In a given instance the formation of the extensive relationship and actions taken within it can quite properly be said to be motivated by personal interest on the perpetrator's part. But they may also be Convention-related. Accordingly any inquiry concerning causation arising in an extortion case must allow for the possibility that the extensive activity has this dual character.

The existence of a Convention related purpose is a factual matter for the decision-maker to determine having regard to the particular circumstances of each case. While the cases referred to above were decided before the introduction of the 'essential and significant reason' requirement in s.91R(1)(a), they still provide useful guidance in relation to the issue of motivation for persecution. The Full Court's decision in *Rajaratnam* demonstrates the importance of making clear findings on this issue, bearing in mind that extortion may arise from multiple motivations. A finding that the motivation for extortion is personal will not necessarily exhaust an inquiry into whether there is the requisite nexus between the extortion feared and a Convention ground.

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182 *Jayawardene v MIMA* [1999] FCA 1577 (Goldberg J, 12 November 1999) at [36]-[37]. See also *Santhikumar v MIMA* [1999] FCA 1777 (Einfield, Lindgren and Tamberlin JJ, 25 December 1999) and *SZROR v MIAC* [2012] FMCA 888 (Driver FM, 16 November 2012) at [33], in which the Tribunal was found to have correctly understood and addressed a claim that an extortion threat was made because of the perceived wealth of the applicant's family and not because of any other Convention related attribute.

183 *Rajaratnam v MIMA* [2000] FCA 1111 (Moore, Finn and Dowsett JJ, 10 August 2000) at [48]. Justice Moore also acknowledged that the existence of personal or business attributes of the victim did not remove the possibility that other Convention-related issues might be factors which influenced the conduct or motivation of those engaging in extortion (at [10]). See also *SZLAN v MIAC* (2008) 171 FCR 145 at [79];[80]; and *SZMVK v MIAC* [2009] FMCA 304 (Raphael FM, 14 April 2009) at [12]-[13].

184 In *SZQSX v MIAC* [2012] FMCA 210 (Raphael FM, 29 February 2012) (upheld on appeal: *SZQXS v MIAC* [2012] FCA 616 (Cowdroy J, 15 June 2012)) the Court confirmed at [13] that, where a decision-maker has turned its mind to the possibility of persecutory intent, but finds upon sufficient evidence that the extortion lacked a persecutory element, that is a factual finding for the decision-maker.

185 Examples of other cases concerning this question include *Ahmed v MIMA* [2000] FCA 1571 (Matthews J, 8 November 2000), where the Court found that the Tribunal erred by treating its affirmative finding that a particular clan in Somalia were victims of extortion as denoting that there was no Convention reason for harming them. See also *MIAC v MZYRI* [2012] FCA 1107 (Jagot J, 16 October 2012) in which it was claimed that local villagers had killed the claimant's father and taken his land, which continued to be occupied by a local commander. The Court found that the Reviewer had operated on the basis of an impermissible dichotomy between the self-interested motives of the commander, and the underlying religious reasons motivating the villagers to continue to persecute the family and enable the oppressive conduct of the commander. However, see *DZACC v MIAC* [2012] FMCA 314 (Cameron FM, 20 April 2012) as an example of circumstances where it was open for the Reviewer to consider multiple motivations but conclude that the harm was motivated by a non-Convention reason. The claimant had alleged he would be persecuted by his girlfriend's family and the Reviewer found that although his religion and caste may be reasons that the family found him unsuitable, he was targeted because her family objected to the relationship. The Court held that the Reviewer had not applied a false dichotomy or failed to take into account multiple motivations and that the finding was open to make.

186 *Rajaratnam v MIMA* [2000] FCA 1111 (Moore, Finn and Dowsett JJ, 10 August 2000) per Dowsett and Finn JJ at [50]. Compare with *Ramirez v MIMA* [2000] FCA 1000 (Hill, Mathews and Lindgren JJ, 2 August 2000) at [38]-[43] in which the Full Federal Court found the Tribunal's finding that the ELN were 'motivated by profit' and their actions were 'criminal and not political in nature' precluded the conclusion that mere acts of resistance to the organisation's actions might be taken to
Harm resulting from exposing corruption

In certain circumstances, harm arising from the exposure of corruption can give rise to persecution for reasons of political opinion.

In *MIMA v Y* the Tribunal found that the applicant’s stance against criminal activity of police officers led to the harm which he suffered, and that stance was effectively the expression of a political opinion against corruption, a pervasive aspect of the Brazilian state. In holding that the Tribunal had approached the questions before it with a proper appreciation of the law to be applied, the Federal Court stated:

The Tribunal was seeking to determine whether Y would be looked upon merely as a campaigner against corruption who was at risk of retribution by individual corrupt officials, or whether corruption was so much a part of government and of the exercise of State power in Brazil that opposition to it could be regarded as opposition to authority as it was organised and operated in Brazil. The Tribunal concluded that the views and actions of Y would have been likely to be regarded as contrary to the best interests of the State and particularly of its Police Force. Supportive of this finding was the fact that complaints to appropriate authorities served not to activate an inquiry but to bring down harm upon Y and his wife. The coercive power of the authorities appeared to be exercised against them, not against the corrupt officials.

Similar views were expressed by the Full Federal Court in *V v MIMA*, where Wilcox J held that an attitude of resistance to systematic corruption of, and criminality by, government officers can fall within the description ‘political opinion’, however this is a question of fact.

In the same case, Whittlam J stated that:

... a person who publicly campaigns against official corruption in a country, where such corruption is endemic and apparently tolerated by the government authorities, may well be thought to evince a “political opinion” within the meaning of that phrase in the Convention definition.

Hill J held that:

The exposure of corruption itself is an act, not a belief. However it can be the outward manifestation of a belief. That belief can be political, that is to say a person who is opposed to corruption may be prepared to expose it, even if so to do may bring consequences, although the act may be in disregard of those consequences. If the corruption is itself directed from the highest levels of society or endemic in the political fabric of society such that it either enjoys political protection, or the government of that society is unable to afford protection to those who campaign against it, the risk of persecution can be said to be for reasons of political opinion.

These views were echoed by the Federal Court in *Zheng v MIMA*:

... exposure of corruption can, in a wide range of circumstances, lead to political persecution. Thus, exposure of corruption in circumstances where it so permeates government as to become part of its very fabric can quite easily lead to a fear that the exposure, of itself, may be imputed to be an act of opposition manifest a contrary political opinion and consequently there was no error. See also *SZRAJ v MIAC* [2012] FMCA 484 (Driver FM, 7 June 2012) at [24]-[25] (upheld on appeal in *SZRAJ v MIAC* [2012] FCA 1237 (Lander J, 9 November 2012) and an application for special leave subsequently refused: *SZRAJ v MIAC* [2013] HCASL 30 (Kiefel and Gageler JJ, 13 March 2013), where the Court noted an apparent conflict between the Tribunal’s finding that the essential and significant reason for the extortion was not the applicant’s political affiliations with the Bangladesh National Party and its acceptance that a reason for the demands was that the applicant was not in political favour at the time. The Court found that the Tribunal’s reasoning was explicable on the basis that, while the applicant’s political affiliation was a factor in the extortion, the dominant factors were his apparent success as a businessman, and personal animosity.

to the machinery, authority or governance of the state. Likewise, refusal to participate in a corrupt state system can also be seen as an expression or manifestation of political opinion as the refusal to participate may be imputed by the authorities to be a challenge to the machinery, authority or governance of the state. Also, … exposure of systemic corruption may be an expression of “political opinion” even if the state is against corruption but is unable to protect the applicant from persecution on this account. In such a case, however, it may be difficult to establish that the exposure of corruption is a manifestation of a political act such as defiance of, or opposition to, the machinery, authority or governance of the state.\footnote{Zheng v MIMA [2000] FCA 670 (Merkel J, 23 August 2000) at [32]; Zheng v MIMA [2000] FCA 670 (Merkel J, 23 August 2000) at [33].}

The Court also emphasised that where individual, rather than systemic, corruption is exposed it is less likely that the act of exposure will be one in which a political opinion will be seen to have been manifested. This was so because the exposure would be more likely to be seen as the reporting of criminal conduct rather than as any form of opposition to, or defiance of, state authority or governance.\footnote{W68/01A v MIMA [2002] FCA 148 (Lee J, 25 February 2002) at [53]-[54]. Examples of other cases concerning persecution arising from exposure of corruption include MIMA v Z (unreported, Federal Court of Australia, Davies J, 15 May 1998) and C v MIMA (1999) 94 FCR 366 at 375. See also MZWAO v MIMA [2005] FMCA 407 (Phipps FM, 11 April 2005) where it was held that the Tribunal had erred in failing to consider whether the applicant’s refusal to participate in the corrupt practices of his superiors in the Ukraine’s State Price Control Inspectorate could be a manifestation of a political opinion.}

In \textit{W68/01A v MIMA} the Tribunal found that the corrupt behaviour exposed by the applicant did not permeate the government and concluded that his act would therefore not be regarded by the Iranian authorities as an expression of political opinion. In setting the Tribunal decision aside, the Federal Court reiterated the views set out in \textit{V v MIMA}:

… The question that had to be answered was whether the exposure of corruption of an organ of State could be perceived by those exercising broad powers as a challenge to State authority and as an act inspired by political opinion.

That, of course, was a question of fact involving consideration of the position of the State organ in the hierarchy of State power, the degree of immunity from scrutiny or control and the extent of the powers exercisable without accountability. The fact that harmful conduct by officers of a State authority, carried out in an attempt to silence the applicant, may be criminal, would not mean that such conduct could not, at the same time, be conduct designed to maintain the political “status quo”. As Wilcox J stated in \textit{V at [17]}, there is no dichotomy between criminal activity and persecution.\footnote{Zheng v MIMA [2000] FCA 670 (Merkel J, 23 August 2000) at [32].}

As in the judgments relating to revenge and extortion, these cases demonstrate the importance of recognising that harm in response to exposure of corruption may have multiple motivations. It will be for the decision-maker to consider whether an essential and significant reason for the feared harm is one or more of the Convention grounds.

\section*{LAND DISPOSSESSION}

A limited line of authority has developed that, at least in certain circumstances, forced and continued dispossession of land, where the dispossession itself occurred in the past, is capable of amounting to persecution. In \textit{SZALM v MIMA}, the Court commented that where land that provided a person’s livelihood is unjustly or unlawfully seized by a government or its agents (or the government approves of seizure by individuals using threats of violence), and the seizure was part of a pattern of seizures based upon a Convention characteristic, all the elements needed to satisfy the test of persecution under the Convention and s.91R are
present.\footnote{SZALM v MIMA [2004] FMCA 262 (Driver FM, 7 May 2004) at [17]-[21]. The Tribunal accepted that the applicants had been forcibly dispossessed of their farm land but found that they could relocate to Harare and had already done so. Although the Court observed that the act of dispossession probably effectively removed the risk of physical harm, the Tribunal erred in failing to consider whether the continuing dispossession was persecution. The Court observed that it was erroneous to treat the applicants as having withdrawn from a particular social group of landowners upon dispossession, as their move was not voluntary and this approach assumed that it was reasonable to expect them to accept their dispossession and live their lives differently (contra S395/2002 v MIMA (2003) 216 CLR 473).} SZALM was followed in \textit{S2012 of 2003 v MIAC}, in which the Court found error in the Tribunal’s assumption that a person forcibly dispossessed of their land must accept the victory of their persecutors and live their lives differently elsewhere.\footnote{S2012 of 2003 v MIAC [2008] FMCA 954 (Driver FM, 31 July 2008) at [22]-[23].} That the applicants were resigned to that course, having already relocated and changed employment, did not mean that the permanent deprivation of their land as a means of earning a livelihood was not a continuing act of persecution which the applicants could be expected to accept.

In \textit{SZSRQ v MIBP} however, the Court expressed doubt that the dispossession claims identified in \textit{SZALM} and \textit{S2012 of 2013} amounted to a valid claim for refugee status under the Convention, noting that the incorporation of the relocation principle within the Convention implied that a person who had been persecuted by dispossession of their land in one part of their country and fled to another part of their country which was able and willing to afford them protection could not, at that point, be a refugee within the meaning of the Convention.\footnote{SZSRQ v MIBP [2014] FCCA 2205 (Judge Manousaridis, 25 September 2014) in obiter at [70]-[74]. The Court commented that the harm a person feared brought about at the time and as a result of dispossession did not remain with the person in the new location.}

It remains a question of fact and degree for the decision-maker whether the forced and continued dispossession of land amounts to persecution within the meaning of the Act and Convention. As suggested in \textit{SZSRQ}, these kinds of claims might give rise to issues concerning the relocation principle, which is based on the requirement that an applicant be outside their country owing to a well-founded fear. It raises the question of whether an applicant is entitled to international protection in another country (which necessarily involves moving away from the land of which they have been dispossessed), in circumstances where they can move safely to another part of their country of origin.

\textbf{VULNERABILITY}

Being in a position of vulnerability or defencelessness will not of itself bring the harm feared within the Convention. In \textit{Omar Mohamud Mohamad v MIMA} the applicant contended that he was subjected to selective harassment in the context of the clan warfare in Somalia because he was a member of a weak clan.\footnote{Omar Mohamud Mohamad v MIMA [2000] FCA 109 (Whitlam, Mathews and Gyles JJ, 16 February 2000).} The Court upheld Emmett J’s reasoning at first instance\footnote{Omar Mohamud Mohamad v MIMA [1999] FCA 688 (Emmett J, 19 May 1999).} that persecution of small or weak groups was not, of itself, persecution for a Convention reason. Emmett J had stated:

Harm arising out of such a war may be disproportionately directed to those unable to defend themselves, whether they be individuals or smaller weak groups. A defenceless person in such circumstances,
however, is not at risk by reason of membership of such a group but simply because he or she occupies the territory or has the resource which is sought by the persecutors. The fact that such a person is defenceless to resist the claim by the more powerful group and is unable to defend it does not render the conflict that might arise conflict for a Convention reason. It is a most unfortunate circumstance of human life that that be so. However, I do not consider that persecution of weak people in order to obtain what they have, because it is easier to recover what they have from them than from a stronger group, is persecution for a Convention reason.\footnote{Omar Mohamud Mohamad \textit{v} MIMA [1999] FCA 688 (Emmett J, 19 May 1999) at [31].}

In \textit{MIMIA \textit{v} VFAY} the Tribunal acknowledged that the young applicant could face danger if he were to return to Afghanistan and that he was particularly vulnerable because of his age but found that there was no longer any real chance that he would face persecution by the Taliban.\footnote{\textit{MIMIA \textit{v} VFAY} [2003] FCAFC 191 (French, Sackville and Hely JJ, 22 August 2003).} It found that even if children or unaccompanied young people could be said to be particular social groups, the difficulty he would encounter would not be for a Convention reason but ‘because of his youth and inexperience and so limited capacity to manage in a difficult environment and the generalised insecurity and hardship which prevails in his country’. In setting aside the decision of the Federal Magistrate,\footnote{VFAY \textit{v} MIMIA [2003] FMCA 35 (Driver FM, 27 March 2003).} the Full Federal Court held that the Tribunal correctly appreciated the questions that it had to ask. While the Tribunal recognised that, as an unaccompanied child in Afghanistan, VFAY would be ‘vulnerable’ to harm, its reasons showed that what it had in mind was that certain groups, such as children, the sick and the elderly, would be less able to cope with the ‘generalised insecurity and hardship’. The Court stated that the fact that the general conditions in Afghanistan might have a differential impact on some groups does not show that the members of those groups will be subject to persecution because of their membership of a particular social group.\footnote{\textit{MIMIA \textit{v} VFAY} [2003] FCAFC 191 (French, Sackville and Hely JJ, 22 August 2003) at [60].}

Nevertheless, the general proposition that differential impact of generally harsh conditions on some groups does not show that the members of those groups will be subject to persecution because of their membership of a particular social group needs to be treated with some care, and should not be taken to mean that differential impact might not point to persecution. For example, as the High Court held in \textit{Chen Shi Hai \textit{v} MIMA}, enforcement of a general law which targets or impacts differently upon a particular class or group (such as ‘black children’ as distinct from children generally) and thus operates discriminatorily may constitute persecution.\footnote{For further discussion of differential impact see Chapter 4 of this Guide and the discussion above under ‘General laws that impact adversely upon a particular group’ and ‘Conscription laws’.}