



**Australian Government**  
**Refugee Review Tribunal**

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**Country Advice**  
**Pakistan**

Pakistan – PAK40523 – Aman Committees  
– Taliban  
25 June 2012

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RRT File No  
Member  
Date of Request  
File Path  
Country adviser



**Background**



**Short Answer**

- 1. Please advise if country information indicates Taliban pursues people who did join Aman committees in their local villages to try to protect their community?**

Sources consulted indicate that peace committees, Aman committees or lashkars and anti-Taliban lashkars or militias have had defence and security roles in villages and have sustained attacks from Taliban or other militants. Information located indicates that the Taliban in Pakistan (Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan or TTP) can draw upon significant resources for use against those they determine to have opposed them, and have targeted those who join local village defence organisations.

- 2. Please advise if the Taliban has a different attitude to people who are members of the current defence committees in the local villages which are similar but supervised by the army?**

Information consulted indicates that tribal militias in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) Province “continued to be systematically targeted” by the Taliban. Sources consulted have not differentiated between village defence committees, tribal lashkars, village anti-Taliban militia, members of Aman lashkars or the peace army, but generally indicate that these groups are targeted by the Taliban. With regard to the [redacted] Swat in KPK, the security situation appears to have become less stable in 2011. Security forces are

clearly being targeted by militants, leading to a more than threefold increase in deaths of security forces. Suicide attacks in the province killed 411 people during 2011, with an increase in bomb attacks to 198. The district of Swat recorded 16 terrorist attacks in 2011. Village defence committees or anti-Taliban lashkars set up to protect communities from attacks by militants, are operating in this challenging security environment, with a lack of sustained practical support from government authorities. Members of village defence committees have been targeted for retributive attacks by the Taliban not only while they were on duty, but also while off duty in their own houses and mosques.

**3. Please advise if the attitude of the Taliban has a particular rigorous approach to people who were members on the Aman committees in the KPK province?**

A number of sources consulted indicate that the Taliban attack and target members of village defence committees, anti-Taliban militias, tribal lashkars and members of Aman or peace committees. The reports consulted did not differentiate between members of these various defence committees, anti-Taliban militias and Aman committees. The response to Question 2 above indicates the security environment in which village defence is carried out in KPK, the attitude of the Taliban to those who oppose it and instances in recent years when members of village defence lashkars or militias have been targeted by militants for attack.



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**1. Please advise if country information indicates Taliban pursues people who did join Aman committees in their local villages to try to protect their community?**

Sources consulted indicate that peace committees, Aman committees or lashkars and anti-Taliban lashkars or militias have had defence and security roles in villages and have sustained attacks from Taliban or other militants. Information located indicates that the Taliban in Pakistan (Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan or TTP) can draw upon significant resources for use against those they determine to have opposed them, and have targeted those who join local village defence organisations.

In January 2012 the *Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting*<sup>1</sup> reported on the Taliban in ██████████ Swat in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) Province.<sup>2</sup> The report quoted a spokesman for the TTP Swat chapter, who said that the Taliban are in Pakistan and can attack anywhere in Pakistan.<sup>3</sup> The military command in Pakistan claim however that “the region has been cleared of Taliban militants and their network destroyed”.<sup>4</sup> While leader of the TTP Swat chapter Maulana Fazlullah has said that he will return to wage war in Pakistan, tribal lashkars or militias and peace committees have been formed in villages in Swat, and actively conduct regular village patrols. The report states that members of lashkars are “the prime targets of Taliban militants”:

In Oct. 2011, Fazlullah vowed to return to Pakistan and wage a new war. But most people who live in Swat believe this would be strongly resisted. They have formed tribal *lashkars* (militias) and peace committees in both lower and upper Swat and regularly monitor their villages.

But it seems there is no end to violence. The region is still in the grip of fear and uncertainty.

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<sup>1</sup> The *Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting* describes itself as an “an innovative award-winning non-profit journalism organization dedicated to supporting the independent international journalism that U.S. media organizations are increasingly less able to undertake. The Center focuses on under-reported topics, promoting high-quality international reporting and creating platforms that reach broad and diverse audiences”. Source: Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting, < <http://pulitzercenter.org/about-us> > Accessed 20 June 2012.

<sup>2</sup> A map of the North West Frontier Province, now known as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) Province, at the end of the response to this question provides a diagram of the districts which make up Malakand Division in that province, indicating that Chitral, Upper Dir, Lower Dir, Shangla, Buner, Malakand P.A Districts and Swat, which is surrounded by the other districts, constitutes Malakand Division in the north of the province.

<sup>3</sup> Buner S 2012, Pakistan’s Swat Valley: Taliban Gone But Peace Remains Elusive, *Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting*, < <http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/pakistan-swat-valley-taliban-fazlullah-afghanistan-border-military> > Accessed 20 June 2012, <Attachment>; also CISNET Pakistan <CX282250>.

<sup>4</sup> Buner S 2012, Pakistan’s Swat Valley: Taliban Gone But Peace Remains Elusive, *Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting*, < <http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/pakistan-swat-valley-taliban-fazlullah-afghanistan-border-military> > Accessed 20 June 2012, <Attachment>.

Over the past year more than 100 security personnel and civilians were killed in militants' attacks in the Dir and Chitral districts, close to the Pak-Afghan border. Members of the lashkars are the prime targets of Taliban militants.<sup>5</sup>

TTP Swat claimed responsibility for an attack on a peace committee member in Swat in November 2011:

On Nov. 11, terrorists attacked Karim ul Hadi, a member of the peace committee in the Kabal area of Swat, with a hand grenade that seriously injured him and two others. The incident happened in Kanju Township, a wealthy area that houses government and NGO offices. TTP Swat has accepted responsibility for the attack.

The TTP co-ordinate with other groups to achieve their aims:

All of this demonstrates that Fazlullah has extended his network to other parts of the province where his militants coordinate with other militant organizations and criminal groups to pursue their violent agenda.<sup>6</sup>

The lashkars and peace committees were formed after the military action against the Taliban to improve security, however reports indicate that generally they have not received sustained practical support from the government, leaving them inadequately resourced to repulse attacks from well-armed and trained militants. There are claims that participation in these units puts civilians 'into direct confrontation with the militants':

Immediately after the end of the military action, senior military and civilian officials encouraged people to form lashkars and peace committees at all levels to halt the re-emergence of the Taliban. The security establishment failed to realize that these lashkars would need weapons and logistic support on regular basis, which they are not getting. Instead, locals were asked to surrender their weapons to the security agencies to ensure peace in the region.

Zia ud Din Yousafzai, spokesman of the Swat Peace Council, says militants are equipped with the latest weapons and explosives and that they are still in the surrounding areas.

"People have rendered numerous sacrifices and their socio-cultural and economic fabric is completely destroyed. This is the responsibility of the military, police and intelligence agencies to ensure peace and stability in the war-torn valley. Forcing civilians to perform security duties will further endanger their lives and will bring them into direct confrontation with the militants who are active in the border region right from Swat to North Waziristan Agency," he said.

The Pakistan army rejects the claim that people are forced to perform security duties in their villages, noting that army units are deployed in Chitral and Dir to block Taliban re-entry into the valley.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Buner S 2012, Pakistan's Swat Valley: Taliban Gone But Peace Remains Elusive, *Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting*, < <http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/pakistan-swat-valley-taliban-fazlullah-afghanistan-border-military> > Accessed 20 June 2012, <Attachment> .

<sup>6</sup> Buner S 2012, Pakistan's Swat Valley: Taliban Gone But Peace Remains Elusive, *Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting*, < <http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/pakistan-swat-valley-taliban-fazlullah-afghanistan-border-military> > Accessed 20 June 2012, <Attachment> .

<sup>7</sup> Buner S 2012, Pakistan's Swat Valley: Taliban Gone But Peace Remains Elusive, *Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting*, < <http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/pakistan-swat-valley-taliban-fazlullah-afghanistan-border-military> > Accessed 20 June 2012, <Attachment> .

Sources consulted did not refer to the targeting of Aman Committees in Swat, however a report in the *Long War Journal* in December 2011 details the targeting of the leader of an anti-Taliban militia, the Aman Lashkar or Peace Army, after the militia had helped the Pakistani army clear Taliban from Arakzai and the Khyber Agency in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The commander of another Aman Lashkar was killed a fortnight earlier, also after targeting the Taliban. While this information refers to actions in FATA rather than Swat in KPK Province, it indicates the role of peace committees and Aman lashkars in the community, and shows that they have been targeted by the Taliban, including through suicide attacks:

A leader of an anti-Taliban militia and head of the Darband Peace Committee,\* Haji Hashim (Zaman) Khan, was killed in a roadside blast as he and his two colleagues were refueling their vehicle in the restive city of Hangu, officials reported yesterday. Haji Hashim led a faction of the 20,000-strong anti-Taliban lashkar (militia), the Aman Lashkar ("Peace Army"), which fiercely opposed the presence of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Lashkar-e-Islam in lower Arakzai and the Khyber Agency. In April, Hashim Khan and his militia helped Pakistani security forces clear most of lower Arakzai.

[...] Taliban fighters in Arakzai are key suspects in the attack.

Haji Hashim Khan's death is the second assassination of an Aman Lashkar commander by militants within the past two weeks. On Nov. 17, a roadside bomb killed Commander Hassan Khel, the Aman Lashkar leader of Kokkikhel and Hassan Khel, as he and his family traveled to Peshawar from the Tirah Valley in Khyber. A few days before, on Nov. 10, clashes between the Aman Lashkar and Lashkar-e-Islam militants left four militiamen dead in the Droadda area of the Bara tehsil in Khyber Agency. And earlier this year, militants conducted a series of high-profile suicide attacks against numerous local lashkars in Bajaur, Dir, and Khyber.<sup>8</sup>

While the government theoretically supports the use of local lashkars in protecting communities from militants, a lack of ongoing practical government support has led to significant losses, such that one local peace committee in Hangu<sup>9</sup> disbanded. :

The Pakistani government has publicly voiced support for the raising of local tribal lashkars as bulwarks against Taliban expansion throughout the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The Peshawar Corps Commander, Lieutenant General Asif Yasin Malik, told reporters in October that the Aman Lashkars "have played a commendable role in maintaining peace and normalcy in some parts of the restive tribal regions," and further called upon the militiamen to "stand united against the Frankenstein of militancy."

Over the past few years, and with limited support from the government, tribes have organised lashkars in Bajaur, Peshawar, Dir, Buner, Lakki Marwat, Khyber Agency, and other areas. But some lashkar commanders say a lack of government resources and support has led to monumental strategic losses. One local peace committee in Hangu recently disbanded after taking numerous casualties, and blamed Pakistani forces for failing to provide promised arms and ammunition.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Long War Journal 2011, *Anti-Taliban tribal leader killed in northwest Pakistan*, 2 December, [http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/12/antitaliban\\_tribal.php?utm\\_source=feedburner&utm\\_medium=feed&utm\\_campaign=Feed%3A+LongWarJournalSiteWide+%28The+Long+War+Journal+%28Site-Wide%29%29&utm\\_content=Google+Reader](http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/12/antitaliban_tribal.php?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+LongWarJournalSiteWide+%28The+Long+War+Journal+%28Site-Wide%29%29&utm_content=Google+Reader), accessed on 6 December, 2011, CISNET Pakistan <CX277846>.

<sup>9</sup> The map at the end of the response to this question shows that Hangu District is part of Kohat Division, also in KPK Province.

<sup>10</sup> Long War Journal 2011, *Anti-Taliban tribal leader killed in northwest Pakistan*, 2 December, [http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/12/antitaliban\\_tribal.php?utm\\_source=feedburner&utm\\_medium=feed](http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/12/antitaliban_tribal.php?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed)

Another source indicates that lashkars have had 'mixed results' in combatting militancy, as for example in Khyber agency some initial success was achieved as militants went into hiding, but a lack of coordination with the government and inadequate support left them unable to provide defence against sustained attacks by militants.<sup>11</sup>

A January 2012 report in *Dawn* noted that a meeting of the TTP and the Afghan Taliban on 31 December 2011 which had been formed in part to 'resolve differences among various militant factions' informed all Taliban fighters to 'desist from killing and kidnapping for ransom innocent people and cooperate with this committee in curbing crimes'.<sup>12</sup>

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
[&utm\\_campaign=Feed%3A+LongWarJournalSiteWide+%28The+Long+War+Journal+%28Site-Wide%29%29&utm\\_content=Google+Reader](#), accessed on 6 December, 2011, CISNET Pakistan <CX277846>.

<sup>11</sup> Lamb R D and Hameed S 2012, Subnational Governance, Service Delivery, and Militancy in Pakistan, *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, June, p.36, CISNET Library <23255>.

<sup>12</sup> Mehsud, S 2012, 'Taliban Forces Regroup to Fight US Forces', *DAWN*, 3 January <<http://dawn.com/2012/01/03/al-qaida-taliban-ask-pakistani-militants-for-help>> Accessed 21 May 2012 <Attachment>.

# NORTH WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE

Khyber Gateway - Khyber.ORG



1995 Survey of Pakistan

Source: Khyber.org, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Divisional Map,

<<http://www.khyber.org/images/maps/nwfpdiv.jpg>> Accessed 22 June 2012, <Attachment>.

2. Please advise if the Taliban has a different attitude to people who are members of the current defence committees in the local villages which are similar but supervised by the army?

Information consulted indicates that tribal militias in KPK “continued to be systematically targeted” by the Taliban. Sources consulted have not differentiated between village defence committees, tribal lashkars, village anti-Taliban militia, members of Aman lashkars or the peace army, but generally indicate that these groups are targeted by the Taliban. With regard to ██████████ Swat in KPK, the security situation appears to have become less stable in 2011. Security forces are clearly being targeted by militants, leading to a more than threefold increase in deaths of security forces. Suicide attacks in the province killed 411 people during 2011, with an increase in bomb attacks to 198. The district of Swat recorded 16 terrorist attacks in 2011. Village defence committees or anti-Taliban lashkars set up to protect communities from attacks by militants, are operating in this challenging security environment, with a lack of sustained practical support from government authorities. Members of village defence committees have been targeted for retributive attacks by the Taliban not only while they were on duty, but also while off duty in their own houses and mosques.

In an assessment of KPK published in 2012, the *South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP)*<sup>13</sup> reported that in 2011, tribal militias “continued to be systematically targeted” by the Taliban:

Tribal militia and elders, who have been supporting the Government since 2008, continued to be systematically targeted by the terrorists. At least 12 tribal elders were killed in 2011, though the number fell from 40 in 2010, while an unspecified number of tribal militia members were also targeted. In the worst single attack on tribal militia, 43 persons were killed and another 52 sustained injuries, in the March 9 incident in Adezai village. Immediately after attack, on March 10, 2011, Haji Dilawar Khan, the leader of the *Qaumi Lashkar*, warned that the *Lashkar* would end cooperation with the authorities if they were not provided adequate material and financial support by the Government ‘within two days’. He stated, further, that the Government’s apathy had been demonstrated when KP Minister for Local Government and Rural Development, Bashir Ahmad Bilour, had reportedly told the media that the militia were no longer useful. Earlier, on March 3, 2011, Haji Khan had argued that the Government was pursuing “an ambiguous policy” towards the TTP, and accused local legislators of supporting the terrorist formation. Again on August 18, 2011, he claimed that extremists would be further strengthened in the suburban areas of Peshawar, because the Government had intentionally stopped supporting the *Lashkar* volunteers, leaving them at the mercy of the terrorists.<sup>14</sup>

*Defence committees in local villages*

An article in Pakistan’s *The News* in November 2010 refers to posters put up by militants in Mingora in Swat, warning members of the village defence committee to quit their positions or face the consequences:

Mingora: a local defence committee here Tuesday [9 November] asked the members of a grand jirga [council of elders] to promptly inform it about the presence of militants in their respective areas.

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<sup>13</sup> The South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) is ‘the largest website on terrorism and low intensity warfare in South Asia’, produced by the Institute for Conflict Management, based in New Delhi. Source: [http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/icmp/support\\_us.htm](http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/icmp/support_us.htm) Accessed 25 June 2012.

<sup>14</sup> South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) 2012, *Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assessment – 2012*, <<http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/nwfp/index.html>> Accessed 19 June 2012, <Attachment>.



The defence committee in Bara Bandai Union Council of Kabal tehsil [sub-district] had convened the jirga to take stock of the situation arising out of display of threatening posters by militants.

Addressing the jirga, Idrees Khan, head of the peace body, said they would not be cowed down by threats of the militants. He said the militants had no power to confront the forces and they have resorted to pasting posters at night to stir up tension among the locals.

The militants had pasted posters in Bara Bandai to warn the members of village defence committee to quit the body or get ready for the consequences. In a befitting reply, the defence committee also pasted posters against the militants, asking them to surrender or else force would be used against them.<sup>15</sup>

The *Associated Press of Pakistan* reported in 2009 that members of a defence committee conducted a joint search operation with security forces in Mora in October 2009, killing several terrorists.<sup>16</sup> The same report stated that search and clearance operations were also taking place in Swat and Malakand.<sup>17</sup>

In November 2008 the *Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)* reported that ‘an increasing number’ of “anti-Taliban lashkars” in tribal and settled areas were seen as the best way of stopping militants. Attacks on those who involved in forming the anti-Taliban lashkars were continuing:

The increasing number of anti-Taliban lashkars of volunteers in the tribal areas as well as settled districts of the Frontier province was no doubt a ray of hope for the people and the government, who believed it the most effective way to curb militancy. But the successive attacks on anti-Taliban jirgas, kidnappings and murders of some effective tribal elders, who played pivotal role in formation of the lashkars, are not only rendering the lashkars ineffective, but also posing the threat of pushing the militancy-hit regions to a looming civil war. The government has not been able to fully support the lashkars despite its claims of tactfully dealing the menace of militancy by extending support to the anti-Taliban lashkars. There is no arrangement for proper training of the volunteers, who join the squads so that they could be able to combat the well-trained militants.<sup>18</sup>

Tribal lashkars have been targeted by the Taliban for attack in Swat as well as other areas, in particular suicide attacks against those in charge of the lashkars. The excerpt below details two such attacks, in Bajaur and Orakzai Agencies in FATA. A third incident in Bajaur Agency involved kidnapping and killing II leaders of a tribal lashkar. These incidents are seen as retribution by the Taliban for earlier successes by the lashkars against the militants:

The raising of tribal lashkars have invited the wrath of the militants, who seem confused amid the prolonged military operation in Swat, Bajaur Agency, semi-tribal region of Darra Adamkhel and other parts of the tribal belt, and some settled districts. Finding no way out, the militants, who have been on the run due to the excessive bombardment by jetfighters and gunship helicopters, are hitting the pro-government tribal elders and peace jirgas.

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<sup>15</sup> The News, Pakistan 2010, *Pakistan's Swat peace body says will not be "cowed down" by militants' threats*, 11 November, BBC Monitoring Service, CISNET Pakistan <[CX253199](#)>.

<sup>16</sup> Associated Press of Pakistan (APP) 2009, *Three terrorists killed in northwest Pakistan - military*, 4 October, BBC Monitoring Service, CISNET Pakistan <[CX234448](#)>.

<sup>17</sup> Associated Press of Pakistan (APP) 2009, *Three terrorists killed in northwest Pakistan - military*, 4 October, BBC Monitoring Service, CISNET Pakistan <[CX234448](#)>.

<sup>18</sup> Ali Y 2008, *Tribal Lashkars need Govt. Support*, *Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)*, <<http://san-pips.com/PIPS-R&D-%20Files/Reports/R&D-Report-Article33/R&am p:D-Report-A33-D.asp>>, accessed on 21 January, 2009, CISNET Pakistan <[CX218782](#)>.

One such attack they made on an anti-Taliban jirga in Salarzai tehsil of Bajaur Agency on November 6 that killed more than 20 tribal elders including the head of the tribal Lashkar in the same area, Malik Fazal Karim Baro, and about 100 tribesmen got injured. Karim Baro, who was a retired major of Bajaur Levies, is considered to be the leading figure who initiated formation of anti-Taliban squad in Bajaur Agency. It was in the afternoon, when the jirga of hundreds of tribal elders was in progress that a teenaged tribal boy came to the venue in a car. After getting down of the car, he went straight to the middle of the jirga and squatted near Fazal Karim. Soon he blew himself up that resulted in the huge human loss. The militant group in Salarzai area - Karwan-e-Nimatullah - claimed responsibility for the attack.

A similar attack had been made on another anti-militant jirga in Adezai area of Orakzai tribal agency wherein more than 110 tribal elders had been killed. While, the militants in Chamarkand tehsil of Bajaur Agency had kidnapped 11 elders of a tribal lashkar a few weeks ago of which eight were beheaded and thrown away on the main road.

These incidents are a clear message to the tribal people from Taliban to stay away from forming lashkars against them. The lashkars in the initial days had recorded great successes against the militants, as only in Bajaur they had demolished the houses of several militant commanders including those of Maulana Faqir Mohammad, the central deputy head of Baitullah-Mehsud-led banned Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan [TTP], Maulvi Faqir Mohammad, the central spokesman for the banned organization, Haji Nimatullah and others.

The reason behind this was that the Taliban led by Maulvi Faqir were, and are, reluctant in getting involved in clashes with their fellow tribesmen. But some splinter groups of the TTP like the one led by Nimatullah in Salarzai and some other in Charmang and Mamond areas of Bajaur Agency, rose up against them.<sup>19</sup>

Anti-Taliban Peace Committees continued to be targeted in 2011, including at least 32 attacks in KPK. Members of the peace militias were attacked not only during their patrols, but also when they were off-duty in their own houses, as well as during jirgas organised by the peace militias:

Militants not only attacked members of these peace militias during their patrol hours but also targeted them in their houses, in mosques during worship times, in funeral prayers of their relatives as well as during jirgas convened by these peace militias.<sup>20</sup>

Government support of anti-Taliban lashkars or peace committee volunteers has waned, and some community support has also waned in circumstances where the peace committees have been accused of misappropriating compensation money:

The government's policy of preferring community policing against militant networks in most militancy hit areas of KP and FATA is becoming increasingly problematic as waning government support to anti-Taliban lashkars is leading to fissures both within these tribal militias and between the lashkars and local communities. The lashkars have been targeted by militants who consider the move of local people against them as an act of defiance. Peace committee volunteers increasingly feel disenchanting due to a lackluster attitude of the government in providing funds and ammunition to them. The situation is further compounded by divisions among villagers / tribesmen and lashkars over compensation money. The compensation grants to heirs of people killed in terrorist attacks are mostly distributed through these lashkars. Families of victims of terrorism in various areas have accused the lashkars of misappropriating the compensation money given to them by the government.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Ali Y 2008, Tribal Lashkars need Govt. Support, *Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)*, <<http://san-pips.com/PIPS-R&D-%20Files/Reports/R&D-Report-Article33/R&D-Report-A33-D.asp>>, accessed on 21 January, 2009, CISNET Pakistan <CX218782>.

<sup>20</sup> PIPS 2012, *Pakistan Security Report 2011*, pp 10-11, Section 3.1.2, MRT-RRT Library General Papers 35951.

### *Security in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province*

In a 2012 report on KPK, the *South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP)* noted that 511 civilians were killed in the province in 2011, while 331 Security Forces (SF) were killed, a more than threefold increase over the previous year's figure. The increase in deaths of Security Forces was the result of offensives by militants, leading to the conclusion that militants have more control there than government authorities:

[...] According to partial data compiled by the *South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP)*, a total of 1,206 persons, including 511 civilians, 364 militants and 331 SF [Security Forces] personnel, were killed in 242 incidents of killing recorded in 2011, marginally down from 1,212 persons, including 607 civilians, 509 militants and 96 SF personnel killed in 213 such incidents in 2010. Though civilian killings in the Province declined by 18.78 per cent, they remained much higher than the civilian toll in FATA (488), often dubbed the 'most dangerous place on earth'. The 39.83 per cent drop in terrorist fatalities was, moreover, in conformity with the broad trend in the rest of Pakistan, demonstrating a growing reluctance among Pakistani SFs to engage the extremists on the ground. Worryingly, however, fatalities among SFs have increased almost three-and-a-half fold, an overwhelming proportion of these inflicted in suicide attacks and terrorist initiated engagements, rather than offensive operations by the SFs. The militants appear to have established an upper hand in the region in their fight against the state's forces.

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<sup>21</sup> PIPS 2012, *Pakistan Security Report 2011*, p. 31, Section 11.3.6, MRT-RRT Library General Papers 35951.

Fatalities in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: 2005- 2012<sup>22</sup>

| Years        | Civilians   | SFs         | Militants   | Total        |
|--------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|
| 2005         | 2           | 0           | 2           | 4            |
| 2006         | 60          | 13          | 27          | 100          |
| 2007         | 393         | 221         | 372         | 986          |
| 2008         | 868         | 255         | 1078        | 2201         |
| 2009         | 1229        | 471         | 3797        | 5497         |
| 2010         | 607         | 96          | 509         | 1212         |
| 2011         | 511         | 331         | 364         | 1206         |
| 2012*        | 25          | 10          | 17          | 52           |
| <b>Total</b> | <b>3695</b> | <b>1397</b> | <b>6166</b> | <b>11258</b> |

Source of data in Table: SATP, \*Data till February 12, 2012<sup>23</sup>

According to SATP, suicide attacks in KPK killed 411 people in 2011, and the number of bomb blasts in the province increased from 137 in 2010 to 198 in 2011:

Suicide attacks remained rampant in the Province, with as many as 411 persons killed and 705 injured through 2011, in 23 such attacks. 26 suicide attacks were recorded in 2010, inflicting a total of 489 fatalities and injuring another 767. Meanwhile, the number of other bomb blasts in the Province increased from 137 in 2010 to 198 in 2011, though resultant fatalities fell from 611 to 554. In addition, the Bomb Disposal Squad (BDS) managed to foil several bomb blasts by recovering and diffusing the explosive devices. KP Additional Inspector General, BDS, Shafqat Malik had disclosed, on June 2, 2011, that at least 25 per cent of terror attempts had been prevented in Peshawar by diffusing bombs, suicide jackets, fuses and other explosive materials. He revealed, further, that the BDS had diffused five suicide jackets, two vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (IEDs), 63 timed devices, 25 remote-controlled IEDs, 105 grenade IEDs and 114 rocket IEDs, in the year, till that date.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>23</sup> South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) 2012, *Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assessment – 2012*, < <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/nwfp/index.html> > Accessed 19 June 2012, <Attachment>.

<sup>24</sup> South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) 2012, *Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assessment – 2012*, < <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/nwfp/index.html> > Accessed 19 June 2012, <Attachment>.

The Pakistan Security Report 2011 found that KPK was the third most volatile region in Pakistan in 2011, with 521 terrorist attacks which killed 820 people.<sup>25</sup> The Table below shows the frequency of terrorist attacks in the districts of KPK, with 16 attacks recorded in the district of Swat during the year:

**Table of Terrorist Attacks in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa in 2011**

| Districts         | Frequency  | Killed     | Injured     |
|-------------------|------------|------------|-------------|
| Hangu             | 45         | 127        | 221         |
| Swat              | 16         | 11         | 21          |
| Bannu             | 36         | 35         | 60          |
| Kohat             | 50         | 37         | 55          |
| Swabi             | 25         | 19         | 28          |
| Peshawar          | 149        | 201        | 587         |
| Shangla           | 2          | 3          | 1           |
| Charsadda         | 48         | 119        | 225         |
| Buner             | 1          | 2          | 0           |
| Mardan            | 30         | 50         | 103         |
| Nowshera          | 36         | 56         | 142         |
| D.I. Khan         | 16         | 19         | 30          |
| Tank              | 12         | 10         | 10          |
| Lower Dir         | 12         | 92         | 117         |
| Upper Dir         | 10         | 7          | 5           |
| Lakki Marwat      | 14         | 7          | 31          |
| Battagram         | 1          | 9          | 26          |
| Mansehra          | 2          | 7          | 15          |
| Karak             | 3          | 9          | 3           |
| Chitral           | 1          | 0          | 0           |
| Malakand division | 1          | 0          | 0           |
| Kohistan          | 1          | 0          | 2           |
| Haripur           | 1          | 0          | 2           |
| <b>Total</b>      | <b>512</b> | <b>820</b> | <b>1684</b> |

Source: PIPS 2012, Pakistan Security Report 2011, Table 5, p 9, MRT-RRT Library General Papers 35951.<sup>26</sup>

### *Taliban in Pakistan*

One source described the Taliban organisation in Pakistan as 'incredibly fluid, yet very well co-ordinated'<sup>27</sup> and noted that the Taliban movement in Swat, which seemed to have a direction of its own prior to 2007, had later begun to coalesce with movements from other areas into 'a well-organised guerrilla movement' with 'an organisational depth all of its own'.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>25</sup> PIPS 2012, *Pakistan Security Report 2011*, p 9, Section 3, MRT-RRT Library General Papers 35951.

<sup>26</sup> PIPS 2012, *Pakistan Security Report 2011*, Table 5, p 9, MRT-RRT Library General Papers 35951

<sup>27</sup> Zaidi S M A 2009, 'The Taliban Organisation in Pakistan', *RUSI Journal*, October, Vol. 154 No.5, p.40, <Attachment>.

<sup>28</sup> Zaidi S M A 2009, 'The Taliban Organisation in Pakistan', *RUSI Journal*, October, Vol. 154 No.5, p.40, <Attachment>.

The Taliban in Pakistan (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan or TTP), which has been described as ‘a network of franchises’, enables a group who share ‘a marked degree of affinity with the Taliban ideology’ to draw upon the sizeable human and material resources of the Taliban in Pakistan in achieving their aims. The nature of the organisation indicates that there are significant resources available to the Taliban in Pakistan:

[...] the Pakistani Taliban maintain close liaison with their parent organisation and Al-Qa’ida and its affiliates. The organisational structure of the Pakistani Taliban is an illustrative example of its fluid nature. Traditionally, the Pakistani Taliban have never been an integral part of the larger Afghan Taliban organisation, and have tended to maintain a distinct identity, despite sharing ideological affiliations. The Pakistani enterprises can best be comprehended as a ‘network of franchises’. Small militant bands which have tended to spring up in the tribal areas of Pakistan ally themselves ideologically with the Afghan Taliban if they share a sufficient commonality of ideological and territorial interests, which include the establishment of a Pashtun homeland. The alliance is established in return for using the symbolism of the Taliban: the militants employ this franchise ‘branding’ to ‘market’ themselves, which also ensures Taliban support. In return, they have to follow the organisation’s strategic objectives. However, the Taliban organisation does not just accept any rag-tag group of guntoting militants as legitimate contenders for Taliban membership; the candidate group needs to display a marked degree of affinity with the Taliban ideology to qualify.

A group may range from ten to fifty dedicated fighters who share the same Talibanised ideology; they may prefer to give themselves a distinct identity by naming themselves (for example Karvaan-e-Naimatullah) or may simply be known as *maqami* (local) Taliban by the populace. These groups tend to have their own locally generated human intelligence networks, alongside varying degrees of logistical capability. They may co-ordinate with other neighbouring groups, which sequentially form a logistical backup chain for these Taliban. It should be remembered that these groups have the backing of the TTP’s vast infrastructure, and can call for reinforcements, suicide bombers or other human and material resource when required from the umbrella group. It should also be kept in mind that these commanders attain prominence in ‘a manner typical of Pashtun tribal history — rise of charismatic persons within a social network who are able to exercise some clout and then get affiliated with the Taliban for further advancement’.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Zaidi S M A 2009, ‘The Taliban Organisation in Pakistan’, *RUSI Journal*, October, Vol. 154 No.5, p.41, <Attachment>.

**3. Please advise if the attitude of the Taliban has a particular rigorous approach to people who were members on the Aman committees in the KPK province?**

A number of sources consulted indicate that the Taliban attack and target members of village defence committees, anti-Taliban militias, tribal lashkars and members of Aman or peace committees. The reports consulted did not differentiate between members of these various defence committees, anti-Taliban militias and Aman committees. The response to Question 2 above indicates the security environment in which village defence is carried out in KPK, the attitude of the Taliban to those who oppose it and instances in recent years when members of village defence lashkars or militias have been targeted by militants for attack.

Specific references to peace committees include the following: compensation money distributed by 'lashkars or peace committees' was referred to in a security report on Pakistan in 2011:

The government distributes compensation money mainly to lashkars or peace committees, which has given rise to complaints of embezzlement. Villagers in various areas accuse lashkars of misappropriating the compensation money given to them by the government. Such a state of affairs can lead to splits not only within lashkars but also outbreak of clashes between lashkars and villagers, and lead to a situation that the militants can exploit.<sup>30</sup>

A reference was also located to a member of a peace committee who was the victim of a target killing in the Tarrol area of Islamabad by local Taliban militants.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> PIPS 2012, *Pakistan Security Report 2011*, p. 26, Section 10.2.2, MRT-RRT Library General Papers 35951.

<sup>31</sup> PIPS 2012, *Pakistan Security Report 2011*, p 15, MRT-RRT Library General Papers 35951.

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